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1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) worldwide is large and 
growing annually. The total deal value of mergers and acquisitions in 2015 reached 
4.7 trillion USD, up by 42% compared to 2014 (OECD, 2016; ThomsonReuters, 
2017). Therefore the entire M&A sector is a major economic force creating media 
and academic interest. The increasing volatility on financial markets and the on-
going specialisation in services leads to a growing uncertainty of decisions 
regarding financial transactions. In many of these mergers the question of financial 
adequacy of the merger conditions and its “fairness” arises.  
The board of directors of a target company must ensure the financial fairness 
of a takeover because of its fiduciary duty to its shareholders. If the board does not 
ensure the adequacy of the offer, legal consequences might arise. Since a court 
ruling in January 1985, the so-called Smith vs. van Gorkom case, fairness opinions 
are a common instrument in nearly every M&A transaction in the US (Cain and 
Denis, 2012). The Delaware Supreme Court ruled in January 1985 against the 
directors of Trans Union Corporation and found them guilty of a lack of due 
diligence when the company was taken private in a leveraged buyout. The justice 
concluded that management has failed to obtain enough information on the 
adequacy of the offer and the company’s value before agreeing to sell it (Sweeney, 
1999). Jurisdiction implied that liability could have been avoided by obtaining a 
fairness opinion from anyone in a position to determine the corporation’s value. 
Since the Smith vs. Van Gorkom decision courts do generally accept fairness 
opinions obtained by target’s boards of directors as a primary source in the 
satisfaction of fiduciary duties in assessing the deal and recommending a proposed 
deal to the shareholders. Fairness opinions are consequently used by management 
as a tool to provide legal protection. 
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Due to the prominence of the ruling on the financial adequacy of a takeover 
bid for shareholders the quality of fairness opinions is of importance. Nevertheless, 
the inadequacy of fairness opinions has repeatedly been criticised in the last years, 
especially by members of the legal community (Prokop, 2013; Elson, 1992). Given 
the lack of standardisation and the huge creative leeway in business valuations, the 
verdict is proclaimed that the valuations in fairness opinions can be arbitrarily 
manipulated. With a false incentive structure and insufficient independence of the 
performing investment bank, the fairness opinion as an instrument for protection 
of the shareholders would therefore be useless (Davidoff, 2006; Bebchuk and 
Kahan, 1989). 
The problems of inadequacy with regards to the pricing precision emerge 
mainly from asymmetric information levels between management, the advisor and 
the shareholders. Depending on different factors, the differences in the information 
levels are smaller or bigger. The management team has the advantage of insider 
knowledge and normally being involved in the discussion of the terms of 
acquisition and has superior knowledge about the financial adequacy of the deal 
than shareholders, who normally only receive information from periodically issued 
and possibly biased financial reports of the company (Schmidt, 2016). Nonetheless, 
the investment bank creating the FO might as well have superior knowledge 
compared to the management. 
These asymmetric information levels lead to problems addressed in the 
principal-agent theory (PAT), which focuses on the relations and problems arising 
of a contractual agreement between persons or entities with different information 
levels (Schmidt, 2016; Coase, 1937).  
In relation to fairness opinions (FOs) the first principal agent problem (PAP) 
arises between the management (principal) and the investment bank (agent). The 
second PAP arises between management and the shareholder. The underlying 
problem is that the interests of the management might not be aligned to those of 
the shareholders, for example in management buyouts (Hall, 2005). These problems 
limit the quality of fairness opinions. 
Besides the prominence of FOs, research on fairness opinions is still rather 
limited. Bowers and Latham describe the level of research in 2004 as “the issues 
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related to fairness opinions have only recently begun to be examined in the 
financial literature” (p. 4).  Of course, afford is spent on researching the limitations 
of fairness opinions and their advantages and disadvantages since 2004, however, 
the field of fairness opinions offers still large potential for research. Empirical 
evidence in the finance literature is limited and existing results are mixed (Liu, 
2015). Therefore, the research in this dissertation is of explorative nature and 
variables cannot always be deducted by quantitative research. 
Classical M&A research offers an extensive list of variables that might 
potentially influence the precision of fairness opinions, but for a first empirical 
study a limitation on the information provided in a fairness opinion appears most 
promising. Based on the idea to lower information asymmetries, the reader of a 
fairness opinion should be able to understand the provided valuation range and 
draw conclusions on the valuation precision. Furthermore, the valuation models 
used in FOs offer still some space for tactical pricing by the advisor to manipulate 
the valuations (Schönefelder, 2007). Hence, understanding the factors that increase 
precision can help to identify possibly biased opinions, where the precision is 
expected to be lower and the elimination of information asymmetries likewise 
limited. Precision should be measured by the valuation range, under-
/overvaluation of the target and the accuracy of the fairness opinion. 
Additionally, overfitting of regression analysis is another argument why the 
variables should be derived from the functions of fairness opinions and the 
provided information. To avoid overfitting, 10 to 15 observations per predictor 
variable will allow good estimates, according to Peduzzi et al. (1995) and Green 
(1991). A deduction of variables from classical M&A research would lead to more 
than 50 variables from different aspects like planning, financial data, negotiation, 
due diligence, transition management structures, post-merger integration, 
leadership and trust, cultural integration, HR practices, control and monitoring 
(Weber et al., 2014). As the data sets at hand has 392 observations split into two 
nearly equal sub data sets of approximately 200 observations each and even only 
100 observations for some valuation models, a biased selection of variables would 
be needed, if all variables of M&A research are considered. In contrast, focussing 
on the information provided in the fairness opinion, an elimination of variables due 
to overfitting is not needed. 
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Therefore, the aim of the dissertation is to derive variables that influence the 
precision of fairness opinions based on the information provided in the fairness 
opinion and find out in how far the reader of a fairness opinion can draw 
conclusions from these variables on the precision of fairness opinions. For that 
purpose, a data set comprising all US-mergers between 2003 and 2013, which make 
use of FOs, is collected and analysed by the help of univariate and multiple 
regression analysis. The US market is chosen as it is the largest stock market in the 
world and information is best available as fairness opinions must be made public. 
Additionally, the US market is best researched in the current body of literature. 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER 
Existing literature provides limited insights to fairness opinions. The limited 
body of literature in relation to fairness opinions focuses so far on legal issues (e.g. 
Calomiris and Hitscherich, 2007; Davidoff, 2006), the aim of fairness opinions 
(Zimmermann, 2015), the usage rate of fairness opinions (e.g. Bowers and Latham, 
2004; Kisgen et al., 2009), usage rates of employed valuation models (e.g. Aders et 
al., 2012; Schönefelder, 2007), deal completion rates (Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008) 
and cumulative abnormal returns (e.g. Cain and Denis, 2012; Kisgen et al., 2009). 
None of the studies so far has focused on the valuation precision of fairness 
opinions and, hence, this dissertation is purposed to fill this research gap by 
answering the main objective. 
The term valuation precision comprises in this context three different 
dimensions of calculating the exactness of FOs. Valuation range as the first 
dimension is derived from the difference between the lowest and highest valuation 
mentioned in the fairness opinion. The second dimension, under-/overvaluation 
can be calculated from the paid price in relation to the average valuation stated in 
the fairness opinions and is of interest as previous research on cumulative 
abnormal returns has shown that fairness opinions of the target advisors show an 
undervaluation of the target, whereas the advisors of the acquirer arrive at an 
overvaluation of the target (Kisgen et al., 2009). The third dimension, valuation 
accuracy, makes use of the absolute percentage values of the under-/overvaluation 
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as neither of them is preferable. A precise valuation is preferred by all parties 
involved. A higher precision can be associated, if the valuation range is small and 
the valuation accuracy and under-/overvaluation near to a difference of zero 
percent. 
Fairness opinions deliver information on different variables and factors of a 
transaction with the aim to lower information asymmetries. Hence, a discussion of 
the different functions will outline the basic information that are carved out and 
delivered by FOs. Fulfilling the functions, FOs are supposed to lower information 
asymmetries and to be more precise. However, it must be kept in mind that 
company valuations are always to some extent subjective, as “the practice of 
valuation is an inexact art, not a precise science.” (Yee, 2005, p. 536). Furthermore, 
the writers of the FOs have to make assumptions with regards to the financial 
development of a company in the near future, which can never be completely 
exact.1 
In order to fulfil the main objective of this study, the following sub objectives 
are defined: 
 To extract variables from the discussion of the functions fairness 
opinions have to fulfil and the information they provide. 
 To discuss the principal-agent theory in relation to fairness opinions 
in order to gain associations of the variables on the precision. 
 To deduct the association to precision of deal specific variables from 
M&A research and fairness opinion specific variables from existing 
FO research. 
 To analyse the data for the US market between 2004-2013 with 
appropriate statistical models. 
These sub objectives lead furthermore to the following research questions: 
(1) Which information is provided by fairness opinions? 
(2) Which variables can be extracted from this information? 
                                                   
1 Graham (1973), p. 315 f.: „[…] the combination of precise formulas with highly 
imprecise assumptions can be used to establish, or rather justify, practically any value one 
wishes, however high, for a really outstanding issue.“ 
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(3) How are the variables expected to be associated to the precision based 
on the functions FOs have to fulfil? 
(4) How are the variables associated to precision based on the principal-
agent theory? 
(5) What association does the classical M&A research indicate for these 
variables? 
(6) What does existing research on FO indicate about the association to 
precision? 
(7) Does the use of certain valuation models influence the precision of 
fairness opinions? 
(8) What is the average valuation range? 
(9) What is the average valuation accuracy? 
 
Research questions 1-6 will be answered in the theoretical approach in 
chapters 2 and 3 and research questions 7-9 will be answered in the empirical part 
of this dissertation in chapter 4 and 5. 
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 1 gives an introduction to the topic of fairness opinions and discusses 
the current level of research.  The links between fairness opinions and the principal-
agent theory and M&A research are highlighted. It develops the relevant research 
questions and explains the aim of the thesis. It proceeds to describe the structure to 
give a roadmap for further examination and to point out why specific topics are 
discussed and how they fit into the overall picture to help answering the question 
of the factors influencing the precision of fairness opinions. 
Chapter 2 is intended to provide an overview of the essential conceptual, 
content wise and institutional foundations of fairness opinions in the USA. The 
chapter explains the different functions of fairness opinions with regards to the 
regulatory framework. In this chapter, an institutional overall picture of the 
fairness opinion is drawn, on which the work can be built up in the further course 
of events. Furthermore, the criticism on fairness opinions highlights principal-
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agent conflicts in fairness opinions. The principal-agent theory is used to explain 
the diverging interests of managers, shareholders and investment banks fairness 
opinions are torn between and why FOs can sometimes not lower information 
asymmetries. This chapter deducts the variables for the empirical analysis. 
Chapter 3 introduces the current body of literature research on M&A in 
relation to the deal specific variables. Research on M&A has shown that rather no 
wealth is created with mergers, but mostly transferred from the acquiring 
shareholders to the target’s shareholders. Additionally, research on fairness 
opinions has shown that fairness opinions specific variables influence cumulative 
abnormal returns. The discussion on deal specific and fairness opinion specific 
characteristics is used to further deduct associations of the variables with regards 
to the precision of fairness opinions. Afterwards the hypotheses for the empirical 
chapters are defined. The expected association on the precision is derived from the 
presumptions to fulfil its functions and lower information asymmetries. 
Chapter 4 gives a short definition of the term precision of fairness opinions 
with regards to the different ways to measure precision. The manual collection of 
the data set by extracting the information and variables from the fairness opinions 
is explained.  Furthermore, the statistical methods that are employed to prepare the 
data set are introduced and the descriptive values of the data set are highlighted. 
Univariate tests round the chapter off. 
Chapter 5 introduces the preconditions for multiple regression tests. In a next 
step, where applicable, the results of the univariate analysis are tested by the help 
of ordinary least square regressions. The results are also checked for robustness by 
using the three most employed valuation techniques in fairness opinions. 
Chapter 6 summarises the main conclusions of this paper and puts them in 
contrast to other research results and names future projects and research questions. 
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2 FUNDAMENTALS ON FAIRNESS OPINIONS 
In this chapter the basics of fairness opinions are discussed. Hereby the 
objective is to introduce the fairness opinion in its full picture. Initially, the term 
fairness opinion will be introduced with regards to the conceptual, content-wise 
and process-related meaning. Next, the different functions of FOs in the context of 
mergers and acquisitions will be highlighted. The shortfalls of fairness opinions 
will be discussed and solutions to overcome these obstacles will be addressed. 
Thereafter, the principal-agent theory will be discussed. The aim of this chapter is 
to deduct the variables for the empirical research and gain first associations to the 
precision of fairness opinions. 
 
2.1.1 Definition Fairness Opinion 
Fairness opinions can be defined as a written assessment of the fairness of an 
offer in the context of a transaction from a financial perspective by an independent 
expert to the attention of a decision maker (Schwetzler et al., 2005). FOs can be 
obtained from a qualified assessor for various legal transactions and are, hence, an 
opinion issued by an expert in this area (Lazopoulos, 2006). These legal transactions 
include, but are not necessarily limited to, M&A transactions, spin-offs, squeeze-
outs, financings, transfer of assets, employee stock ownership plans, restructuring 
of companies, share buybacks and equity placements (Zimmermann, 2017). The 
focus in this paper is placed on M&A transactions, where more than 50% of the 
outstanding shares are intended to be sold to the acquirer. The intention is 
mentioned here as deals do not necessarily need to be successful in the end. For all 
these transactions, the offer of a potential acquirer for the potential target is the 
assessment object of the fairness opinion. It is also the area where the use of fairness 
opinions is best-known for and its largest field of application (La Mura et al., 2011).  
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The fairness opinion itself entails the following components: 
 Opinion Letter 
 Valuation Memorandum 
 Factual Memorandum 
 
The opinion letter, also called accompanying letter in the US, contains an 
explicit statement on the fairness from a financial point of view (Schüppen, 2012) 
as well as an explanation of the activities carried out by the company. Due to the 
limitations of the scope of the fairness opinion to a fairness from a financial point 
of view, fairness opinions should not be mixed up with an explicit investment 
advice to shareholders, because the FO does neither state that shareholders should 
agree to the pending transaction nor that the price offered is the best price 
achievable (Giuffra, 1986). Additionally, the used valuation methods and 
confidentially agreements are stated and the date of the opinion is provided in the 
opinion letter (Zimmermann, 2017). 
The valuation memorandum outlines in detail the premises, theoretical 
methods, calculations and assumptions used in the valuation process, where the 
opinion letter rests upon (La Mura et al., 2011). Typically, the valuation methods 
used include a weighted combination of a discounted cash flow valuation, 
comparable companies (earnings multiple and transaction multiple valuations), 
premium and break-up valuations and, where applicable, a liquidation analysis. 
Latter one is only used in case the target could otherwise not survive and would be 
liquidised (Davidoff et al., 2011). Furthermore, dividend growth models are an 
often used valuation model in fairness opinions. Share price trends of the 
companies involved and the environment on the capital and transaction market are 
briefly mentioned as well (Zimmermann, 2017). This statement is limited to one or 
two sentences describing the market performance, but it is explicitly not analysing 
whether a market is hot and overvalued or cold; although market sentiment is 
known to influence M&A (Ljungqvist et al., 2006). The valuation memorandum is 
made publicly available to the shareholder as a summary in the relevant United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings (S-4 statement). 
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The factual memorandum summarises confidential information and detailed 
financial numbers and calculations. It can be longer than the published two parts 
of the fairness opinion. Due to the confidentially the factual memorandum is 
mostly not created for publication. The factual memorandum is usually presented 
to the client’s board of management verbally and handed over afterwards. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a factual memorandum is crucial if one of the 
involved parties asks for litigation (Zimmermann, 2017). 
Table 1 illustrates the main content of fairness opinions in the USA on the 
basis of the fairness letters from Goldman Sachs to the special committee of the 
Nymex Holdings Inc. (NHI). 
 
Table 1: Elements of FOs on the example of Nymex Holdings Inc. 
Element of FO Description Example of Nymex Holdings Inc. 
Summary of 
assignment 
 Determines what should be 
specifically examined in the 
Fairness Opinion. 
 Depending on the structure of 
share capital and supply, 
appropriateness for several 
groups of shareholders is 
determined simultaneously or 
separately. 
 Specific contract is recorded in 
the contract with the client 
("Engagement Letter") and 
varies depending on the 
transaction situation.2 
 Examination of the „fairness 
from a financial point of view” in 
relation to the offer of the 
acquirer to the shareholders of 
the target. 
 No fairness assessment for 
Rollover Holders contributing 
shares. 
 No fairness testing for "affiliates" 
(such as management or banks) 
holding shares. 
 No examination of fairness for 
shares already held by the 
acquiring company (not part of 
the consideration). 
 
                                                   
2 Gould / Ahmedani (2005), p. 27: „No federal or state laws govern the parameters of 
such an engagement.“ 





 Brief summary of the merger 
agreement containing the key 
transaction parameters. 
 Specifies the offer to be 
examined. 
 Merger of NHI into buyer 
company, which in turn is held 
by holding company. 
 Offer of 81 USD per share in cash 
to ordinary shareholders. 
 Names the number of shares to 
be purchased (size). 
 Rollover Holders invest their 
shares in the merged company. 
Summary of 
assignment 
 List of information and analysis 
the fairness opinion rests upon. 
 Of particular importance is 
whether the management's 
business plans were used and 
discussed with the bank. 
 No detailed analysis of any 
specific analyses is carried out 
as these are not a part of the 
fairness letter. 
 „Management's "financial 
forecasts" were used and 
discussed. 
 Considered financial stock 
market data and comparison 
with peers.3 
 "Considered financial terms of 
other business combinations". 
 "Considered search for other 
information, financial studies, 
financial and accounting 










 "Disclaimers and Provisions", 
highlighting reservations and 
limitations of the FO. 
 Disclaimers serve, above all, to 
avoid liability. 
 Assumption that underlying 
information is complete and 
accurate. The bank is not taking 
any responsible for correctness. 
 Assumption that projections of 
the management’s board 
represent the best currently 
available estimate. 
                                                   
3 Peers are companies comparable to the analysed company in relation to size, 
business sector etc. 




 Assumption that no adverse 
effects will effect from regulatory 
or other delays in the transaction. 
 „No independent appraisal of 
the assets and liabilities“. 
 Fairness Opinion is based on the 
situation at the time of 
preparation. 
 „Our opinion addresses only the 
fairness, from a financial point of 
view“. 
 „Our opinion does not address 








 Indication of whether Bank 
also acts as a consultant in 
the transaction. 
 Generic statement on 
compensation structure, 
especially if performance-
related component included. 
 Indicate whether the 
company has granted 
indemnification to protect 
Bank and its employees from 
claims for damages. 
 Statements on advisory 
activity and remuneration 
structure may indicate 
potential conflicts of interest. 
 „Acted as financial advisor in 
connection with the merger“. 
 „Our aggregate fee will be 
increased if the Merger is 
consummated“ (contingency 
fees). 
 „The Company has agreed to 
indemnify us for certain 
liabilities and other items 






 Statement of past and 
possible future business 
relationships with target and 
acquirer companies. 
 Investment banking services 
to both buyers and sellers in 
the past and future (previous 
relation). 





 Should indicate potential 
conflicts of interest. 
 Bank is invested in private 
equity funds of the buyer. 
 Possibility of trading 
securities of the target and 
buyer companies. 
Addressee  Determines who is the 
addressee of the Fairness 
Opinion. 
 Clarifies that a fairness 
opinion, in particular, is not a 
direct recommendation to 
shareholders. 
 Should counteract liability 
towards non-contractual 
third parties. 
 Special Committee of the 
Board of Directors is the only 
addressee of the FO. 
 „Does not constitute a 
recommendation to any 
stockholder as to how such 
stockholder should vote“. 
Judgement on 







 Summary, whether the offer 
from the perspective of the 
bank is "fair from a financial 
point of view". 
 „Based upon and subject to 
the foregoing, it is our opinion 
that, as of the date hereof, the 
Merger Consideration to be 
received by the holders of 
Company Common Stock 
(other than holders of 
Company Common Stock that 
are affiliates of Parent and the 
Rollover Holders) is fair to 
such holders, from a financial 
point of view.“ 
Source: own production 
 
The table has addressed four variables possibly of interest for the precision 
of fairness opinions. These are cash, size, contingency fees and previous relation. 
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Some findings of the table need to be discussed in more detail in order to gain 
a profound understanding of the nature and functions of fairness opinions. The 
summary of assignment emphasises that all analyses and criteria have been 
included in the assessment which the bank considered to be relevant. This implies 
that the issuer of the fairness opinion has some space for tactical manoeuvres in the 
appraisal that allow the experts to come to nearly any valuation intended 
(Schönefelder, 2007). 
The most important limitation of a fairness opinion is the fact that it solely 
deals with the fairness of the offer from a financial point of view. All non-financial 
considerations, such as legal or even social aspects, are therefore not the object of 
assessment (Laird and Perrone, 2002). A procedural fairness test, which is 
supposed to check whether the takeover took place under fair conditions, is neither 
content of the fairness opinion (Schönefelder, 2007). 
The final fairness judgment of the taken example clarifies an important 
difference to appraisals or arbitrator's awards. In these cases, the valuing party 
determines the fair value of the company concerned, which is then paid to the 
shareholder as a severance payment. By contrast, the fairness opinion does not 
establish a specific valuation in exact US-Dollar (USD). Instead, it is merely 
determined whether the offer price falls within a "range of values encompassing 
financial fairness" (Davidoff, 2006). For this purpose, a valuation range is 
determined. This range is chosen based on the experience and opinion of the 
advisors and their understanding of “fair”. The term fair is not further defined in 
the opinion (Cain and Denis, 2012). However, if the offer price falls within this band 
width, then the transaction is always considered to be fair (fair range). 
Consequently, a fairness opinion does also not indicate or test whether the 
offered price by the acquirer is the best obtainable price on the market for the target 
shareholders.4 The following figure 1 illustrates this. The example chosen indicates 
that a first offer of 50 USD can be fair as it is within the lower limit of an exemplary 
                                                   
4 Davis (2004), p. A1: „[…] because fairness is so subjective, banks aren’t insuring or 
guaranteeing it’s the best deal for shareholders. They’re simply saying it fits within a range 
of fairness” 
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valuation range of 45-75 USD. Hence, the fairness opinion would conclude that the 
deal is fair.  
 
Figure 1: Illustration fair valuation 
1st offer 50 USD: 
2nd, raised offer 70 USD: 
valuation range 45-75 USD: 
Source: own production 
 
Subsequently a new, raised offer could be made by the acquirer and the new 
offer pays 70 USD per share. The offer is now at the upper limit of the valuation 
range, but still inside and, consequently, fair. However, the first offered price was 
not the best achievable price. 
If the offer is not appropriate from the bank's point of view, in the previous 
example any valuation below 45 USD or above 75 USD, this is called an 
"inadequacy opinion" (Schwetzler et al., 2005). Any valuation below 45 USD would 
be considered inadequate for the targets’ shareholders and any valuation above 75 
USD would be considered inadequate for the acquirers’ shareholders. The final 
judgment "fair" is then replaced by the term "not fair" or "inadequate", but the other 
contents remain essentially the same. However, it rarely happens that such an 
opinion is published. In contrast, if the bank does not conclude the offered price to 
be fair, it will inform the client before submitting the fairness opinion. Based on the 
valuations arrived in the FO, either further negotiation between the parties will be 
agreed in order to come to a price lying within the valuation range or the 
termination of the transaction will be announced (Davis and Berman, 2005). 
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2.1.2 Principal, timing and process of fairness opinions 
Commercial banks have traditionally been allowed to compete with 
investment banks and auditors in M&A processes. Since the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley-Act in 2002, auditors are forbidden to provide this kind of advisory 
services in the USA (Allen et al., 2004). However, especially for smaller 
transactions, specialised boutiques and valuation advisors are still commissioned. 
There are no formal requirement criteria in order to be allowed to issue fairness 
opinions, but the FO provider has to be "qualified and independent" (Bowers and 
Latham, 2004, p. 3). 
As no exact numbers are given in current research on the market share of 
specialised boutiques and investment banks for the US market, a German sample 
is taken to illustrate the differences. Due to the strong internationalisation of capital 
markets similarities can be assumed to exist between the US market and the 
German market. Even without similarities, the numbers do still give a hint on the 
selection process of the advisor. In Germany, (the cheaper) consultants and 
auditing firms are still allowed to issue fairness opinions and had a market share, 
based on the number of issued fairness opinions, of 54% in 2007 (Aders and 
Schwetzler, 2011). Due to the high fee structure of investment banks, consultants 
and certified accountants are responsible for 80% of all fairness opinions for 
transactions valued less than 100 million euro, but only for 25% of all fairness 
opinions for deals of more than 1 billion euro. The lower prices for consultants and 
auditing firms seem to be an important aspect for smaller deals. Oppositely, 
investment banks have a market share of only 20% for small deals, but 75% for large 
deals (Aders and Schwetzler, 2011). 
Fairness opinions requested by the target side are mostly commissioned by 
the board of directors or by an independent special committee of the board of 
directors. But sometimes it can also be seen that a majority shareholder requests an 
own, individual fairness opinion as well. However, these fairness opinions are 
neither published nor addressed in the S4-statements and can, thence, not be 
statistically analysed. The decision to ask for a fairness opinion is seen as a smart 
move if the majority shareholder has to defend her action against other third party 
investors in its own company (Landefeld et al., 2005). The principal is also the 
primary addressee of the fairness opinion. The fairness letter contains the explicit 
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statement that the fairness opinion is not addressed to the shareholder. However, 
this creates a peculiar dichotomy as on the one hand, the fairness of an offer is 
judged for the shareholders who ultimately have to decide whether to accept or 
reject it, but at the same time they are not considered to be the addressee of the 
opinion (Davidoff, 2006). 
In friendly takeovers, which are defined as takeovers that are welcomed by 
the target’s management board, whereas hostile takeovers are against the will and 
objectives of the target management, fairness opinions are usually requested and 
written briefly before the public announcement of the transaction is made, 
although this might change under given situations (Bartell and Janssen, 2017). If 
new and material changes in the circumstances of the deal become apparent after 
the fairness opinion has been issued, the investment bank has no legal duty to 
update the fairness opinion (Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), P95, 842 (Del. Ch. 1991)). 
However, it is the duty of the board of management to check whether the new 
situation affects the validity of the FO (Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P97, 805, at *11-12 
(Del. Ch. 1993)). For hostile takeovers, the fairness opinions are issued after the 
announcement is made, which is logical as a prior issuance of the acquirer fairness 
opinion would take the surprising effect of the hostile announcement. The target, 
on the other hand, has no knowledge of the intended takeover and no chance to 
obtain the FO in advance. Due to the different timing and the risk of being 
outdated, the mood of the transaction (friendly or hostile) might influence the 
precision of FOs. 
The creation of a fairness opinion is following ideally the process described 
in figure 2. Due to the circumstances of the deal, some minor differences to this 
process might be observable. Figure 2 is based on the work of Bucher and Bucher 
(2005) and combines concepts of Schönefelder (2007) and Bartell and Janssen (2017) 
as well. 
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Source: Based on ideas of Bucher and Bucher (2005), Schönefelder (2007) and 
Bartell and Janssen (2017) 
 
In a first step the assignment is declared to the advisor and as soon as the 
contract is signed, all relevant information such as the background of the company, 
the market it is active on, historical business reports and the condition of the offer 
itself, are collected and processed by the advisor. Above all, the advisor analyses 
the business plans that reflect the expected performance of the company and the 
forward looking statements as these are the primary source of information for the 
valuation purposes. This process is called information collection and processing. 
Often discussions will be held with management to better understand the 
assumptions underlying their business plans and forward looking statements. 
However, the business plan is not always checked for plausibility by the bank, but 
accepted as the current "best estimate" (Bucher and Bucher, 2005). Nonetheless, 
Figure 2: Work flow creation fairness opinion 
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some banks develop different and individualised scenarios and estimates in order 
to put the business plan into perspective. This might lead to different scenarios 
described as “base case” and “upside case” or “downside case”.5 Once the data 
basis is clarified, a business valuation will be carried out using, if possible, various 
valuation models in the next step (Bucher and Bucher, 2005). An internal valuation 
presentation is prepared, which is critically reviewed in a bank’s in-house "Fairness 
Committee" of experienced, and not in the fairness opinion involved bankers. The 
fairness committee is used to improve the independence of the FO from the 
management board (independence of principal and agent) and check the quality of 
the FO (Schönefelder, 2007). As a result, the fairness of the offer is finally assessed 
financially, and the fairness letter and valuation memorandum are finalised and 
handed over to the client. The valuation memorandum is usually presented 
verbally to the client allowing to ask questions or stop the publication of the FO 
(Bartell and Janssen, 2017). 
 
  
                                                   
5 Fairness opinions of Crimson Exploration Inc (target) and Contango Oil & Gas Co 
(acquirer), available at www.SEC.gov/Archives/Edgar 
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2.2 SMITH VERSUS VAN GORKOM RULING & THE FUNCTIONS OF 
FAIRNESS OPINIONS 
2.2.1 Insurance function 
The verdict spoken in the Smith vs. Van Gorkom case is nowadays seen as 
the de-facto starting point for the extensive use of fairness opinions in nearly every 
M&A activity (Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)). The Delaware 
Supreme Court ruled in January 1985 against the board of directors of Trans Union 
Corporation (target company) and found them guilty of not having acted on the 
basis of adequate information, as the offer was made with great haste, without 
studying the offer document in detail and, above all, "without the benefit of reports 
for valuation purposes” (Hartmann and Rogers, 1991, p. 527). The court criticises a 
lack of duty in the due diligence process during the leveraged buyout. The directors 
were unable to invoke on the Business Judgment Rule and were personally held 
liable due to a breach of their duty of care, which resulted in a fine of 33.5 million 
USD payable to the shareholders of Trans Union Corporation. 
The court highlighted that especially the board of directors made a mistake 
in the decision-making process to not rely on an in-depth analysis on the fair value 
of the company. This fair value can be obtained from an investment bank in form 
of a fairness opinion as the verdict has clarified. In this case, a well-prepared 
valuation report of the company itself would also have led to a fulfilment of the 
conditions to comply with the Business Judgement Rule. However, internally 
created valuation reports of the company itself do only in rare cases fulfil the 
independency requirements. Thence, managers rarely rely on the reports as they 
often violate the Business Judgement Rule (Nielsen, 2008). Since the Smith vs. van 
Gorkom case fairness opinions are generally accepted by the courts as a reliable 
source of information in M&A activities (Davidoff, 2006). 
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Although the court decision made in Smith vs. Van Gorkom has emphasised 
that there is no legal duty to seek a fairness opinion6, the public and managers 
regard FOs as an implicit necessity to appeal to the Business Judgment Rule 
(Davidoff, 2006; Chazen, 1981). This understanding is reflected in a sharp increase 
in the consumption of fairness opinions. While in 1985 only 19% of all target 
companies relied on fairness opinions in any kind of M&A activity, the percentage 
figure rose to 42% a year later. According to Bowers (2002), the percentage numbers 
rose to 80% between 1994 and 2002.  
However, later court decisions and rulings highlight the fact that a critical 
appraisal of the fairness opinion by the board of directors is crucial to obtain legal 
protection from it. A director was denied having done the critical appraisal in 2005 
as he would have otherwise realised the inadequacy of the fairness opinion due to 
his experience in valuations (Hall, 2005). Consequently, it is not enough for the 
board of directors to rely blindly on the judgment in the fairness letter or a fairness 
opinion at all. Rather, a thorough understanding and scrutiny of the underlying 
analysis in the valuation memorandum is essential (Davidoff, 2006). This finding 
underlines the need for a deeper analysis of factors and variables influencing the 
valuation precision of fairness opinions. 
 
2.2.2 Information function for private shareholders and management 
The previously discussed insurance function is derived from the information 
function of fairness opinions, because only the information on the value of the 
company allows the responsible bodies and shareholders to make a reliable 
decision. Some researchers believe fairness opinions to be the central decision-
                                                   
6 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d, 858, 873 (Del. 1985): „We do not imply that 
an outside valuation study is essential to support an informed business judgment; 
nor do we state that fairness opinions by independent investment bankers are 
required as a matter of law. Often insiders familiar with the business of a going 
concern are in a better position than are outsiders to gather relevant information; 
and under appropriate circumstances, such directors may be fully protected in 
relying in good faith upon the valuation reports of their management.“ 
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making basis for private investors and institutional investors (Zimmermann, 2015) 
as the fairness opinion allows not only the management, but also the shareholders, 
to better understand the financial attractiveness of the proposed deal. Fairness 
opinions do often provide management, especially of the acquiring firm, with 
information that have been previously unknown or not available to the 
management (Essler et al., 2008). 
In addition, fairness opinions help reducing information asymmetries 
experienced by the shareholders as they are typically based on business plans and 
management estimates of the company's future development, which are mostly 
previously not publicly available (Parijs, 2005). The company valuations, thus, 
reflect the latest estimates of the management. Particularly, in the case of takeovers 
of small and medium-sized enterprises, which are often only covered to a limited 
extent by financial analysts and press releases in general, this reduction of 
information asymmetries is central to the shareholder's decision-making 
(Schönefelder, 2007).  
The success of fairness opinions in providing information to shareholders 
and others engaged in the transaction is proven by lower abnormal returns in 
transaction where FOs are obtained (Chen, 2010). This argument implies that 
fairness opinions can fulfil other functions than only providing legal security for 
managers; they lower asymmetric information levels. 
Hence, information on the transaction size is not only mandatory information 
in the fairness opinion as the example of Nymex has shown; it is also linked to the 
level of asymmetric information. For smaller transaction less information is 
previously known and the level of asymmetric information before the fairness 
opinion is written is higher. 
 
2.2.3 Protection function of shareholders 
Conflicts of interest do often exist for management or members of the board 
of directors, especially in transactions where a management buyout is planned 
(Nielsen, 2008). The fairness opinion fulfils here the function to protect the 
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shareholders as the shareholders do not have to rely solely on the judgment of a 
possibly biased board of directors, but rather receive an expert opinion of an 
(independent) expert. Internal assessment or valuation reports could, in this 
situation, not fulfil the protection function to the same extent as an external 
valuation report like the fairness opinion can do (Nielsen, 2008). Especially with 
regards to management buyouts, the valuations of the management bear the risk 
to understate the value of the company as an undervaluation saves costs for the 
management board when acquiring the company. An external valuation of the 
same amount as in the management buyout would normally be considered as too 
low by management, but as acceptable in situations of management buy-outs 
(Nielsen, 2008). 
Hence, the in the Smith vs. van Gorkom case explicitly mentioned internal 
valuation by management is not an alternative of equal objectiveness as the FO and 
is, consequently, not often applied by management in general (Fiflis, 1992). 
 
2.2.4 Argumentation and signalling function towards shareholders 
Fairness opinions can be used by the board of directors on both sides as an 
instrument to convince shareholders of the attractiveness of a transaction. An 
opinion issued by a reputable investment bank can deliver valuable arguments to 
convince shareholders of the quality and financial adequacy of a deal (Cooke, 1996). 
Fairness opinions on the side of the acquiring company can offer appreciated 
information why the merger or takeover provides economic advantages for the 
acquirer. Hence, the arguments given here can help to convince reluctant 
shareholders of the advantages of the proposed deal (Kisgen et al., 2009). By doing 
so, the fairness opinion helps to lower the information asymmetries between the 
shareholders and the management board. The argumentation function is stronger, 
if the advisor has a higher reputation (Cooke, 1996). Hence, reputation is a variable 
that can have an influence on the precision of fairness opinions. Critically seen 
fairness opinions can be used to convince shareholders, which gives reputation a 
negative association to the precision. 
FUNDAMENTALS ON FAIRNESS OPINIONS   45 
However, a fairness opinion written by an experienced and well known 
investment bank can send a strong signal to the shareholders of both parties that 
the transaction is a transaction of highest quality, at least in relation to the financial 
arrangements (Kisgen et al., 2009). Otherwise it is assumed that the investment 
bank/advisor will not issue the fairness opinion. An overly friendly fairness 
opinion can damage the reputation of the investment bank immediately and lead 
to lower earnings in the future. This quality signal can help to increase the 
acceptance level of the underlying offer. Thus, the fairness opinion sends a quality 
seal function to both the board of directors and shareholders through its competent 
analysis and the investment bank's standing behind it (von Dryander, 2001). 
Therefore, the signalling function of fairness opinions attaches a high quality of the 
provided information to the FO. 
 
2.2.5 Process function for the deal 
In the case of Smith vs. Van Gorkom the board of directors rushed the 
decision to sell the company, which helped, among other things, to act without 
profound information on the adequacy of the offer (Davidoff, 2006). The more or 
less implicit duty to obtain a fairness opinion gives the target company valuable 
time in the transaction process to contact further partners, search for a white knight 
or initiate any defensive action to protect the shareholders of the own company 
(Macey and Miller, 1988). 
As a matter of fact fairness opinions help to structure the M&A process in all 
aspects, though this is neither the function nor the objective of fairness opinions. 
However, especially the target shareholders are put in a better position as the 
transaction process is slow downed and at least stretched for a couple of days, if 
fairness opinions are requested (Bucher and Bucher, 2005). The process function of 
FOs does not lead to a deduction of variables. 
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2.2.6 Deal completion and pricing function of fairness opinions 
By signalling a qualitative deal, fairness opinions also foster a higher deal 
completion rate. The signalling effects help encouraging shareholders to accept the 
proposed deal. In cases of completely uninformed shareholders not only the 
reputation of the investment bank achieves this, but also the vague price indication 
supports this decision process (Mihanovic, 2005). 
The board of directors is obliged to realise the „highest value reasonably 
attainable” for its shareholders in the USA (Rubenstein, 2005, p. 1739). In principle, 
in effective markets this objective can be accomplished through various options, 
e.g. auctions. If a large number of bidders in a highly competitive auction try to buy 
the target, it can be assumed that the price paid by the highest bidder is close to the 
maximum price that can be achieved (Davidoff, 2006). However, in market 
situations where buyers are not sufficiently interested or unbiased information are 
not available, e.g. bankruptcies, this pricing function can be fulfilled by a fairness 
opinion. The market is in extreme situations not able to deliver a fair price 
indication, but the FO can achieve this through the denotation of a fair price 
(Davidoff, 2006), although this pricing function is only fulfilled by delivering a 
valuation range and not a precise valuation. Furthermore, a denomination of share 
exchange rates in a fairness opinion is opposing the idea of a concrete valuation 
due to the share price fluctuations that affect the final deal price. 
To better fulfil the pricing function, a cash value is preferred (Mihanovic, 
2005); but only a valuation appraisal can fully fulfil the pricing function. 
Nonetheless, a cash offer does better fulfil the pricing functions of fairness 
opinions. Hence, the pricing function attaches a positive association of cash as the 
method of payment to the precision of fairness opinions. 
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2.3 DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
2.3.1 FINRA rule 2290 
Disclosure requirements for mergers & acquisitions in the US including 
fairness opinions are regulated by the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in schedule 13E and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s 
(FINRA) rule 2290 and FINRA rule 5190, which supersedes FINRA rule 2290. The 
SEC rule requires target companies to disclose whether they received a fairness 
opinion or not. If they received a fairness opinion, the fairness letter as well as a 
summary of the valuation analysis must be attached to the SEC filings (Schedule 
13E-3, Item 15, Item 16 and Item 1016 (a)–(d), (f), (g)). The aim of the SEC is to enable 
an educated shareholder to make an appropriate decision on whether to sell the 
shares to the acquirer on the same basis of information as the board of directors has 
received. 
 Next to these disclosure requirements, past court decisions have led to a de-
facto extension of the requirements. The following list summarises these 
requirements of Schedule 13E-3, Item 125, as described in Martin, 1991 and 
Davidoff, 2006: 
 Identify the outside party (investment bank writing the FO) and/or unaffiliated 
representative. 
 Briefly describe the qualifications of the outside party and/or unaffiliated 
representative. 
 Describe the method of selection of the outside party and/or unaffiliated 
representative. 
 Describe any material relationship that existed during the past two years or is 
mutually understood to be contemplated and any compensation received or to 
be received as a result of the relationship between (i) The outside party, its 
affiliates, and/or unaffiliated representative; and (ii) The subject company or its 
affiliates. 
 State whether the subject company or affiliate determined the amount of 
consideration to be paid or whether the outside party recommended the 
amount of consideration to be paid. 
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 Furnish a summary concerning the opinion. The summary must include, but 
need not be limited to: 
o The procedures followed. 
o The findings and recommendations. 
o The bases for and methods of arriving at such findings and 
recommendations. 
o Instructions received from the subject company or affiliate. 
o Any limitation imposed by the subject company or affiliate on the scope 
of the investigation. 
 
Next to these rules, the adoption of FINRA rule 2290 in the end of 2007 has 
led to further disclosure requirements. The superseding FINRA rule 5190 does not 
lead to further notable changes in the requirements. The following disclosures and 
procedures focus, hence, on FINRA rule 2290 (Davis, 2008). But before the focus is 
placed on FINRA rule 2290 it needs to be highlighted that previous relations must 
be indicated as they might potentially affect the objectivity of fairness opinions. 
Hence, the variable previous relation can a have a significant association on the 
precision of fairness opinions. 
 
2.3.2 Disclosures 
If at the time a fairness opinion is issued to the board of directors of a 
company the advisor issuing the fairness opinion knows or has reason to know that 
the fairness opinion will be provided or described to the company's public 
shareholders, the advisor must disclose in the fairness opinion the following: 
(1) if the advisor has acted as a financial advisor to any party of the transaction 
that is the subject of the fairness opinion, and, if applicable, that it will receive 
compensation that is contingent upon the successful completion of the 
transaction, for rendering the fairness opinion and/or serving as an advisor; 
(2) if the advisor will receive any other significant payment or compensation 
contingent upon the successful completion of the transaction; 
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(3) any material relationships that existed during the past two years or that are 
mutually understood to be contemplated in which any compensation was 
received or is intended to be received as a result of the relationship between the 
advisor and any party to the transaction that is the subject of the fairness 
opinion; 
(4) if any information that formed a substantial basis for the fairness opinion that 
was supplied to the advisor by the company requesting the opinion concerning 
the companies that are parties to the transaction has been independently 
verified by the advisor, and if so, a description of the information or categories 
of information that were verified; 
(5) whether or not the fairness opinion was approved or issued by a fairness 
committee; and 
(6) whether or not the fairness opinion expresses an opinion about the fairness of 
the amount or nature of the compensation to any of the company's officers, 
directors or employees, or class of such persons, relative to the compensation 
to the public shareholders of the company. 
 
Point (1) has highlighted that contingency payments must be mentioned in 
FOs. This leads to the assumption that contingency payments are associated to the 
precision of fairness opinions. Point (3) identifies the need to indicate whether any 
previous relations between the advisor and the company have existed. Hence, an 
association on the precision of fairness opinions can be presumed. However for 




Any advisor issuing a fairness opinion must have written procedures for 
approval of a fairness opinion by the advisor, including: 
(1) the types of transactions and the circumstances in which the member will use a 
fairness committee to approve or issue a fairness opinion, and in those 
transactions in which it uses a fairness committee: 
 the process for selecting personnel to be on the fairness committee; 
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 the necessary qualifications of persons serving on the fairness 
committee; 
 the process to promote a balanced review by the fairness committee, 
which shall include the review and approval by persons who do not 
serve on the deal team to the transaction; and 
(2) the process to determine whether the valuation analyses used in the fairness 
opinion are appropriate. 
 
The adoption of FINRA rule 2290 moves the responsibility to ensure that 
conflicts of interest of the fairness opinion writer are avoided away from the agent 
to the principal of the FO. The increased disclosure requirements are expected to 
lead to a more sophisticated selection of the advising investment bank (Gould and 
Ahmedani, 2005). 
On the other hand, criticism against FINRA rule 2290 is focusing on the facts 
that contingency fees are not forbidden and, hence, the conflict of interest of the 
investment bank to recommend a bad deal instead of indicating and thereby 
stopping a poor deal is still given. Contingency fees are criticized as they amount 
to nearly 90% of the total advisory fees paid in M&A transactions or 1% of the final 
deal value. Hence, the FO provider might be tempted to alter valuation models in 
order to come to valuations that allow continuing with the transaction, whereas 
unaltered models would not consider the deal to be fair (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). 
Furthermore, FINRA rule 2290 does not essentially increase disclosure 
requirements above what is already a de-facto requirement based on past court 
decisions (Gould and Ahmedani, 2005). Nonetheless, the changes in regulations 
leading to tougher disclosure requirements and increase in the awareness of 
possible conflicts of interests lead to the assumption that a positive association to 
the precision of fairness opinions exist as supported by Gould and Ahmedani, 2005. 
Therefore, the deal’s execution date should be used to analyse whether the 
FO is written before or after the changes in legislation. Later FOs are associated 
with a higher precision as disclosure requirements are stronger. 
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2.4 CRITICISM TOWARDS FAIRNESS OPINIONS 
Despite the wide-spread use of fairness opinions as a consequence from the 
Smith vs. Van Gorkom ruling, FOs are still a subject of intensive criticism. The main 
shortcomings of fairness opinions are already discussed, but statements like the 
one from Davidoff (2006, p. 1560) that FOs are “conflict-ridden, subjective, rubber-
stamps, meaningless and hackneyed” ask for a more thorough investigation. The 
following discussion highlights the criticism and the strong connection to the 
principal-agent theory. 
 
2.4.1 Conflict of interest caused by the principal of the fairness opinion 
The principals of a fairness opinion might pursue their own interests during 
mergers and acquisitions, which might conflict with their duty to act in the interest 
of the shareholders. One reason for that can be the fear of managers to lose their 
own jobs or suffer a subsequent loss of power after the merger is completed. This 
might lead to the result that decision-makers are more reluctant to engage in a 
transaction, even if it is in the best interest of the shareholders (Roll, 1986).  
In order to prevent management from acting so and to ensure an objective 
assessment of the transaction, so-called "golden parachutes" were introduced in the 
USA as a counter-incentive. These often include the immediate transfer of stocks to 
managers and the possibility to redeem immediately stock option plans that are 
otherwise not yet due and additionally high severance payments in the case of 
takeovers (Bress, 1987). However, golden parachutes bear the risk of being over 
dimensioned. Hence, if the financial compensation is too high, decision-makers 
might be over-inclined to accept a takeover bid, which is not necessarily in the best 
interest of the shareholders (Hall, 2005).  
Other financial incentives for accepting an offer can be made by the buyer, 
for example, in form of a signing bonus or very lucrative advisory deals for the 
management team for the immediate future after the company is purchased (Choi, 
2004; Cochran et al., 1985). 
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Furthermore, in M&A activities considered as management buyouts or going 
privates with management participation, direct incentives are given to the 
management team to acquire the target as cheap as possible. This contradicts the 
paradigm to achieve the best obtainable price for the shareholders, but lowers the 
costs for the manager’s manoeuvre (Nielsen, 2008; Oesterle and Norberg, 1988). 
All the just discussed factors are more linked to general problems of mergers 
and acquisitions. However, a strong link to fairness opinions is given in the way 
that such wrong incentives for the board of directors or management might result 
in the selection of a fairness opinion provider, who is not completely objective. 
More precisely, Oesterle and Norberg (1988, p. 211) state that “managers dress up 
their positions with valuations by ostensibly fair-minded experts in order to 
hoodwink their shareholders”. This would take away the protecting role of fairness 
opinions for shareholders, while management is still protected from liability risks 
(Elson, 1992). 
 
2.4.2 Conflict of interest caused by the agent of the fairness opinion 
The agents of a fairness opinion might pursue their own interests during 
mergers and acquisitions as well the principals might do. The criticism on FINRA 
rule 2290 has briefly introduced the problem of a lack of independence. Some 
researchers comment the interests of the investment banks providing FOs that they 
either support the interests of the client or pursue their own interests, but never the 
interest of the shareholders (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). 
In many US acquisitions, the investment bank does not only provide the 
fairness opinion, but also advises the companies, either target or acquirer, on all 
strategic and financial aspects of the transaction (Morgan Stanley, 2007; Roll, 1986). 
For these advisory services, the investment banks receive an advisory fee, 
depending on the transaction size, which can amount to a double digit million US-
Dollar value. This fee is called "contingent fee." The provision of the fairness 
opinion, on the other hand, is often compensated separately and is ideally be 
independent of its outcome. However, the remuneration for the fairness opinion is 
usually well below the advisory fee. For example, two studies for the US market 
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show that the fairness opinion fee accounts for less than 15% of the total 
compensation (Kisgen et al., 2009; Rubenstein, 2005). In monetary terms a median 
fee for fairness opinions of 300,000 USD is paid, whereas the median advisory fee 
amounts to 2,400,000 USD (Kisgen et al., 2009). 
Multiple researchers have proven that fairness opinions increase the 
likelihood of deal completion significantly (Rubenstein, 2005), which is in line with 
the interests of the investment banks to maximise the obtainable profits from M&A, 
but might be against the interests of shareholders. However, this criticism is 
countered by the fact that the fees are often determined as a percentage of the 
transaction volume and, thus, likewise an incentive to obtain the highest possible 
offer price is given for the investment bank, which is aligned to the expectations of 
the target shareholders, but not to those of the acquiring shareholders (Mihanovic, 
2005). 
In addition to the monetary incentives of the bank, past, current and future 
relationships (previous relation) with the client are cited as a reason for a possible 
lack of objectivity. Psychological ties of the consultant from past projects make it 
more difficult to cross the interests of the management with an independent 
fairness opinion. Furthermore, an investment bank that has consistently 
recommended a transaction in the past and has actively helped to initiate the 
current transaction would lose credibility if it then discards the transaction in its 
fairness opinion (Morgensohn, 2005). 
Especially since the beginning of the new millennium an increased number 
of transactions are carried out in the way of leveraged buy-out (LBO) (Cumming et 
al., 2007). In these transactions the target is acquired in cash by a combination of 
equity and debt. Here, investment banks have often the position of “dual 
presentation”, which means that the bank represents the target company, but it also 
provides services, e.g. financing, to the acquiring company. More precise, the 
investment bank offers staple financing to the acquirer. Staple financing is a pre-
arranged financing package offered to interested bidders in M&A transactions. The 
staple financing is arranged by the investment bank advising the acquirer company 
and includes all details of the lending package, including the principal, fees and 
loan covenants. The name is derived from the fact that the financing details are 
stapled to the back of the acquisition term sheet (Povel and Singh, 2010). Hence, if 
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the transaction does not materialise, no financing is needed and the investment 
bank would lose this additional contract. 
Contradicting these severe allegations are comments that investment banks 
are not willing to risk a sustainable damage in their reputation by issuing biased 
fairness opinions. In addition with liability risks arising from wrong fairness 
opinions, these two factors are perceived to outweigh short-term monetary benefits 
received through contingent fees (Kisgen et al., 2009). For this reason, the 
objectivity of investment banks in the context of fairness opinions should be 
regarded as given (Schönefelder, 2007).  
These conflicts have highlighted the need to further investigate the variables 
previous relation, contingency fees and reputation. 
 
2.4.3 Approaches to improve the quality of fairness opinions 
Various approaches are proposed to address and solve the problems of 
conflicting interests caused by the agent and the principal, which are closely linked 
to discussions on the quality of fairness opinions. 
Particularly in LBOs, but also in any other M&A transaction, a second 
fairness opinion (multiple FOs) is recommended to overcome potential conflict of 
interest. The second opinion can be rendered by an investment bank, which is not 
linked to any other advisory services in the transaction. Ideally, the bank does also 
not have any previous relations to the companies involved and does not receive 
contingency fees (Sorkin, 2005). Thence, the second FO performs the role of an 
objectivity test and can identify an obviously one-sided first fairness opinion 
(Kisgen et al., 2009). Some banks, e.g. Credit Suisse, have introduced frameworks 
where certain kinds of transactions are required to be double-checked by a second 
fairness opinion. This can be seen as a pro-active approach to lower potential 
conflicts of interest and, in turn, increase the quality of the fairness opinion 
(Schönefelder, 2007). 
An alternative to multiple fairness opinions is the review of a fairness opinion 
by a "Valuation Advisor", who assesses the robustness and objectivity of the 
FUNDAMENTALS ON FAIRNESS OPINIONS   55 
fairness opinion. This is typically done by small, specialised boutiques. However, 
it is criticised that such boutiques might be forced to grant "rubber stamps" in order 
to stay in business at all (Sorkin, 2005, p. 3). Furthermore, it is argued that the lack 
of valuation standards make second opinions relatively useless as any difference in 
the valuation can be easily justified by the issuer of the first fairness opinion (Roll, 
1986). 
As a consequence, commentators like Davis (2004) claim that investment 
banks performing advisory services and receiving performance-based 
compensation should generally be refrained from issuing fairness opinions. 
Legislation in France, for example, does not allow this combination of business 
activities; however in the US this is not forbidden (Davis, 2004). On the other hand, 
it is argued that the fairness opinion provider in question is best acquainted with 
the company and the transaction circumstances. Hence, the advisor is the most 
qualified and reliable addressee to compile a reliable company valuation.  
Another approach to enhance the functionality of fairness opinions is a better 
disclosure. While the SEC’s and FINRA’s reforms outlined in chapter 2.3 may, at 
least, contribute to increasing shareholder awareness of conflicts of interest, 
disclosure of all material company valuation considerations and assumptions, 
based on critical analysis, will allow the reader of the fairness opinion to come to 
own  judgments (Davis, 2004). Improved disclosure can also be beneficial for the 
investment banks itself as previous court decisions have shown that good 
disclosure can contribute to a mitigation of liability risks (Kisgen et al., 2009). 
Others prefer the approach to standardise fairness opinions with regards to 
the used valuation models. Current practice is criticised for methodologically 
flawed valuation models that either are not following theoretical guidelines or are 
adapted to the needs of the fairness opinion provider (Rau, 2000; Elson, 1992). 
Therefore, stronger regulation is expected to limit the scope of misuse of valuation 
models and subjectivity. Hence, the degree of subjectivity will be lowered 
(Schwetzler et al., 2005). In some countries, like Germany, fairness opinions are 
asked to follow certain valuation standards as described in IDW (Institut der 
Wirtschaftsprüfer (Institute of Auditors)) standard IDW S8 “Grundsätze für die 
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Erstellung von Fairness Opinions”7 (Franken and Schulte, 2014). Bingham (2005) 
demands that at least a second fairness opinion has to follow the guidelines for 
fairness opinions issued by the American Society of Appraisers, an institution 
similar to the IDW, in the USA. 
With the introduction of a standard procedure for fairness opinions, courts 
would also be placed in the position to use an objective benchmark to judge the 
quality and work of the fairness opinion provider (Rubenstein, 2005). Otherwise, 
criticism on standard procedures argues that any standard would never be able to 
capture the complexity of fairness opinions and business valuations correctly. 
Experienced advisors are better able to adapt to the given circumstances of a 
transaction, if no standards are set and might, thus, still arrive to a fair valuation 
and effective assessment, where they would fail to do so with strong guidelines in 
place (Mihanovic, 2005). Especially the standard valuation models often fail to 
come to a positive company valuation, if the target is facing bankruptcy or is 
already illiquid (Ratner et al., 2010). 
Last but not least, some researchers demand a tightening of the liability rules. 
This could help investment banks to avoid controversial contracts with potential 
conflicts of interest, which would improve the fairness opinion functionality for the 
shareholder (Davidoff, 2006).  However, extended liability is being criticised for the 
fact that investment banks will increasingly make use of disclaimers which will in 
turn mean that the fairness opinion loses its informational content (Davidoff, 2006). 
The discussion has shown that multiple fairness opinions are believed to 
improve the quality of FOs. Hence, a positive association to the precision can be 
assumed. Furthermore, the conflicts of interests between the principals and the 
agents of fairness opinions call for a closer analysis of the principal-agent theory, 
which is provided in the next chapter. 
                                                   
7 IDW has issued a framework for valuation standards in fairness opinions. 
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2.5 PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
2.5.1 Concepts of the principal-agent theory 
2.5.1.1 Introduction to the principal-agent theory 
The previous discussion of the limitations of fairness opinions has 
highlighted that fairness opinions are influenced by principal-agent relations and 
the consequences of opposing interests. This is not surprising as agency theory is a 
fundamental building block in modern corporate finance literature (Tirole, 2009). 
Consequently, a more detailed look on the theory and its implications is beneficial.  
The principal-agent theory describes the contractual relation between one 
party, the principal, who delegates work to another party, the agent. The principal-
agent relationship has a hierarchic structure of super ordination and subordination 
(Blum et al., 2005). The contractual agreement has a strong relation to risk sharing 
between individuals and groups (Arrow, 1971) and can be applicable in a variety 
of situations, ranging from macro level issues as regulatory policy to micro level 
details as expression of self-interest or lying (Schwarz et al., 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The main goal of the principal-agent theory is concerned with solving 
problems that arise due to the contractual setting between the two parties and 
asymmetric information between them (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2015; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
The first problem arises when the goals and aims of the principal and the 
agent conflict and when it is difficult for the principal to control what the agent 
does. The inherent problem for the principal is to verify that the agent is acting 
appropriately and in the best interest of the principal due to information 
asymmetries (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). Figure 3 illustrates this. The agent, in 
relation to fairness opinions, the management board, hires a principal, the 
advisor/investment bank. The bank receives a monetary compensation for the 
assignment and is monitored by the principal. The agent carries out the assignment 
by offering time and skills. However, the agent will show a strong opportunistic 
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behaviour as a homo oeconomicus8 under the assumption of utility maximisation. 
Under this assumption the agent will minimise the expenditures to fulfil the task 
assigned by the principal (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2015). 
 
Figure 3: Principal-Agent relation 
 
  Source: Rothaermel (2015, p. 415) 
 
The second problem is deducted from the risk sharing approach. Whenever 
the principal and the agent have different attitudes to risk, they will focus on 
different outcomes and take different actions. 
                                                   
8 In economics, homo economicus is the concept portraying humans as 
consistently rational and narrowly self-interested agents who usually pursue their 
subjectively-defined ends optimally.  Homo economicus is often portrait as perfect 
rational (Caruso, 2012). 
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The focus of the principal-agent theory is emphasised on the contract 
governing the relationship between the two parties and the most efficient contract 
between them, taking into effect assumptions about the behaviour of people (e.g. 
self-interest, risk aversion, free lancing), organisations (e.g. conflict among 
members) and information (e.g. information is a commodity that can be acquired), 
according to Arrow, 1992 (Dionne and Harrington, 1992). 
Agency theory is applied on organisational phenomena as compensation 
(Conlon and Parks, 1990), board relationships (Fama and Jensen, 1983), innovation 
(Bolton and Scharfstein, 1998; Zenger, 1988), ownership and financing structures 
(Agrawal et al., 1992), but also on vertical integration (Anderson, 1985; Eccles, 1985) 
and acquisition and diversification strategies (Amihud and Lev, 1981). 
To summarise the ideas of the principal-agency theory so far, it can be said 
that the domain of the principal-agency theory is the relationship between the 
principal and the agent who have differing goals and opposing attitudes toward 
risks, but are engaged in cooperative behaviour due to a contractual setting. 
The principal-agency theory has developed in two different streams, the 
positivist and the normative principal-agent theory (Blum et al., 2005; Jensen, 1983). 
The normative stream is more focused on cases and the general theory of the 
principal-agent theory, for example on employer-employee, buyer-supplier 
relationships or any other agency (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Research is based 
on assumptions, which are logically deducted and mathematically proven 
(Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2015; Harris and Raviv, 1978). This concept is also 
employed in this dissertation to deduct the variables and the expected associations 
on the precision.  
However, as Eisenhardt (1989) points out, the two streams are 
complementary. The positivist theory identifies contract alternatives, whereas the 
principal-agent stream indicates which contract is the most efficient one under 
given situations. 
  The positivist agency theory focuses on identifying situations in which the 
principal and the agent are supposed to have conflicting interests due to different 
aims. It tries to find the ideal contractual solution to overcome the situation in 
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which the agent is more focused on her self-interest. One proposition is to use 
outcome-based contracts as they are partly used for fairness opinions in terms of 
contingency fees. The conflicts of self-interests by the agents are reduced by these 
contracts (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2015; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) as these 
contracts align the preferences of agents with those of the principals as the financial 
rewards for the agent depend on the same goals and actions. By aligning the 
preferences the underlying problems of hidden characteristics, hidden intentions 
and moral hazard are reduced (Hartmann-Wendels, 2015; Townsend, 1979). These 
three problems will now be explained in more detail. 
 
2.5.1.2 Hidden characteristics 
Problems in terms of hidden characteristics are based on information 
asymmetries between the principal and the agent regarding the quality of the 
subject matter, e.g. the sale of a company, before contract closing. This information 
asymmetry is relevant, because information is a strategic factor for all economic 
decisions (Blum, 2015). Thus, in the context of a purchase agreement, the seller is 
usually better informed about the nature of the object of sale as the buyer. The 
buyer can only decide on the basis of a temporary inspection of the item to be 
purchased. Consequently, assuming a strictly opportunistic behaviour, this leads 
to an adverse selection, which means that the buyer will not buy the object. Based 
on the fear of hidden defects, the purchaser is only willing to pay a lower than 
average price for the goods. However, the seller is not willing to sell the product at 
a lower than average price, if the product quality is above-average (Blum, 2015). 
Inevitable corollary, the average quality of the products offered in the market will 
decline and the purchaser, in turn, is again only willing to pay a below-average 
price for the goods. In theory, the chain would continue indefinitely and an 
equilibrium price would not be found. (Blum et al., 2005; Akerlof, 1970). This 
negative chain can be stopped by obtaining fairness opinions, if the positive mind 
setting is accepted that fairness opinions provide value and lower information 
asymmetries. 
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2.5.1.3 Hidden intention 
Hidden intentions are a problem, which result from the willingness of the 
agent to exploit the dependence of the principal, often referred to the freelancing 
problem. This problem can occur before and after contract closing. With her 
advanced knowledge, the agent knows how to reduce the working effort or to 
maximise her compensation claim and is prepared to use this advantage over the 
principal in her own interest. After contract closing the principal faces the problem 
how to verify that the agent acts in the best interest of the principal and does not 
follow her own self-interests (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2015; La Porta et al., 2000). 
 
2.5.1.4 Moral hazard 
The moral hazard effect emerges after contract closing and is divided into 
hidden action and hidden information. A hidden action is any activity in the 
context of actively realised or omitted action, which cannot be monitored by the 
principal. A lack of effort by the agent to act in the interest of the principal and to 
do the intended work for the principal is described by the term shirks (Hartmann-
Wendels et al., 2015). 
 It is also possible that the agent uses the resources of the principal to pursue 
his own interests, described as consumption on the job. Hidden information means 
that the principal is capable of monitoring the agent, but due to a gap of expertise 
she is not able to evaluate the agent’s working effort and performance capabilities. 
This information asymmetry allows the agent to realise fringe benefits. The agent 
can act for her own benefit without any benefit for the principal. One example is 
the investment bank employee, who works on private or other business projects on 
the principal’s time. However, the research is so similar to the intended work or so 
complex that the principal cannot detect what the agent is actually doing 
(Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2015; Blum et al., 2005). 
These situations have in common that they produce additional costs. The 
principal has additional monitoring costs and the agent incurs additional bonding 
costs as the agent cannot accept other offers while carrying out the current 
assignment. In addition, the principal incurs residential losses incurred from the 
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diverging principal and agent interests despite the use of monitoring and bonding 
(Schmidt, 2016). 
Mutual trust, e.g. due to previous relations, reduces agency costs and 
increases the cooperation profit for both parties as in situation with a lack of 
confidence in each other, monitoring costs will rise continuously. This might lead 
to an overinvestment in safeguards. With the ambition to achieve a cooperative 
solution, there has to be consensus between the parties and activities of one's accord 
or manipulation have to be excluded. Consensus solutions found in a regulatory 
system have the advantage that the interests and values of each party are respected 
(Schmidt, 2016). 
Agency problems between the principal and the agent arise from a 
combination of information asymmetries and conflicting aims.  The three main 
ideas to overcome these problems are the reduction of information asymmetries, 
the harmonisation of aims and confidence building.  
 
2.5.1.5 Reducing information asymmetries 
Since all agency problems are based on information asymmetries, all 
measures to lower information asymmetries lead to a reduction of agency 
problems. These improvements can be achieved by both parties. An improvement 
of market transparency can be initialized by the principal as well as by the agent. 
The principal can try to gain additional information from other sources to reduce 
the level of asymmetric information (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2015). 
The principal with a lack of information respective to the agent can fill up this 
gap by active information procurement about the qualifications of the agent. This 
information procurement process is commonly known as screening. The screening 
process is done by the principal in his own interest, to avoid risks and problems of 
hidden characteristics and hidden intentions (Schieg, 2008). In relation to fairness 
opinions, investment banks might pretend to have experience in crafting FOs or 
with the business segment, but do not have the necessary skills or manpower to 
successfully proceed with the assignment. The idea to acquire an agent, which has 
proven to be qualified before, is an option to overcome these obstacles. Either a 
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previous relation can be beneficial as the qualifications are known on first-hand 
basis or a high reputation in the market, which signals quality. 
In addition to the principal, the agent can also help limiting the information 
deficit. This is called signalling. An agent with high qualities or reputation intends 
to differentiate from agents with less favourite attributes. In order to show the own 
abilities, the agents can reveal their unique qualities (Schmidt, 2016). An investment 
bank can, for example, provide previous fairness opinions or qualifying documents 
to the principal, demonstrating the previous success and experience. 
Screening and signalling are only relevant for problems arising before 
contract closing. After closing screening and signalling are superseded by 
monitoring and reporting. Both activities are aimed at reducing the asymmetric 
information distribution during the operating contractual relationship. Thereby the 
monitoring and reporting tools should also prevent the risk of hidden intention 
and moral hazard (Gӧbel, 2002). Table 2 summarises the shown problems related 
to the principal-agent theory and is based on the ideas of Hartmann-Wendels et al. 
(2015). 
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2.5.1.6 Harmonisation of aims 
Theory provides different solutions to mitigate hidden intentions and moral 
hazard. The programmability and measurability define the proposed solutions. 
Programmability is defined as the degree to which appropriate behaviour of the 
agent can be defined upfront by the principal. For simple tasks as cleaning jobs the 
outcome can be defined easily in advance, for example cleaning staff has to clean 
the entire building by the end of the night. The measurement of the job completion 
is rather simple compared to the services an investment bank offers. Consequently, 
different contract types are suggested. For more programmable jobs, behaviour 
based contracts (e.g. hourly wages) are suggested, whereas complex and less 
programmable jobs require an outcome-based contract (contingency fees for 
fairness opinions). 
Measurability becomes easier and faster, if the principal and agent know each 
other for a long time. In long-term principal-agent contracts it is most likely that 
the principal will learn about the agent, according to Lambert (1983). This means 
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that information asymmetries are larger in short-term contracts (as the creation of 
a fairness opinion). Hence, it is recommended for short term contracts to rely on 
previous relations as asymmetries of information are smaller and controlling 
becomes easier. This leads to a positive association of previous relation on the 
precision of fairness opinions. 
If the principal and agent would not pursue different aims, the level of 
asymmetric information between the two parties would not be relevant. Therefore, 
a harmonisation of aims is in the interest of both partners. This can be achieved, as 
seen, by a contractual agreement that offers the lowest potential of conflicts. Two 
different contractual agreements are desirable, depending on the level of 
complexity of the activities to be carried out. 
Before contract closing the principal should harmonise the agent’s aims with 
the own aims. This should consequently leads to a contract which offers the lowest 
conflict potential. The instrument of designing performance-oriented contracts is 
well-known especially for the remuneration of managers in stock listed companies. 
For example, the agent’s compensation claim can be linked completely or partially 
to the aim desired by the principal. Under certain circumstances, a material reward 
could reduce the motivation or even displace the motivation completely. A multi-
period cooperation has a positive effect on the agency problem, because of the 
possibility that the agent risks losing his reputation (Schmidt, 2016). 
Another approach to control the agent more thoroughly and easier is given 
by Gailmard (2014). According to his ideas, hiring multiple agents to carry out the 
same work independently will help to lower moral hazard and information 
asymmetries. Multiple (FO) agents will compete do be better than the other agents, 
either in time consumption and/or quality. Additionally, every agent will provide 
additional, incremental information to the principal and, hence, lower information 
asymmetries (Bovens et al., 2014). 
Hence, not only previous relations and contingency payments help to 
moderate the effects of asymmetric information, but also multiple FOs are seen as 
one way to overcome these problems. 
Tobias Lippe   66 
2.5.2 Information asymmetries between management and shareholder 
Until now, the discussion of the principal-agency theory has entirely focused 
on the relation of management (principal) and the fairness opinion provider 
(agent). However, the relation between shareholder and management is also a 
principal-agent relation. The shareholder is the principal and the management the 
agent, who should act in the best interest of the shareholder (Jensen, 1986). The 
same problems arise from this principal-agent relation as they arise out of the 
principal-agent relationship between management and fairness opinion provider. 
Nonetheless, the focus is different. 
Especially the financial rewards of management are in contrast to the 
financial rewards shareholders expect. A pay-out of excessive cash of companies in 
terms of dividends to its shareholders creates conflicts of interests. Pay-outs to 
shareholders reduce the resources under the agent’s control (management) and 
reduce the need for monitoring and also make monitoring easier for the 
shareholders (Harada and Nguyen, 2013; Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982). 
Additionally, dividend payments are generally expected to be beneficial to share 
prices (Gordon, 1959) and, hence, dividend payments are highly appreciated by 
shareholders. In contrast to that, managers prefer to keep dividends streams in the 
company as more funds under their control increase the power of managers. 
Likewise, compensation of managers is often linked to company growth 
(Bergstrasser and Phillipon, 2006; Murphy, 1985). Additionally, the urge of firms to 
promote middle managers in order to keep them satisfied creates a strong need to 
grow in order to supply the needed managerial levels constantly (Baker et al., 1993). 
Due to the diverging interest of the principal and the agent, cash is expected to be 
associated to the precision for the statistical analysis based on the principal-agent 
theory. 
These conflicts of interest in regards to pay-out policies grow if companies 
generate substantial free cash flows. Managers are interested to spend the excess 
free cash flows in all projects that generate positive net present values in order to 
grow, whereas shareholders might be able to find better projects with a better 
return outside the company (Jensen, 1986).  
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This conflict between management and shareholders has briefly introduced 
the problems of diverging interests and the influence of certain variables on 
shareholders’ returns. Therefore, the links between PAT and wealth transfers in 
M&A transactions are strong and partly explainable by principal-agent conflicts. 
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2.6 MAIN FINDINGS OF CHAPTER 2 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a systematic introduction to 
the essentials of fairness opinions as an integral part of public mergers and 
acquisitions in the USA, which will form the background for subsequent chapters. 
For this purpose a general description of fairness opinions is given in chapter 
2.1. Chapter 2.2 explains the relevance of fairness opinions due to the Smith vs. van 
Gorkom ruling. Furthermore, this subchapter is used to introduce the different 
functions fairness opinions can and have to fulfil in relation to the board of 
directors and shareholders. By delivering certain functions and information to its 
readers, first indications are given what variables might influence the precision of 
fairness opinions. These are, sorted by the order of appearance, friendly or hostile 
deals, size, reputation, cash, contingency fees and FINRA (year), the difference 
between target and acquirer valuations and lastly multiple fairness opinions and 
multiple valuations. 
Section 2.3 dealt with the regulatory frameworks in the US, focusing on 
disclosure requirements. It is highlighted that there is no obligation to obtain a 
fairness opinion in the USA, but since the Smith vs. van Gorkom ruling nearly 
every merger is using FOs to limit the liability of the board of directors. 
Nonetheless, conflicts of interest between the principals and agents can arise. 
Hence, disclosure requirements were changed in 2008 with the adoption of FINRA 
rule 2290. The effect on the quality and, consequently, precision of fairness opinions 
is not yet known and this change in legislation will be a variable for the empirical 
research. 
Furthermore, general criticisms against fairness opinions are mentioned and 
solutions and ideas offered by researchers and practitioners are presented. In 
particular, FOs are criticised for their arbitrary in valuation and missing standards 
in valuation models. Solutions include the use of at least a second fairness opinion 
to overcome problems caused by conflicts of interests. Other solutions recommend 
the use of an investment bank with a high reputation and/or an independent bank. 
Lastly, chapter 2 discusses the principal-agent theory as the criticism on 
fairness opinions has highlighted the possibly opposing interests of the involved 
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parties. The discussion shows the mechanisms that might influence the triangle of 
power, control and free-lancing in the relation between the board of management, 
investment bank and shareholders which bias the quality of fairness opinions. In 
doing so, the discussion offers solutions how to avoid conflict ridden fairness 
opinions. 
The variables derived from the functions of fairness opinions and the 
principal-agent theory are summarised in the following table and incorporate an 
indication what influence they are predicted to have on the valuation precision 
based on the previous discussion. 
 
Table 3: Summary of variables based on the functions and principal-agent 
theory and the expected influence on the precision of fairness opinions 
Variable Functions of FO 
Principal-agent 
theory 
Friendly deal +  
Size +  
Reputation o + 
Cash + o 
Contingency fees o + 
FINRA +  
Multiple FOs + + 
Related mergers + + 
Previous relation + + 
Multiple valuations + + 
Acquirer +  
Source: own production 
where a + indicates a positive association to the precision and an o a neutral effect. 
 
 
Therefore, in chapter 3 the so far identified variables will be discussed with 
regards to their influence on wealth transfers in M&A deals. Chapter 3 will focus 
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on deal characteristics variables influencing fairness opinions with regards to 
mergers and acquisitions. Also fairness opinions cannot be directly compared with 
results from M&A research, it can be expected that some variables that improve the 
quality (in terms of lower wealth transfers or improved cumulative abnormal 
returns) of M&A deals will also improve the quality of fairness opinions. Lastly, 
the current status of research in FOs will be discussed under consideration of deal 
specific and fairness opinion specific variables and the hypotheses formulated. 
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3 WEALTH TRANSFERS IN MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS AND ITS 
RELATION TO FAIRNESS OPINIONS 
Chapter two has provided variables expected to be associated to the precision 
of fairness opinions. These variables are now discussed with regards to the 
association on M&A. The aim is to deduct from the existing body of literature 
whether the association is positive or negative. The research on M&A is mutually 
limited on deal characteristic variables. Lastly, the current available body of 
literature with regards to the performance of transactions using fairness opinions 
is presented and the hypotheses are formulated. The discussion of fairness opinion 
research results allows analysing deal and fairness opinion specific characteristics. 
Special attention is paid on the level of asymmetric information related to these 
variables and the functions they fulfil. 
 
3.1 WEALTH TRANSFERS IN MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
3.1.1 Target and acquirer in mergers & acquisitions 
A general wealth gain arising from mergers and acquisitions is still highly 
debated among researchers. Many researchers agree that mergers and takeovers do 
not create wealth, but merely transfer ownership of assets (Martynova and 
Renneborg, 2008; Peacock and Bannock, 1991). A full explanation why merger-
active companies and economies underperform the market cannot be answered 
within a couple of pages as it involves a complex interplay of economic, social and 
political factors (Ismail and Krause, 2010; Porter, 1998). As the focus of this 
dissertation is based on the precision of fairness opinions, the following notations 
try to summarise the main findings. 
 The bulk of empirical evidence suggests that positive gains from takeovers 
accrue almost entirely to shareholders of target firms (Moeller et al., 2004a; Jensen 
and Ruback, 1983). While the average abnormal return recorded in these studies is 
invariably positive and statistically significant, returns to the shareholder of 
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bidding firms are negative for mergers and not significantly different from zero for 
takeovers. Consequently, a separation between targets and acquirers is beneficial 
when analysing returns for M&A and the precision of fairness opinions (Cain and 
Denis, 2012). Finally, acquisitions and mergers are on average not wealth-creating, 
but the takeover process transfers wealth from the shareholders of the bidder to 
those of the target (Moeller et al., 2004a; Houston et al., 2001; Agrawal et al., 1992; 
Healy et al., 1992; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992; Servaes, 1991; Jensen and Ruback, 
1983).  
However, the transfer of shareholder wealth cannot be observed in every 
period of time. In a research using only UK data from 1977-1986, the results suggest 
that the gains experienced by target’s shareholders occurred at the expense of the 
acquiring shareholders’ account, but the wealth decrease of the bidding 
shareholders was especially observed in the period from 1977 to 1980. The last six 
years of this study showed no significant abnormal wealth destruction on the 
bidding side or wealth redistributions between target and acquirer (Limmack, 
1991). 
Nonetheless, the general negative results for acquirers are not shared by 
other researchers. Based on an empirical study covering 30 years from 1955 to 1985 
and over 3,400 mergers in the US and UK, significant wealth gains for both sides 
are observed (Franks et al., 1991). The observed wealth increase on the acquirer’s 
side amounts to +8% in the UK and +4% in the USA. The wealth gains for the target 
side’s shareholders are significantly higher with +31% in the UK and +24% in the 
US. Nonetheless, none of the cited studies can be compared one by one to another 
study as the time spans to measure the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 
differently chosen. Some studies focus on a time period of only a couple of hours 
after the announcement is made to measure CARs, whereas other studies observe 
CARs over many years. Another study agrees to the fact that the observed wealth 
destructions on the acquirer side cannot be explained by wealth transfers from the 
acquirer side to the target side. This study highlights some big wealth destructions 
in large M&A activities as the driving force behind the partly observed wealth 
losses on the acquirer side (Moeller et al., 2003; Gregory, 1997). 
To round up the previous discussion it can be said that wealth gains or losses 
resulting from M&A are still heavily debated, but some M&A transactions are more 
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successful than others. However, the discussion is able to demonstrate that wealth 
gains are larger for targets and lower for acquirers and these differences are neither 
depending on timing nor on markets. Hence, a separation between targets and 
acquirers is needed for the empirical analysis. 
 
3.1.2 Cash versus stock payment in mergers & acquisitions 
3.1.2.1 Introduction to the role of cash 
The review on cash or stock as a method of payment in M&A deals is needed 
as managers have different reasons why they choose one of the two payment 
options or a combination of the two (Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). The body 
of literature can be divided in two different groups. The first group is the means of 
payment groups (cash versus stock) and the other one the source of financing 
(internal cash reserves or cash flow versus debt financing). As the second group 
becomes only relevant if cash is chosen to pay for the deal, the following discussion 
will be divided in cash and stock. The difference in the source of financing will be 
explained in the cash part.  
 
3.1.2.2 Cash payment 
The empirical literature provides substantial evidence that suggests that 
announcements of all-equity M&As results in significantly negative cumulative 
abnormal returns to acquiring shareholders. Deals fully financed by cash, on the 
other hand, outperform fully stock financed deals (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2006; Andrade et al., 2001; Travlos, 1987). The diverging performances are 
explained by signalling effects as they are also observed in the functions of fairness 
opinions. The signalling effects of cash are positively loaded, whereas stock 
payments are negatively connoted according to the signalling hypothesis by 
Travlos, 1987.  The negative connotation of stock deals is explained by overvalued 
stocks that are used to buy the targets (Fu et al., 2013; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
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Cash financed deals can have three different sources where the money is 
obtained from. These three sources are internally generated cash-flows, cash from 
borrowings (debt financing) and cash from new equity issues.  
Debt financed deals might be initiated by the acquiring management board 
to make use of possible tax savings that are associated with debt financed deals 
(Trinchera, 2012; Graham, 2000). Unused debt facilities lower the market valuation 
of companies by up to 9.7% (Graham, 2000) and companies operating below their 
optimal debt level are foregoing potential benefits of debt financing (van 
Bingsbergen et al., 2010). An increased level of debt financing can also be used by 
management to protect the own company of becoming a potential target as buyers 
might be interested in the unused debt potential (Lewellen et al., 1985). This risk is 
especially given when a large number of firms are cut off from the mechanisms of 
capital-raising. Well-managed companies with low debt levels and wide debt 
capacities are in these situations first candidates to be taken over under conditions 
of high uncertainty (van Bingsbergen et al., 2010). The overall positive CARs of debt 
financed transactions is proven in multiple researches (Martynova and Renneborg, 
2011; Ghosh and Jain, 2000). 
The results for deals financed by new equity issues are mixed, whereas deals 
financed by internally generated free cash-flows deliver negative results. New 
equity financed deals are on the one hand expected to be value-destroying for the 
shareholders as costs are high for new share issues compared to free cash or debt. 
On the other hand, Schlingemann (2004) finds especially positive returns, even for 
the acquirers, if the Tobin-Q ratio is high9 and stocks are overvalued in comparison 
to the average P/E ratio. Hence, the use of overvalued shares over compensates the 
high costs of issuing new shares. 
Acquiring firms with excess cash destroy value due to overbidding or a 
misuse of the excess cash. Jensen (1986) posits that managers assign low 
                                                   
9 Tobin’s Q ratio assumes that all companies on the stock market are valued equally 
to their replacement costs as measured by the firm’s assets. The Q ratio is calculated by 
dividing the total market value of the firm by the total asset value. Companies with a Q 
below 1 are undervalued and Qs greater than indicate an overvaluation (Tobin and 
Brainard, 1976). 
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opportunity costs to their internal free excess cash flows that are not needed for 
reinvestments or normal business activities. Due to the low internal costs, 
managers are more likely to invest in low return projects or deals where a negative 
net present value is given. Hence, managers are more likely to engage in value 
destroying acquisitions (Stulz, 1990). Financing policies limiting the cash resources 
under management’s control, like dividend payments, can mitigate or prevent this 
misuse. Another issue with free cash flows is that free cash flow is frequently used 
for managerial empire building (see e.g. Gorton et al., 2009, Servaes 1991). Empire 
building has the advantage that the company becomes harder to be overtaken by 
competitors, but also leads to build spheres of influence, which lower the chance to 
control management strictly (Masulis et al., 2007). Monitoring becomes more 
complex for shareholders. 
 
3.1.2.3 Stock payment 
In general, managers have superior knowledge and information about their 
own companies than any other person (Ataullah et al., 2014). These advantages in 
information levels can be used by rational managers to achieve gains for their 
companies and shareholders from timing anomalies resulting from irrationality in 
capital markets (Huang and Ritter, 2009; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
If managers perceive their shares to be overvalued by the market, they are 
motivated to use the potentially overvalued shares to acquire firms that are 
undervalued by the market. The overvaluation can be measured in two ways, 
either the price/earnings ratio (P/E ratio) or the Tobin’s Q ratio. If any of the two 
ratios is high, the likelihood for stock payments increases significantly (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003). It is expected that smart management teams of overvalued acquiring 
firms try to make use of their supposedly overvalued shares by buying 
undervalued or less overvalued companies. The overvalued shares are used to pay 
for the acquisition (van Bekkum et al., 2011). Since market errors like over- and 
undervaluation get corrected in the long-term, overvalued firms undertaking stock 
acquisitions seek to protect themselves against future share price corrections by 
selecting relatively undervalued targets (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). A return to the 
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average long-term P/E ratio leads to a lower market capitalisation and, hence, a 
negative return associated with the merger (Dong et al., 2006). 
This assumption is supported by different separate, internationally oriented 
long-term studies. The results do clearly suggest that stock deals underperform 
cash deals significantly in relation to cumulative abnormal returns (Dong et al., 
2006).  The overvaluation of shares as well as the higher risk of owning shares 
leading to higher risk premiums are among the discussed explanations for that 
(Dong et al., 2006; Asquith, 1983; Langetieg, 1978). 
A commonly used method to analyse the success of mergers is a comparison 
between a group including mergers and another group, where the performance of 
shares is measured, which are not engaged in M&A activities in the given time 
period. Cumulative abnormal returns are used for this purpose. 
A study consisting of 534 deals has yielded a significant underperformance 
of stock mergers by -23.6% and -36.1%, depending whether the deal is a merger (-
23.6%) or a takeover (-36.1%), whereas cash deals outperformed the comparison 
group by +5.1% in mergers and +69.8% in tender offers (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). 
Furthermore, differences in bidder-target valuations are greater among stock 
offers than among cash offers (Dong et al., 2006) as a larger premium on the share 
price of the target is needed to convince the market to agree to the suggested 
takeover. Additionally, a takeover process is a time-consuming process. This means 
that a takeover financed with shares must include a premium to include a risk 
buffer for share price fluctuations during negotiations and final settlement of the 
merger (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). These larger valuation differences and 
premiums are believed to be incorporated in the valuation ranges of fairness 
opinions, leading to a negative association of stock payments to the precision. 
 Consequently, cash deals are expected to yield better cumulative abnormal 
returns and contribute positively to the performance of transactions compared to 
share financed transactions, albeit cash does also offer serious drawbacks. 
However, the level of asymmetric information in cash deals is lower compared to 
stock financed deals. 
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Due to the last two arguments, a positive association on the precision of 
fairness opinions can be derived from the previous discussion for cash deals. 
 
3.1.3 Size of the deal in mergers and acquisitions 
3.1.3.1 Absolute size in terms of transaction size 
The effects of the transaction size in terms of the paid price by the acquirer 
for a target on M&A performance are still debated and no clear indication is given 
whether larger deals are easier to value or yield better results than smaller deals.  
The hubris of management thesis by Roll (1986) is mostly used for a negative 
argumentation towards size. Hubris of management leads to empire-building. The 
hubris of management causes a risk of overpayment and, hence, worse results for 
the acquiring shareholders. A mixture of overconfidence and empire-building is 
believed to lead to non-value maximising deals of larger corporations (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2008). In contrast to that, smaller firms tend to make acquisitions where 
they know the market and products well, which increases the returns from 
acquisitions (DePamphilis, 2010). With a large data set at hand Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004b) have analysed cumulative abnormal returns of 
mergers and find better cumulative abnormal returns for smaller deals.  
In the same vein, another research proxies the complexity of a deal by the size 
and concludes that larger companies consist of more business units, which makes 
the valuation process more difficult and, hence, less precise (Servaes and Zenner, 
1996). However, this negative impact can be overcompensated by the preference to 
choose a highly competitive investment bank, which will improve the precision. 
Furthermore, large companies are expected to have lower levels of asymmetric 
information in comparison to smaller companies against the creator of the fairness 
opinion as they are more likely to use in-house investment banking services or at 
least advices from their own M&A team to inform themselves on the quality, 
integrity and honesty of a proposed transaction. These services are normally fully 
controlled by an investment bank. Therefore, having the ability to use in-house 
services reduces the contractual agreed work of the investment bank and makes it 
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additionally easier to control the actions of the bank, according to the PAT (Servaes 
and Zenner, 1996). 
Besides that, larger companies are assumed to be better informed about 
market trends and competitors and can thereby contribute positively to the work 
of the investment banks. This cooperation helps to increase the valuation precision 
of investment banks and is a strong argument for advantages of larger deals in 
M&A (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). Though, although Servaes and Zenner see an 
increased complexity, the advantages of lower asymmetric information in 
knowledge and experience over compensate the increased complexity. Overall 
they assume that larger deals are superior to smaller deals. 
The positive signalling effects of cash are more likely to be achieved by larger 
deals as the likelihood to use a higher ratio of cash or only use cash to finance a 
deal is higher for larger deals than for smaller deals (Fich et al., 2018), which is 
associated to better outcomes as the discussion of cash has shown. 
Contradicting the positive link between size and cash are the results of 
another research, where larger targets significantly yield better returns in M&A, 
but stock payments are preferred. The explanation given in the study is larger deals 
are more successful than smaller ones as market control factors leading to a market 
domination are relevant (Fuller et al., 2002). Therefore, market domination can be 
added to the positive argumentation of the superiority of larger deals. 
Lower levels of asymmetric information are linked to other positive size-
related effects which are noted in other researches of Trimbath et al. in 2001, Hunter 
and Jagtiani in 2003 and Moeller et al. in 2004b, just to mention a few. Due to the 
increased amount of publicly available data, larger deals deliver better CARs. 
Another advantage of official and public data is that public data is less likely to be 
biased by management as quarterly reports must follow a standard layout. 
Additionally, manipulating regular financial statements is more difficult than 
manipulating a single statement issued for a one-time special event (Hunter and 
Jagtiani in 2003 and Moeller et al. in 2004b). 
Another argument for lower levels of asymmetric information of larger deals 
is related to the number of independent analysts following a company to give 
investment recommendations. By providing recurring recommendations, analysts 
lower information asymmetries in the markets in M&A and coverage is higher for 
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larger companies (Chang et al., 2006).Therefore, larger companies have more 
publicly available data and a higher analyst coverage. 
Competition for large targets is less intense than for smaller targets as fewer 
potential buyers are available and able to provide the needed financing. Due to the 
lower competition, the risk of tender offers is lowered and premiums can be chosen 
on a lower level, reducing the losses for acquiring shareholders (Gorton et al., 2009). 
Additionally, in larger companies managers are less likely to hold a high 
percentage of ownership. To boost own profits resulting from the transaction, 
managers owning a large percentage of shares might ask for higher premiums. This 
leads to higher wealth transfers of the acquiring to target shareholders, leading to 
higher losses (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Overall, strong positive associations of 
larger deals are presented by the current body of M&A literature. 
 
3.1.3.2 Relative size 
Besides the absolute size of a target, the relative size can be of interest as well. 
Relative size indicates the market capitalisation of the target in contrast to the 
market capitalisation of the acquirer. 
Fich et al. (2018) find strongly significant results supporting the view that the 
relative size is more important than the absolute size of the target, but do not 
provide further indications why they believe so. Large differences in size are 
necessary to realise planned synergies according to Homberg et al. (2009). Negative 
relative size effects are observed by Golubov et al. (2012). Golubov et al. argue that 
the increased complexity of relatively large deals make the results less positive. 
However, Song et al. (2013) find opposing results and see a faster deal completion 
of relatively large targets and increased precision. 
 
Summarising the discussions on size it can be concluded that absolute size 
provides positive associations as information asymmetries are lower before the 
transaction takes place the larger the deal. However, relative size does not indicate 
a clear answer what targets should be preferred. On the one hand, smaller deals 
are seen to be easier to be integrated. On the other hand, larger deals provide more 
information and financial data that are less biased. With regards to fairness 
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opinions, larger deals are expected to yield better results as information 
asymmetries shall be lowered by FOs. This is only possible for the advising bank, 
if data is freely accessible and reliable and larger companies offer more public data. 
Due to the fact that fairness opinions only provide a valuation of the target, only 
absolute size effects will be considered in the empirical research. 
 
3.1.4 Reputation of banks in mergers and acquisitions 
3.1.4.1 Introduction to the role of banks 
Most market participants agree that financial advisors play a key role for the 
success of a transaction, mostly summarised in the superior deal hypothesis, stating 
that high reputation advisors suggest deals with higher overall transaction gains 
(Schiereck et al., 2009). The superior deal hypothesis is derived from theory 
describing the relationship between high reputation and high quality (Angwin, 
2001; Allen, 1984; Shapiro, 1983). In case of mergers and acquisitions, the 
investment banks mostly fulfil the following three core activities for their clients. 
Firstly, the investment bank identifies potential bidders or targets. Secondly, the 
banks are engaged to complete offers, seek for higher bids, defend against hostile 
offers, and finally negotiate the deal. Thirdly, investment banks advise on the 
bidding strategy, on the offer price, whether to accept or reject the offer, and 
evaluate the potential for competitive bids. In addition, practitioners emphasise the 
role of investment banks in providing liquidity and, therefore, an increase in 
efficiency on the market for corporate control (McLaughlin, 1990). 
But as shown by Ismail (2010), just a few prestigious investment banks 
dominate the M&A market. Recent empirical studies provide mixed evidence for 
the superior deals hypothesis, but indicate that the selection of financial advisors 
affects the performance of the associated transaction. 
Nonetheless, the reputation of investment banks cannot only be scrutinised 
with regards to different M&A performances, but the reputation is also determined 
to play an important role with regards to initial public offerings (IPOs). Hence, both 
areas will be considered in more detail to gain an independent understanding of 
the importance of reputation for FOs. 
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3.1.4.2 Mergers and acquisitions performance 
Financial advisors in transactions do generally increase shareholder returns 
due to their expertise in the market, which enables them to find suitable targets and 
identify financial and operational synergies in form of increased economies of scale 
and scope (Bowers and Miller, 1990). Building on this argumentation, many 
researchers argue in favour of the postulated superior deal hypothesis of banks 
with higher reputation (Fang, 2005). The high reputation is based on the expertise 
gained from previous experience and knowledge by advising other deals. Golubov 
et al. (2012) emphasise that advisors with a high reputation are willing to put more 
effort in providing their services as they fear a loss of reputation and market share, 
if their services are of low quality. With a loss of reputation, future businesses will 
diminish. 
Focussing on empirical results, Bowers and Miller (1990) find higher returns 
in M&A transactions advised by top-tier advisors due to their knowledge and 
experience. These higher returns are found for targets and acquirers. Concentrating 
on publicly traded targets, Kale et al. (2003) find that cumulative abnormal returns 
are lower if only the target firm chooses external M&A-advice. In contrast, 
shareholders benefit in form of higher CARs if either the bidder or the target firm 
is advised by a first-tier rather than a lower-tier investment bank. The results 
indicate additionally that top-tier investment banks are more likely to back out 
from transactions, if the risk of value-destroying deals is high. This underlines the 
argument that investment banks care for their reputation and a higher reputation 
leads to better FOs. 
A positive relation of the reputation of investment banks and the return of 
the acquirers’ shareholders is presented by Bao and Edmans (2011) and Golubov et 
al. (2012). Both researches argument with better skills of banks that have a higher 
reputation to identify synergy effects. The acquiring shareholders will benefit more 
than the target shareholders from these skills. Therefore, both results support the 
superior deal hypothesis. 
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Larger companies prefer larger investment banks, according to Titman and 
Trueman (1986). With the superior deal hypothesis in mind, both researchers are 
able to support the hypothesis by finding better cumulative abnormal returns for 
mergers with investment banks that have a higher reputation (Titman and 
Trueman, 1986).  
Chahine and Ismail (2009) find no significant differences between top-tier 
and low-tier advisors and Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) even find lower returns 
associated with top-tier advisors due to lower synergy gains than in deals 
counselled by low-tier investment banks. 
Top-tier investment banks are more likely to be engaged in more complex 
transactions, where higher premiums need to be paid, which lower the returns to 
the acquirer (Michel et al., 1991). Therefore, the results of Michel et al. indicate 
higher cumulative abnormal returns for deals advised by low-tier advisors 
compared to those advised by top-tier banks, which contradicts previous results. 
The higher complexity of deals advised by top-tier banks is supported by Servaes 
and Zenner (1996), who find lower returns for acquirers, if top-tier investment 
banks are used compared to in-house consulting. However, after controlling for 
factors increasing the complexity like the type of transaction, diversification and 
M&A experience of the acquirer, the results are not significantly different from each 
other anymore. 
Strongly negative reputation results are presented by McLaughlin (1990) and 
Rau (2000). They contradict the positive results in favour of a higher reputation. 
They discover a strong evidence for higher premiums paid by acquirers using a 
first-tier investment bank (average of 58%) to those using a third-tier investment 
bank (38%). If higher premiums paid in a transaction are expected to be negative 
on wealth effects of buyer’s shareholders, M&A performance is believed to be 
better if lower tier investment banks are used. These results are partly explainable 
as analysts and investments banks are not trying to be absolutely precise with their 
valuations, but only better than the peer group (Mikhail et al., 1999). 
The results so far have focused on the US market. Studies performed on the 
Australian market (Da Silva Rosa et al., 2004), the European market (Schiereck et 
al., 2009) and the Asian-Pacific market (Chuang, 2017) have found no significant 
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differences between top-tier and low-tier advisors, but support the arguments that 
top-tier banks are more likely to be used in larger deals and more complex 
transactions. For the Scandinavian market (Esbjörnsson and Lövstrand, 2016), top-
tier advisors deliver better results in form of higher returns for shareholders. The 
deal completion time is higher for top-tier advised deals and, hence, Esbjörnsson 
and Lövstrand argument that the top-tier banks take more time to ensure value 
creation and precise analysis. The European results do, therefore, support the 
superior deal hypothesis. 
One possible explanation why top-tier advisors deliver mixed results is that 
companies may choose their advisor according to advisors prestige and popularity 
as a self-protective measure, according to Ismail (2010). 
Summarising the previous discussion, the arguments given for a higher 
precision of fairness opinions using top-tier advisors outweigh contradicting 
results as they are mostly moderated, if the complexity of the deal is considered as 
well. Especially the argument of Mikhail et al. (1999) that banks are aiming to be 
more precise then the peer group and the superior deal hypothesis are strongly in 
favour of a positive association of reputation on the precision of fairness opinions. 
 
3.1.4.3 Initial public offering performance 
Multiple similarities exist between IPOs and fairness opinions. First of all, 
both processes are supported by an advisor, who, secondly, creates valuation 
models to come to a price range for shares. These similarities make IPO research 
interesting to predict the importance and impact of variables on fairness opinions. 
The second main similarity is the under-pricing of the IPO candidate, who is 
willing to sell new shares (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). With regards to fairness 
opinions, the same undervaluation is expected to be found in the target’s fairness 
opinions (Cain and Denis, 2012), where the target is also selling shares. 
Several reasons are proposed to explain why a firm would willingly under-
price its securities and limit the funds received in IPOs. Many of these reasons rely 
either on contractual problems between the parties involved (Baron, 1982) or on 
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asymmetric information (Chen and Mohan, 2002; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989). A 
common feature in these explanations is that lower uncertainty, in other words 
lower information asymmetries, reduces the need for under-pricing. The presence 
of a prestigious bank may serve as an effective vehicle to reduce uncertainty about 
future cash flows of the newly traded firm (Wang and Yung, 2011) and, 
consequently, under-pricing. Furthermore, better long term performance (Dong et 
al., 2011; Carter et al., 1998), an increase in analyst coverage (Loughran and Ritter, 
2004) and active information aggregation (Wang and Yung, 2011) is seen in IPOs 
advised by banks with a higher reputation, leading to a positive association of 
reputation on the precision. Therefore, the signalling theory of reputation is also 
applicable for IPOs. 
The ability of a firm to convey quality through the selection of the advisor is 
similar to that of the selection of the firm's underwriter. For example, Beatty and 
Ritter (1986) suggest that the underwriter can, through repeated business in the 
IPO market, develop a reputation. Comparable to the M&A market, the desire to 
protect their reputation leads higher-quality underwriters to market low-risk IPOs 
(Carter and Manaster, 1990). High-risk IPOs have a higher under-pricing, lower 
quality and, hence, less precision than low-risk IPOs (Chen and Mohan, 2002). 
Lower quality firms are generally associated with smaller and less experienced 
(reputated) banks (Beatty and Welch, 1996). 
The desire to uphold a high reputation level by banks can be observed by the 
strategies that are employed to identify IPOs where banks want to be associated 
with and how banks refuse those contracts they do not want to be connected to. 
Banks consider the acceptance of an IPO prospectus contract as one of the most 
important business decisions and do, consequently, screen the market carefully in 
advance (DuCharme et al., 2001; Titman and Trueman, 1986). 
Besides the negative effects on the reputation being associated with poorly 
performing IPOs, banks and advisors connected to poorly performing IPOs are 
more likely to be subject of lawsuits by disappointed shareholders (Lin et al., 2013). 
Larger and more prestigious advisors are more vulnerable to these lawsuits 
because of their "deeper pockets", which means that severance payments are higher 
than for smaller banks. Additionally, more severe consequences of damaged 
reputations occur for prestigious auditors (Dye, 1993).  
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The likelihood of a lawsuit is not only a result of the IPOs' immediate 
performance, but also of how they perform in the long run after they begin trading. 
Hence, reputable auditors have an incentive to associate themselves with IPOs that 
are less likely to perform insufficiently in the long run. More reputable banks are 
better able to achieve this and they assist IPOs with a better long-run performance 
than less known advisors (Carter et al., 1998). Being connected to well-performing 
IPOs does further increase the reputation, making the decision process more 
important for reputable banks and advisors (Dong et al., 2011). 
The theoretical considerations are also supported by empirical research. 
Consistent with previous results of Beatty and Welch (1996), significantly lower 
underpricing’s for IPOs are found in IPOs that use prestigious auditors (Neupane 
and Thapa, 2013). The empirical significances are given for different markets as 
well. Results from China by Wang et al., 2003, fully support the US results 
presented before (Carter et al., 1998). Furthermore, evidence shows that IPOs 
advised by lower reputation advisors are more likely to be delisted (Beatty and 
Welch, 1996). 
Summarising the discussion on reputation in relation to IPOs, the arguments 
given support the assumed association that a higher reputation of the advisor is 
positive for the precision of IPOs by reducing the undervaluation of the IPO 
candidate. The results are more consensus-driven than for the M&A performance. 
Hence, it can be concluded that the effects of a higher reputation on fairness 
opinions should be positive, leading to lower valuation ranges and higher 
valuation accuracy, mainly due to lower levels of asymmetric information and the 
superior deal hypothesis. 
 
3.1.5 Focused versus diversified mergers in mergers and acquisitions 
3.1.5.1 Introduction to the role of focused and diversified mergers 
In financial research, the discussion on the usefulness of focused or 
diversified company transactions can be divided in M&A transactions (purchases) 
and divestures. Both share the same characteristics and can be used to discuss the 
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advantages of any of the two concepts. Divestures and M&A transactions are both 
driven by the concepts of risk diversification and the power to dominate the 
market. 
 
3.1.5.2 Mergers and acquisitions 
The portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952) describes that risk diversification is 
generally leading to the same level of returns at a lower risk level. However, other 
research, e.g. Fama and Miller (1972) have shown that investors can better and for 
lower costs diversify risks than companies can do. Consequently, not surprisingly, 
the results of current research on merger success are supporting this statement. 
Diversification is mostly seen as less promising than focused acquisitions as the 
diversification should be carried out by the investor and not the company. 
Mergers are defined as horizontal, vertical or conglomerate. Mergers are 
considered as horizontal when the two companies are in direct competition and 
share the same product lines and markets. They are considered as vertical when 
the two companies have a downstream-upstream structure in which one company 
buys inputs from the latter to produce the final output and, hence, one company is 
the customer of the other. Finally, mergers are considered as conglomerate when 
firms are in different markets and/or do not have business lines in common 
(McCarthy, 2012). Conglomerate mergers are generally considered as diversified 
mergers (Motta, 2009).  
In practice, for most empirical studies, the type of the merger is determined 
by matching their SIC (standard industrial classification) digits. For instance, if the 
4-digits of the two firms coincide, the merger is considered as horizontal, if the first 
2-digits coincide, the merger is considered as vertical, and when none of the 4-digits 
coincide, the merger is said to be conglomerate (Motta, 2009). Another way to 
differentiate the kind of transaction is offered by SDC Platinum, where deals are 
grouped in eight different branches. A merger in the same branch is considered as 
focused, if both companies have the same branch and otherwise it is diversified. 
The different types of mergers occur mostly in waves, where for a certain 
period of time one of the three kinds of mergers is the preferred one. The first wave 
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covered the years from 1900 to 1920 and horizontal mergers were favorited to build 
monopolistic companies like Standard Oil (Lipton, 2006). The second wave in the 
1920s has seen vertical mergers like Ford that acquired steel suppliers to strengthen 
the upstream structure. The third wave lasted from the middle 1950s to the 1970s. 
During the third wave many companies diversified, giving this third wave the 
name mergers of conglomerates (Lipton, 2006). The fourth wave in the 1980s was a 
period of hostile takeovers (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001). The fifth wave in the 
1990s and first decade of the new millennium has seen a mixed kind of mergers, 
neither purely horizontal nor purely conglomerate. Especially deregulation and 
privatisations (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) as well as the raise of internet 
companies has led to large mergers in the telecommunications, entertainment, 
media and technology branches (Andrade et al, 2001), which lead to 
monopolisation and multi-national corporations (McCarthy, 2012). Mergers since 
the middle of 2000 are commonly seen as the sixth wave (Fich et al., 2018), still 
focussing on monopolisation to gain advantages by a higher market penetration. 
Focused acquisitions allow the company to discover and explain synergies 
more easily and in a shorter period of time. The exploration of synergies allows 
management to create economies of scale, where redundant use of assets, resources 
and staff can be reduced (Lambrecht, 2004). According to Fich et al. (2018), high 
synergies are the main value driver in acquisitions for the acquiring shareholders. 
Due to the reduction in waste usage of assets and resources, cost savings leading 
to a higher profitability are more likely to occur in focused mergers (Pike et al., 
2012; Rumelt, 1974). Additionally advantages in the knowledge transfer are 
observed for related mergers. Financing costs by the banks are lower as well as the 
critical mass and bargaining power are larger in the specific business segment than 
conglomerate companies of the same size can offer, where independent business 
units are smaller (Halkos et al., 2016). The chance to exploit value drivers delivering 
efficiency gains more thoroughly is higher as well (Salter and Weinhold, 1979). 
Whereas nowadays horizontal and vertical, hence, focussed mergers are 
mostly seen as more promising with regards to the exploitation of advantages than 
conglomerate mergers can offer, disagreement is often raised for large mergers and 
takeovers by antitrust agencies, if focussed mergers are considered (Motta, 2009). 
As horizontal and vertical mergers increase market power by lowering the number 
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of firms in the merging industry (Stigler, 1964), the risk of a binding veto by 
antitrust authorities is higher, which can increase the costs for these mergers 
significantly by forcing the companies to sell certain business segments as a 
precondition to allow the merger (Gao, 2011, p.799). Besides the mentioned 
advantages in market power and profitability, focussed mergers are nowadays also 
preferred as monitoring costs (Chen et al., 2007) are lower for managers and 
shareholders; a reason that connects seamless to the arguments of the PAT. 
A comparison of the costs to diversify risks among companies and individual 
shareholders in 1972 finds not only lower costs for individual shareholders when 
diversifying risks, but also shorter response times. Companies need many years to 
adjust to rapid market changes by spin-offs or other actions, whereas shareholders 
can rearrange their investments within a couple of hours. Costs are also lower as 
no expensive investment bank is needed, whereas a spin-off is very pricey as 
advisory services of investments banks are needed and hefty fees are paid for the 
execution (Fama and Miller, 1972). 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (also known as Herfindahl index) is a 
measure of the size of a firm in relation to the industry. It is used as a proxy or 
indicator of the amount of competition among them. The index is an economic 
concept widely applied in competition law and antitrust considerations. It is 
calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the top 50 firms within 
a specified industry and market shares are expressed as fractions. The result is 
proportional to the average market share. Therefore, it can range from 0 to 1.0, 
moving from a huge number of very small firms to a single monopolistic producer. 
Increases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a decrease in competition and 
an increase of market power. A company with an index of 1.0 is the only actor in a 
market and, hence, a monopolist, who can set prices according to its own ideas and 
generate the maximum achievable profit (Hirschman, 1964). Huyghebaert and 
Luypaert (2013) find better results for mergers that have a high Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, supporting the view that focused M&A is more successful. 
From a financial market perspective, related mergers are expected to yield 
better results as conglomerate companies are traded, on average, with a discount 
of 8% to 15% compared to focused companies (Berger and Ofek, 1995). In a research 
focussing on the banking sector better results are observed for banks specialised on 
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one segment rather than being an all-round bank offering different business 
streams (Houston et al., 2001). 
However, conglomerate mergers see advantages in shareholder wealth by 
offering coinsurance effects for debts, which lower credit costs and raise the 
maximum debt levels (Hann et al., 2013). 
Only one research finds negative CARs for focused mergers in comparison to 
conglomerate acquisitions. However, the study focuses only on CARs on the 
announcement date of the merger, so the time period is very short (Schipper and 
Thompson, 1983). Any other research carried out on CARs and longer observation 
periods contradicts these results and are support the previously discussed 
outcomes. Therefore, based on M&A observations, a positive association of 
focussed mergers on the precision of fairness opinions can be assumed due to 
higher market domination power and reduced monitoring costs. 
3.1.5.3 Spin-Offs and divestures 
The expected wealth transfers and effects of focused mergers can also be 
observed for spin-offs or divestures, hence, the exact opposite to mergers and 
acquisitions. 
The discounts conglomerate enterprises are experiencing (Berger and Ofek, 
1995) on the stock markets diminish after spin-offs are carried out. Once the 
companies start trading at a stock market, short, medium and long-term studies 
find positive effects on the company values. McConnell and Ovchinnikov (2004) 
find firstly a reduced amount of misallocated resources and, secondly, the discount 
rates applied to valuation models are lower afterwards. Furthermore, investor 
psychology and an increase in management’s efficiency create value after 
divestures, if the overall focus of the company has increased afterwards (Wheatley 
et al., 2005).  
Further advantages of focus increasing spin-offs are related to asymmetric 
information that arises to shareholders. The level of information asymmetry is 
lower for focused companies and these advantages outweigh the increased trading 
costs for the companies, according to Huson and MacKinnon, 2003. Trading costs 
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are higher as the old company was listed once, whereas after the divesture in form 
of an IPO, both companies are listed and double fees have to be paid (Huson and 
MacKinnon, 2003). 
Additionally, companies that have undertaken focus increasing divestures 
and spin-offs show a better investment efficiency than diversified companies (Ahn 
and Denis, 2004). 
All these results of spin-offs and divestures hold true for different 
observation periods, markets and decades (Wheatley et al., 2005). All mentioned 
researches have used cumulative abnormal returns to measure the performances 
and, hence, the results allow coming to similar conclusions than for the M&A 
analysis that focused companies outperform diversified companies. Focused 
acquisitions offer additionally a lower level of asymmetric information. Therefore, 
a positive association on the precision of fairness opinions for focussed transactions 
can be assumed. 
3.1.6 Friendly versus hostile mergers in mergers and acquisitions 
3.1.6.1 Introduction to the transaction type 
An acquisition or takeover is defined as acquiring the control of another 
company, the target, by a stock purchase or exchange, and can either be friendly or 
hostile (Pike et al., 2012).  
Whether a takeover attempt is perceived hostile depends on the 
communication to the target’s shareholders, board of directors and employees and 
the understanding of the message by the recipients. If the board of directors believe 
that the proposed bid is in-line with the interest of the firm´s shareholders, they 
will open up for a further dialog of a possible takeover and create a friendly 
environment (Morck et al., 1988). If the bid is considered hostile, it is, however, not 
unusual, that hostile takeovers turn out friendly at the end, as the bidder secures 
endorsement for the transaction from the target’s board of directors by altering the 
transaction details in favour of the target’s management or shareholders by offering 
more money or other incentives (Pike et al., 2012). 
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An acquiring company needs to offer a purchase premium to succeed with 
an acquisition; this is the difference between the purchase price and the target´s 
pre-acquisition stock price (Haleblian et al., 2009). The size of the purchasing 
premium includes all potential synergy effects minus the costs for the acquisition 
(DePamphilis, 2010; Morck et al., 1988).  
Three different ways are normally used to acquire a company, whereas the 
tender offer is the most common procedure and mostly welcomed as a friendly 
transaction, whereas the last two options are normally seen as hostile. 
 
3.1.6.2 Tender offer 
A tender offer is a public bid made directly to the firm’s shareholders to 
purchase their shares and, consequently, capture their voting rights. The 
prospective acquirer thereby invites all stockholders to tender their stock at a 
specified price in a specified time period. To persuade the majority of the 
stockholders to tender their shares, the offered price usually includes a substantial 
premium (Gaughan, 2011). A tender offer is perceived by management either as 
friendly or as unfriendly. In a friendly tender offer, target’s management is 
(usually) approached prior to the public offer to express the intentions of the 
bidder. The goal of the acquirer is to attain the board of directors’ recommendation 
to the offer. It may also occur that a prospective buyer chooses to present the tender 
offer directly to the shareholders (Gaughan, 2011). This is referred to as an 
unsolicited tender offer. By circumventing management’s approval, the offer is 
normally perceived as hostile. Unsolicited bids typically occur when a bidder has 
the intention to replace management. In case the bid is received unfavourably 
(contested), the bidder has to decide whether to continue or abort its mission. 
Despite the likely chance of facing takeover defences, a bidder often pursues the 
contested tender offer, ending up in a hostile process (Ireland et al., 2009).  
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3.1.6.3 Toehold 
An initial step that is often taken before entering a bid procedure is the 
purchase of target’s shares in the open market up to a specific threshold set by law. 
In doing so, an acquirer can establish a toehold position from which it could launch 
an offer. An advantage of a toehold is that the market is normally unaware of the 
purchase, which enables the bidder to buy shares without having to pay a premium 
to the market price. Toehold purchases are used as a means to lower overall costs 
of an acquisition (Bulow et al., 1999). In addition, having a minority interest in the 
target enables investors to influence the board in certain decisions (Gaughan, 2011; 
Choi, 1991). If a certain threshold is reached, the acquirer has the right to place 
favourable managers in the board of directors of the target company, which can 
lead to increased information about the target and lower information asymmetries 
(Gaughan, 2011). 
A toehold position in a potential target company places the bidder in a 
different, favourable position. The company has a dual role as both bidder and 
minority target shareholder. Consequently, a toehold position has a valuable 
function in an auction process, for both the voting power associated with the shares 
owned as well as the ability to boost the price for the minority stake. Toeholds are 
also acquired by hedge funds and other activist shareholder to force management 
into a sale’s process (Ireland et al., 2009). 
An acquirer can anonymously buy shares until a threshold of 5% in the USA. 
According to SEC regulations, an acquirer that exceeds a 5% equity stake must file 
with the SEC explaining the reason for the purchase and its intention with the target 
within 10 calendar days. The target must be informed simultaneously according to 
Rule 13D of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (Cornell Law School, 2018). 
 
3.1.6.4 Proxy fight 
A proxy fight, or proxy contest, is an attempt by corporate activists to 
persuade shareholders to use their proxy votes on contested issues and board 
positions. Proxy contests are political processes in which incumbent management 
and insurgents compete for shareholder votes. The objective of an acquirer is to get 
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the shareholders to vote in favour of a takeover or for replacement of management, 
in order to obtain takeover approval (Gaughan, 2011). A proxy contest can be an 
effective tactic to take over a company, especially in combination with a toehold 
position. 
Now that the different options how to gain the majority of shares in a 
company are introduced, the focus can be moved to the differences between 
friendly and hostile transactions. 
 
3.1.6.5 Hostile deals 
There are several situations in which takeover bids may turn out hostile. 
When an acquirer chooses to withhold from informing target management of its 
intentions, the unsolicited offer will very likely be considered hostile. But 
management may also reject a bid that imposes a threat to their position. A second 
reason might be that the board legitimately believes the bid is too low. And third, 
the board may also reject a bid because it does not support the strategic changes 
suggested by the bidding company. Finally, a rejection of a bid might be part of 
tactics to maximise shareholder value, either to boost purchase price or to create a 
window for competing bidders to enter (Schoenberg and Thornton, 2006). By 
raising the offer to a proposed price of the target, the offer might be considered 
friendly in the end. 
A hostile bid can be done either directly through a hostile tender offer or by 
open market through the public stock exchange. In order for a hostile acquisition 
to be accepted by the target firm shareholder’s, the premium is usually higher for 
hostile acquisitions than for friendly acquisitions (DePamphilis, 2010).  
A company has several tools to defend itself from hostile raiders. These 
defence mechanisms are categorised as preventive, when they are installed prior to 
the threat, or reactive, when they are deployed after the hostile bid (Schoenberg 
and Thornton, 2006). If the preventive mechanisms are strong enough, the 
companies will not be engaged in M&A. Therefore, for the discussion of the 
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precision of deals in M&A and with a focus on fairness opinions, only reactive 
actions are of interest. 
These reactive, defensive tools can make a hostile takeover attempt costly or 
lead to a cancellation of the proposed transaction. Poison pills can be employed by 
the target’s management to make the own company less attractive by lowering its 
value (Dong et al., 2006). Some of the most used takeover defence tactics or poison 
pills include the following (Pike et al., 2012): 
 Crown jewel defence, where the company sells-off its most attractive 
assets. Selling the cash cow of a company and remaining with a small, 
sometimes loss-carrying remaining company makes the company 
unattractive. 
 Capital structure changes, where a company restructures its capital. It 
involves paying shareholders a high dividend, which is primarily 
financed with considerable amounts of debt. After a recapitalisation, a 
company’s financial position is dramatically different than it was before, 
and the company is therefore a less attractive target. The attractiveness 
of unused debt capabilities has been highlighted in the discussion of 
cash in M&A. 
 White knight, where another company is sought to purchase the target. 
The other company might agree to leave the management in place or 
not to sell parts of the company. Hence, even with a lower bid, the 
company might be preferred by management (and shareholders). A 
variant of the white knight is the white squires defence. A white squire 
refers to a company that purchases a strategic stake to frustrate the 
hostile bidder, but without the intention of making a full takeover offer. 
 Acquiring another company to rise the own valuation or burn excess 
cash and becoming, thence, too expensive for the hostile acquirer. It is 
comparable to the capital structure change, but more future oriented as 
values are acquired instead of being distributed to the shareholders. 
 
Although offers in hostile deals are directly addressed to the target’s 
shareholders, hostile deals are more complex (Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003), which 
influences the time to deal completion negatively (Walter et al., 2008). Due to the 
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resistance of management, no direct negotiations are taking place and the 
resistance of the management team of the target leads to the need to offer a higher 
premium (Song et al., 2013). Due to the lack of direct communication between 
management, information asymmetries are higher and a potential risk for 
misevaluations. The higher premium in hostile transactions leads to higher costs 
for the acquirer and lower cumulative abnormal returns, hence, the precision is 
lower (Golubov et al., 2012). All the previous considerations lead to a negative 
association of hostile deals on the precision of fairness opinions, especially due to 
the higher levels of asymmetric information. 
 
3.1.6.6 Friendly deals 
In friendly acquisitions the details of the merger are negotiated on equal 
footing and as a consequence friendly transactions offer a lower risk of 
misevaluations by the acquirer due to an increased availability of data and 
background information (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). The level of asymmetric 
information is lower. 
A company that considers acquiring another firm would prefer to negotiate 
privately with the target, rather than to enter a competitive auction. There are 
several ways a transaction process can be designed. This ranges from a one-on-one 
deal, with only one bidder, to a broad auction that may include over ten bidders. 
In an auction, there is a decreased chance for acquirers to be successful and the 
purchase price is likely to increase (Sarkar et al., 2007). 
Mergers are defined as combining of two or more entities into one entity by 
a share-swap or a pooling of interests and are, per definition, generally friendly 
and enjoy the full support of the board of directors in both companies (Pike et al., 
2012). Consequently, mergers do not share the risk profile of hostile acquisitions 
(Tuch and O'Sullivan, 2007).  
Due to the lower level of information asymmetries as well as management’s 
endorsement and lower premiums, friendly mergers are expected to yield a higher 
precision in fairness opinions than hostile deals. 
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3.1.7 Main findings of factors causing wealth transfers in mergers and 
acquisitions 
Six variables are discussed in chapter 3.1. These variables have their 
foundation in the discussion of the functions and objectives of fairness opinions, 
which are presented in chapter 2. However, the variables number of fairness 
opinions, number of valuations, previous relation, FINRA (year) and contingency 
fees are not discussed as they are not deal specific variables. Only deal specific 
characteristics can be analysed in M&A research. These mentioned variables are 
fairness opinion specific variables and can, hence, only be discussed in the 
following sub chapter. Nonetheless, deal specific variables can be addressed again 
with the focus on FO research. 
As the previous discussion has shown, the return of the selling shareholders 
is generally positive and, hence, for an overall creation of wealth in a merger, the 
wealth destruction on the buyer side must be as low as possible and below the gains 
of the target shareholders. Transferring this to fairness opinions, the overall 
precision of FOs is better, if the undervaluation on the target side and the 
overvaluation on the acquirer side are smaller. 
The next sub chapter is going to discuss research with a strong link to fairness 
opinions. As fairness opinions are used in the context of financial markets, the 
introduction to general M&A success factors is helpful to understand the following 
arguments more easily. 
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3.2 CURRENT RESEARCH ON FAIRNESS OPINIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
FORMULATION 
The upcoming subchapter discusses the current state of research in the field 
of fairness opinions. The aim of this dissertation, determining variables influencing 
the precision of fairness opinions, is nearly completely untouched by researchers 
so far and this lack of research is also the reason for the detailed discussion in 
chapter 3.1. 
However, at least some comparable research is carried out on cumulative 
abnormal returns in M&A under the condition that fairness opinions are used. 
These research results will be used to come up with hypotheses for the empirical 
research. In order to summarise all previously discussed research results, the first 
paragraph of these subchapters is always used to briefly summarise the results of 
the M&A research and the principal-agent theory. Firstly the deal specific variables 
will be discussed and afterwards the fairness opinion specific variables. 
 
3.2.1 Deal specific variables 
3.2.1.1 Target or acquirer requesting the fairness opinion 
The need to distinguish between target and acquirer shareholders is stated in 
the PAT and general discussion of FOs and M&A transactions. According to the 
principle-agency theory, uninsured people will only buy health protection, if their 
costs of obtaining medical services are above the costs for the insurance. People 
with lower costs for medical services will not enter into the contract as they are 
better off without the contract (Akerlof, 1970). This means for shareholders that 
they will only sell their shares if the benefits promised in the FO are larger than the 
benefits of keeping the shares. 
The results of company valuations in IPOs suggest a general undervaluation 
of the company (Campbell et al., 2008; Carter and Manaster, 1990) going public in 
order to convince the market participants to buy the shares. 
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Hence, shareholders of the target will only sell shares to the acquirer, if the 
monetary return is larger as they would be, if they keep the shares and sell them 
somewhere else, e.g. stock market. However, a moral hazard for the acquirer exists 
as the offer cannot be too high, otherwise the own shareholders will suffer due to 
overpayment. This would increase the risk of shareholder litigation as court cases 
have shown (Smith vs. van Gorkom). Consequently, fairness opinions are 
profoundly impacted by these opposing ideas. 
In order to convince the target shareholders to sell the shares, the fairness 
opinion of the target’s advisor must provide an undervaluation (the fair value in 
the fairness opinion is lower than the offered price) in the valuation models. Doing 
so, the target shareholders realise that the offered price is near the maximum of a 
“fair” valuation and keeping the shares will not lead to higher returns. Contrary to 
that, the advisors of the acquirer must indicate in their fairness opinions that the 
target’s price offered is in the lower range of a “fair” price. In order to do that, the 
advisors come on average to an overvaluation (the fair price in the fairness opinion 
is higher than the offered price) of the target, meaning that the later paid price is 
below the average prices that the bidder would normally have to pay, according to 
the FO (Cain and Denis, 2012). 
Research on fairness opinions support this view by finding strong evidence 
that the investment banks of acquirers do normally value targets significantly 
above the offered price. This overvaluation is on average 20%. The authors of this 
study, Cain and Denis (2012), have also demonstrated that target advisor’s median 
valuations are significantly below the offer price, which supports the allegation that 
targets are significantly undervalued in target advisors fairness opinions and 
significantly overvalued in acquirers’ fairness opinions. 
In the sample of Cain and Denis, the mean range is 76% of the offer price with 
a median range of 48% for acquirers’ advisor fairness opinions and 60% for the 
mean and 36% for the median of all target advisors’ fairness opinions. Therefore, 
they conclude that fairness opinions of target advisors produce more informative 
valuations. Hence, the level of asymmetric information is better reduced by fairness 
opinions of the target. These test results will be repeated by the tests on under-
/overvaluation. 
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Hence, it is interesting to challenge the fairness opinions on the basis of its 
requester. If the acquirer has asked an advisor to issue a fairness opinion, it can be 
assumed that the valuation will justify the price and even overvalue the target. On 
the other hand, a fairness opinion demanded by the target will most properly 
undervalue the target.10 Suggesting a price below the initial offer will help 
convincing shareholders to sell their shares to the acquirer. 
Due to the argumentation in current theory, with regards to fairness opinions 
especially expressed by Cain and Denis (2012), it is necessary to account for the 
differences between the valuations issued by the target advisors and those issued 
by the advisors of the acquirers. Table 4 lists the arguments for the acquirers and 
targets. Target fairness opinions are more informative according to Cain and Denis 
(2012). 
 
Table 4: Arguments for under- and overvaluation depending on the 
provider of the fairness opinion 
Acquirer Target 
overvaluation is limited due to 
litigation risks 
overvaluation is needed to 
convince shareholders 
undervaluation is needed to 
convince shareholders 
undervaluation is smaller than 
overvaluation 
Source: own production 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Fairness opinions issued by the acquirer’s advisor overvalue 
the target whereas FOs of the target’s advisor undervalue the target. 
Hypothesis 1b: The valuation range in FOs of target advisors is smaller than 
the valuation range in FOs of the acquirer. 
                                                   
10 In this paper the term undervaluation always means that the valuation of the target 
is below the mean valuation of a deal with opinions from the target and acquirer. 
Consequently, it can also only be a theoretical undervaluation, if the acquirer also comes to 
an undervaluation. For the term overvaluation the definition is used vice versa. 
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Hypothesis 1c: The difference between target and acquirer valuations has no 
association to the valuation accuracy. 
 
3.2.1.2 Cash payment in fairness opinion 
The principal agent theory has elaborated on the reasons why cash deals are 
predicted to have a better outcome for shareholders on the buyer side. Paying with 
cash instead of own shares is believed to lead to higher returns on the buyer side. 
The literature review of M&A performance agrees generally on the fact that cash-
financed acquisitions yield better results, measured by the means of better 
cumulative abnormal returns, but also shorter deal closing times than for stock 
deals (Tichy, 2001; Andrade et al., 2001; Loughran and Vijh, 1997). Additionally, 
cash deals make the valuation process easier and have a positive signalling effect. 
Most importantly, the level of asymmetric information is lower for cash deals than 
for stock deals. 
With regards to fairness opinions the risk of asymmetric information between 
any of the parties involved and costs of monitoring the agent are increased for 
share-exchange offers (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). The comparably ease in the 
valuation process for cash financed deals can be explained by the highly specified 
knowledge that is needed to value securities and stocks accordingly. If a deal is 
financed with newly issued shares, the financial expert crafting the fairness opinion 
needs further knowledge and experience in the issuance of new shares and how 
this affects the market capitalisation. Consequently an increase in risk is expected, 
which has to be reflected in the fairness opinion, leading to a lower precision 
(Servaes and Zenner, 1996). 
Another argument for a less clear outcome for share financed deals is 
proposed by Kisgen et al. (2009) as a payment with shares carries the risks of stock 
market fluctuations. Compared to cash deals, the share prices of stock financed 
deals can fluctuate during the merger process on both sides – the target and 
acquirer side - compared to a stable cash offer. Nonetheless, although share prices 
can fluctuate, an inclusion of a change in a relevant stock index as the S&P 500 is 
not compulsory as it is the standard and obligatory procedure for research on CARs 
(e.g. Kisgen et al., 2009; Servaes and Zenner, 1996). The fairness opinions and deal 
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price are not altered due to stock market changes. The valuation in the fairness 
opinion is derived without relations to the stock market and only based on the 
valuation models (Zimmermann, 2015). Additionally, as chapter 2.1.2 has 
elaborated, FOs are written and made public briefly before the public 
announcement is made. Hence, the market cannot fluctuate heavily in this short 
period of time compared to CAR research, where the time period observed is often 
30 days or more long. Nonetheless, the pricing function of fairness opinions is not 
fully supported for share-exchange offers. These arguments are supported by 
Mihanovic (2005). 
Setting all the findings in relation to FOs the results of higher premiums in 
stock financed deals indicate a higher underlying risk in stock financed deals 
compared to cash financed deals (McLaughlin, 1990). The legal risk of mitigation is 
increased due to the lowered power of the pricing function of fairness opinions and 
the risk of higher levels of asymmetric information for share-financed transactions 
(Kisgen et al., 2009). Consequently, increased legal risks for stock deals are added 
to the existing arguments from the general M&A discussion as an argument for a 
higher precision of cash financed deals. Fairness opinion providers are expected to 
incorporate a risk premium of e.g. 15% to a valuation range to compensate the 
higher risk. In turn, the valuation range will increase further and, hence, lower the 
precision of fairness opinions. 
To summarise the theoretical outline on cash, the current body of literature is 
in favour of a higher precision for cash deals, a view which is support by the limited 
amount of research on cumulative abnormal returns with regards to fairness 
opinions due to signalling effects of cash, a better pricing function and fairness 
opinions less concerned with asymmetric information. 
Table 5 summarises all arguments.  
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Table 5: Benefits of cash and disadvantages of stock payment 
Advantages of cash Disadvantages of stock 
cash has a positive signalling effect higher undervaluing risk 
faster deal closing specialised knowledge needed 
Lower information asymmetries increased legal risks 
Source: own production 
Hypothesis 2: A higher fraction of cash increases the precision of fairness 
opinions. 
 
3.2.1.3 Size of target in fairness opinion 
The general indecisiveness in relation to the influence of size on M&A 
transactions, especially expressed by Servaes and Zenner (1996), is shared by one 
of the researches that are carried out with regards to fairness opinions. Focussing 
on cumulative abnormal returns for deals obtaining fairness opinions, Kisgen et al. 
(2009) do also not come to clear results. The size of a target in terms of its market 
capitalisation has a direct negative influence on the complexity of the company 
valuation process and, henceforth, on the uncertainty felt by advisors. This 
uncertainty is expected to be reflected in a larger range of possible firm values and, 
hence, a lower precision. However, this uncertainty might be absorbed by 
experienced M&A managers in the own company or simply by more costly and 
assumingly better deal advisors (Kisgen et al., 2009). 
A target selling its entire firm and not only a minority position is a relative 
large deal and the duty of care by the target’s management board accordingly high. 
The potential risk of litigation by the target’s shareholders is likewise high. Thence, 
target’s management wants to promote a fair deal by asking for a fairness opinion. 
The increased risk for the provider of the fairness opinion and the target’s 
management board for litigation might result in a higher valuation range in the 
fairness opinion to lower these risks (Kisgen et al., 2009). But despite the increased 
importance of big deals, larger acquirers might have internal resources to value a 
target and better appraisal figures, which can support the fairness opinion provider 
with helpful information and limit the valuation range stated in the fairness 
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opinion. The last argument shows a strong correlation to the arguments given in 
the discussion on size in M&A activities in general. However, the just presented 
results are only theoretically discussed and do not provide any statistical evidence 
to support these assumptions (Kisgen et al., 2009). 
German data for the use of fairness opinions in mergers and acquisition has 
shown that larger transaction, which are defined as transactions with more than 1 
billion Euro share capital valuation, make use of fairness opinions in 87.5% of all 
deals compared to only 40% for smaller deals. However, the quintessence of this 
research is limited in its significance due to the small sample size of only 22 mergers 
and the period, which is limited to 2007 (Aders et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the 
increased usage of fairness opinions for larger deals should, assuming a general 
usefulness of fairness opinions, which is accepted in this dissertation, lead to an 
increased precision of larger deals. Especially the discussion of the functions of 
fairness opinions provides a positive association of size. 
Table 6 summarises the pro and cons of the discussion. 
Table 6: Pros and Cons of size 
Pro Con 
more experience with M&A increased complexity 
more internal resources increased uncertainty 
increased use of FO risk of litigation 
Source: own production 
 
Hypothesis 3: Larger deals lead to a higher precision of fairness opinions 
than smaller deals. 
 
3.2.1.4 Reputation of investment bank providing the fairness opinion 
The expected association of reputation based on the principal agent theory 
and M&A research provides a clear picture. A higher reputation is positively 
associated with lower asymmetric information levels, a better deal selection and 
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more thorough analysis by the bank. Thence, reputation is seen to be highly 
relevant for the precision of fairness opinions.  
First theoretical researches of reputation and fairness opinions attach a 
negative association to the reputation as the reputation is proclaimed to be used by 
corporate directors only to help persuading shareholders to approve transactions. 
The stringent focus of Bebchuk and Kahan (1989) on law issues might explain their 
scepticism. The questions raised by the legal community existing of Bebchuk and 
Kahan (1989), Cooke (1996) as well as Rau (2000) is whether investment banks 
should draft an imprecise FO to complete a transaction, earn significant premiums 
for that and foster its own market share and, thus, the position as a top-tier 
investment bank? Or is the risk of losing this top-tier image by drafting a friendly, 
and imprecise, FO of higher importance for the FO provider (Rau, 2000)? The 
theoretical discussion has either led to a negative association or a neutral 
association as the deal completion hypothesis might be the main driver of the 
investment banks. 
However, more recent empirical results provide a completely different mind-
set towards reputation and fairness opinions. They contradict and negate previous 
results of the legal community. 
The current body of literature agrees that the thread of losing reputation will 
prevent top-tier investment banks from issuing low quality fairness opinions, 
which implies that the precision is higher for fairness opinions of top-tier 
investment banks. Therefore, a quality sign is attached to fairness opinions and the 
underlying deal by a higher reputation, which is in favour of the superior deal 
hypothesis (von Dryander, 2001). 
The long-term damage from ill-advised and biased fairness opinions is seen 
by Kisgen et al. (2009) to be more severe than possible financial gains from advising 
and finishing off a bad transaction. Kisgen et al. (2009) are able to demonstrate this 
with empirical tests. 
Robust results in another sample of mergers dating between 1994 and 2003 
indicate that top-tier advisors and, therefore, top-tier investment banks only certify 
deals by issuing fairness opinions if the deal is fair. This even holds true after 
controlling for contingent fees, meaning that possible fees do not influence the 
banks, but the threat of losing reputation does (Bao and Edmans, 2011). 
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Even directly considering the valuation ranges of fairness opinions, 
empirical, univariate tests support the superior deal hypothesis. Evidence is given 
that the valuations of top-tier investment banks are of a better quality, if the focus 
is put on the absolute valuation errors. Hiring a top-tier investment bank11 has been 
proven to produce “significantly lower absolute estimation errors” (Cain and 
Denis, 2012) and decrease deal premia (Kisgen et al., 2009), if the buyer acquires 
their services. Whereas lower deal premia are not necessarily leading to a higher 
valuation precision, lower absolute estimation errors help to improve the precision 
of fairness opinions. 
Therefore, it is concluded that advisor rankings play a role in the precision of 
fairness opinions (Cain and Denis, 2013), where a more positive association is 
expected. Advisor rankings, so called league tables, will also be used in the later 
analysis to put the advisor’s name in meaningful and number based ranking. 
Otherwise statistical analysis would not be possible. 
To round the discussion off a statement of Kisgen et al. shall be quoted. 
“Firms use more reputable advisors because they are interested in improving the 
quality of the FOs, while lower-quality advisors are more willing to provide biased, 
or at least less informative, opinions. Further, despite conflicts of interest, higher-
quality advisors might be more likely to provide high-quality FOs because 
reputation concerns can overcome conflicts of interest, whereas a low-quality 
advisor could issue a biased opinion to generate fees even if it is unaffiliated” 
(Kisgen et al., 2009, p.185). However, a test with significant hypotheses is still not 
carried out. This quotation reveals that higher-quality advisors do also help to 
lower asymmetric information levels as they produce more informative fairness 
opinions. 
Nonetheless, the discussion indicates that a higher reputation is generally 
seen to lead to a higher precision of fairness opinions, especially expressed by the 
superior deal hypothesis (Angwin, 2001; Shapiro, 1983) and clear results on IPOs 
(Neupane and Thapa, 2013). The negative considerations against reputation are 
                                                   
11 Top-Tier investments banks are normally described as the leading five investment 
banks in M&A advices during the last year in relation to the deal size. League tables are 
issued on a regular basis on SDC Platinum. The top five banks in the last league table are 
considered as top-tier investment banks. 
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only theoretically discussed and have not been observed in any of the more recent 
research so far. 
Table 7 summarises all arguments. 
 
 
Table 7: Pros and Cons of reputation 
Pro Con 
superior deal hypothesis 
signalling function 
lower estimation errors reputation used to persuade 
shareholders fear of loss of reputation 
only fair deals are certified 
better skills   
Source: own production 
 
Hypothesis 4: A higher reputation of the investment bank leads to an 
improved precision of fairness opinions. 
 
3.2.1.5 Focused versus diversified mergers in fairness opinions 
The results from the merger and acquisition analysis always recommend 
measuring M&A performance under the premise to include a factor for the 
industry relatedness as the results on related (horizontal or vertical merger) or 
diversified mergers differ. 
The research on related or diversified mergers on fairness opinions is nearly 
blank as only one source can be found. Servaes and Zenner (1996) summarise in 
their research that the problem of asymmetric information is less likely for related 
mergers. The information level of the acquirer is higher as the acquirer has in-depth 
knowledge of the business segments itself and the applicable discount factors 
therein. For other industries, this knowledge does not exist in the same extent. 
Hence, controlling the investment bank or providing relevant and accurate 
information is easier for mergers within the same industry (Servaes and Zenner, 
1996). 
WEALTH TRANSFERS IN MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS AND ITS RELATION 
TO FAIRNESS OPINIONS      107 
Nonetheless, the benefits of obtaining a fairness opinion are higher for 
transactions outside the own industry as more information gains can be achieved. 
However, this drawback is only limited to the increased benefits from FOs, but has 
no link to the precision of fairness opinions as the prior and after fairness opinion 
creation information levels are still better for related mergers (Servaes and Zenner, 
1996). 
Coming from the recommendation from classical M&A research to include a 
factor for related mergers, the analysis of current research on the expected 
association allows the conclusion that financial advisors will find it easier to value 
a target when both parties are active in the same industry. Therefore, fairness 
opinions created for related mergers are expected to have a higher precision than 
fairness opinions of non-related mergers. The level of asymmetric information is 
lower between management and target as well as management and investment 
bank, if related mergers are preferred. Monitoring powers of the principal towards 
the agent are increased as well. 
 
Table 8 summarises the pros and cons of related and diversified mergers 
 
Table 8: Pros and cons of related and diversified mergers 
  Pro Con 
Related 
costs to diversify are lower for 
shareholders 
 
knowledge transfer is easier 
synergies are easier to be 
achieved 
Diversified 




Source: own production 
 
Hypothesis 5: Related mergers lead to a higher precision of fairness opinions, 
diversified transactions lower the precision. 
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3.2.1.6 Friendly versus hostile deals in fairness opinions 
The main argument given in the discussion of friendly mergers in M&A is 
that friendly offers are welcomed and accepted by the management team (Kroll et 
al. 2008), whereas hostile bids lead to a decline of the initial offer. Several scenarios 
are feasible after this. The bidder might raise the initial offer to convince the target’s 
shareholders and management team to accept the offer. The second out of many 
alternatives can be a company, acting as a “white knight”, presented by the target’s 
management team that will offer the same or a higher price than the hostile bidder 
in order to offer an alternative to the shareholders. M&A research has, however, 
clearly shown that friendly deals are preferable in order to lower premiums as the 
level of asymmetric information is reduced. 
Hostile transactions can end in a spectacular battle and research by Cain and 
Denis (2012) has shown that fairness opinions are not frequently updated12. 
Therefore, fairness opinions do not always consider the best available alternative 
anymore and become obsolete. Taking these outdated fairness opinions into 
consideration, it is obvious that the credibility and precision of these fairness 
opinions is of limited value. The pricing function of fairness opinions is not fully 
supported in hostile transactions. 
Additionally, in a friendly merger or takeover, the later paid price is often 
negotiated in internal discussions of both, acquirers and targets, management 
teams. The price range in a fairness opinion can consequently be set smaller, 
whereas the price for hostile takeovers is, firstly, not agreed on before and, 
secondly, derived from market forces. The fairness opinion should, hence, be less 
precise in hostile takeovers (Kisgen et al., 2009). Again, these allegations are linked 
to the pricing function of fairness opinions. 
Fairness opinions requested in a friendly transaction indicate whether a 
prudent board can accept the offer by delivering valuation estimates that are based 
on available financial data and management projections. In a hostile deal fairness 
                                                   
12 The data set used in this dissertation has seen many, frequently updated fairness 
opinions. However, it is not stated whether the valuation models are updated or other, less 
relevant information, e.g. spelling mistakes. 
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opinions are often limited in the provided information content due to data 
availability problems as management projections are not obtainable. Therefore, 
provided information can be limited to recommendations by the bank whether a 
better price might be achievable with another partner or an improved offer 
(Bebchuk and Kahan, 1989), instead of providing a valuation range.  
In line with that, the valuation process is more complicated in a hostile tender 
offer from the point of view of an acquirer-side advisor. Since targets will not share 
internal information, financial advisors are left with a greater degree of uncertainty. 
Valuing a hostile tender offer in a FO is generally considered to be more difficult 
(Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003).  
Consequently, fairness opinions issued in a hostile takeover attempt offer a 
larger valuation range and lower precision due to a higher level of asymmetric 
information. 
Timing issues due to the need to react fast after a first bid by a competitor in 
a merger battle is made and, thereby, increasing the pressure on the fairness 
opinion provider can also lower the precision of the fairness opinion (Servaes and 
Zenner, 1996). 
These difficulties in finding appropriate financial data in connection with 
time pressure are highlighted by higher premiums that are paid in hostile deals 
(McLaughlin, 1990). The premium is accordingly lower in friendly deals. This 
should also imply that a fairness opinion is less precise in hostile deals. 
In line with these arguments, Bebchuk and Kahan (1989) use the problem of 
existing conflicts of interests. In a prearranged merger, investment banks might 
conclude a deal to be fair and change valuations accordingly to come to a medium 
price in line with the offer. On the other hand, investment banks might conclude a 
proposed take-over deal being unfair by artificially increasing the valuation for the 
target, if managers want to employ defensive moves and have communicated this 
to the bank. The later argument leads to a violation of the pricing function of 
fairness opinions. Nonetheless, both arguments are in favour of a higher precision 
for friendly deals. 
The signalling function and superior deal hypothesis are the last arguments 
for a higher precision of friendly mergers. First-tier investment banks are less likely 
to be involved in hostile mergers and acquisitions (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). As 
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first-tier investment banks are supposed to deliver better results, according to the 
previous discussion of reputation and accepting the superior deal hypothesis 
(Kisgen et al, 2009), this would imply that hostile bids will lead to less precise 
fairness opinions. 
Summarising current research results it can be expected that friendly mergers 
lead to a higher precision of fairness opinions. Table 9 summarises all arguments 
given in this chapter. 
 
 
Table 9: Pros of friendly deals and cons of hostile deals 
Pros of friendly deals Cons of hostile deals 
banks with higher reputation 
avoid hostile mergers  
FOs for hostile deals are 
created by advisors with a 
lower reputation 
management cooperation FOs are faster outdated 
less asymmetric information higher fees for FOs 
less difficult to value data availability is limited 
Source: own production 
 
Hypothesis 6: Friendly deals increase the precision of fairness opinions. 
 
3.2.2 Fairness opinion specific variables 
3.2.2.1 Number of fairness opinions for one party 
In the classical principal-agent dilemma, the example of an insurer is often 
cited. The insurer cannot observe the level of care taken by the person being insured 
(Pauly, 1968). To solve this problem a risk-sharing contract is usually accepted. 
Either penalties or incentives should result in a risk-sharing with the insurance 
taker (Grossman and Hart, 1983). Another solution is the sale of (parts of) the risk 
to a reinsurance company. Though risk sharing between the management board 
and the investment bank issuing the fairness opinion is not industry standard and 
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the sale of risks arising from M&A to a reinsurance company not possible, the risk 
can be spread in a different way. Multiple fairness opinions can be requested to 
spread the risk of one extremely wrong evaluation on more shoulders. Hence, more 
opinions should lead to a higher precision. 
This approach is in line with the results of the principal-agent discussion. 
Managers of the target as well as the acquirer should, consequently, consider more 
than only one source for obtaining fairness opinions. The results are expected to 
moderate the risk and lead to a better precision, if more fairness opinions are 
acquired. 
The advantages of at least two fairness opinions are theoretically discussed 
by Kisgen et al. (2009), where the second fairness opinion has the role to act as an 
objectivity test for the first opinion. Various banks have additionally introduced 
frameworks requiring at least a second opinion for certain, high risk transactions 
(Schönefelder, 2007). Both arguments provide a strong positive association for the 
number of fairness opinions and research on fairness opinions with a focus on deal 
premiums as well as cumulative abnormal returns confirms this view.  
First of all, the pricing function of fairness opinions is stronger for deals with 
multiple advisors. The incentives to hide critical information and to influence the 
outcome of the valuation process in the desired direction, either by management or 
the investment bank, may be easy to accomplish when any investment bank is the 
sole advisor to either the target or acquirer. Justifying input changes in a multiple 
advisor structure on one side of the deal becomes more difficult since forecasts and 
estimates will be, at least partly, consensus driven or based on joint collaboration 
(Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008). Thus, one will expect more precise investment 
valuations if there is more than one advisor to the target or acquirer.  
Secondly, the superior deal hypothesis is stronger for multiple advisors. The 
use of multiple advisors does not affect the likelihood of deal completion (Kisgen 
et al., 2009), but leads to lower premia paid (Shaked and Kempainen, 2009). 
Research of Shaked and Kempainen (2009) analyses cumulative abnormal returns 
for M&A transactions supported by at least one FO and finds out that deals where 
acquirers obtained more than one fairness opinion have lower deal premiums. In 
another study, the highest premium of acquirers in mergers and acquisitions is 
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paid in deals where no fairness opinion is obtained (46.52%), whereas the premium 
is the smallest where multiple FOs have been acquired (28.11%). In the same vein, 
targets receive the lowest premium, if at least two FOs are obtained (37.3%). 
However, the highest premium is paid if exactly one FO is consumed in the deal 
(44.06%) (Kisgen et al., 2009). Hence, the results are not consistent for targets and 
acquirers or the overall sample. This underlines the need to distinguish the data 
sets in this dissertation into different data sets for all deals and those of targets and 
acquirers.  
Thirdly, more fairness opinions reduce the level of uncertainty and 
asymmetric information. Every fairness opinion sheds some light on the 
transaction and has a certain, yet unknown, value to the shareholders (Kroll et al., 
2008). Consequently, many fairness opinions increase the knowledge about the 
valuation object more than one FO does. By doing so, FOs lower the risks and 
should, as a consequence, reduce the uncertainty in a deal and increase in turn the 
precision of fairness opinions.  
Fourthly, monitoring of the agent becomes easier for the principal as multiple 
advisors decrease the risk of affiliated advisors resulting from conflicts of interests 
and increase the likelihood of independent advisors being involved in the deal. 
Furthermore, the advisory groups will be less likely to give a not backed up fairness 
opinion if they know that their results will be compared to each other (Kolasinski 
and Kothari, 2008). The discussion how to improve the quality of fairness opinions 
has named the advantages of obtaining more than one fairness opinion. The risks 
of a potential bias from previous relations between the principal and the agent are 
lowered. 
Hence, multiple fairness opinions can control risks and mitigate the effects of 
some variables like reputation and, especially, previous relation. The chance for 
biased or incorrect fairness opinions is as well smaller as advisors drafting fairness 
opinions would have to produce the same or at least similarly biased opinions 
(Kisgen et al., 2009). Even Bebchuk and Kahan, who share a critical mind-set 
towards FOs, agree in 1989, that managers looking for unbiased fairness opinions 
should hire a second investment bank to write an opinion. They consent that this 
will lower conflicts of interest and eliminate the problem of contingency fees. 
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In contrast to the previous arguments, Kisgen et al. (2009) found out that 
more FOs are obtained in hostile takeovers and the prefix of precision is negative 
for hostile takeovers. This highlights the need for further research and clear results. 
Nonetheless it can be postulated that multiple fairness opinions in one deal, either 
on the target or acquirer side or on both sides, should reduce the uncertainty in 
fairness opinions. Table 10 summarises all arguments. 
 
Table 10: Pros and Cons of multiple fairness opinions 
Pro Con 
pricing function is stronger 
monitoring of agent easier 
asymmetric information are 
better reduced 
spread of risks among banks often used in hostile deals 
hiding of critical information 
more difficult   
valuation models altering 
more difficult 
  
Source: own production 
 
Hypothesis 7: Multiple fairness opinions increase the precision of FOs. 
 
3.2.2.2 Number of valuations within one fairness opinion 
Adopting the arguments from the principal-agent problem with regards to 
the number of fairness opinions, the moral hazard problem does also exist for the 
number of valuations. Shaked and Kempainen (2009) have theoretically addressed 
the issue that if the investment bank is unable to come to any valuation, the moral 
hazard to please the principle may call the need to provide at least one fitted 
valuation. By doing so the chances of delivering one extremely wrong valuation 
are large and the pricing function of fairness opinions is violated. Additionally, the 
argumentation used for spreading risks leads automatically to the assumption that 
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multiple valuations allow spreading the risk of one extremely wrong evaluation on 
other valuations. This will mitigate the impact of a possible wrong valuation. 
The current body of literature on deal premiums and cumulative abnormal 
returns in mergers with fairness opinions in contrast to M&A transactions without 
a fairness opinion agrees with the conclusion that multiple valuations are 
beneficiary for the precision of fairness opinions.  
With regards to the pricing function of fairness opinions, it is according to 
Shaked and Kempainen (2009) a bad sign for the precision of FOs, if only one 
valuation method is used. The Delaware Court has already suggested that “it is 
preferable to take a more robust approach involving multiple techniques—such as 
a DCF analysis, a comparable transactions analysis … and a comparable companies 
analysis…, to triangulate a value range, as all three methodologies individually 
have their own limitations” (Matthews, 2012, p.72). Hence, the use of only one 
valuation method implies that any other valuation method is not able to deliver a 
plausible calculation and most likely the used valuation method is adapted to 
deliver results. The pricing function is, hence, not fulfilled. 
In the same vein, Mihanovic (2005) criticises the arbitrariness of the valuation 
models used in fairness opinions and recommends to use as many valuation 
models as possible to improve the quality of fairness opinions. Due to that, 
precision should be lower in fairness opinions with only one valuation method 
than in FOs with multiple valuation methods. 
Especially fast growing companies and companies facing bankruptcy yield 
imprecise valuations under the DCF valuation method, but transaction multiple or 
earnings multiple valuations are more precise in these situations and will mitigate 
the inaccurate valuation obtained from the DCF valuation. Therefore, in line with 
the Delaware court decision, more valuations lower the risk of one extremely 
inaccurate valuation due to the valuation methods’ unique advantages and 
disadvantages (Schönefelder, 2007). Therefore, monitoring and judging the 
precision of a fairness opinion is easier, if more methods are applied. Additionally, 
more information are made public (Ratner et al., 2010), which helps to lower the 
level of asymmetric information. 
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Based on the results of the previous discussion it is expected that more 
valuation methods in one fairness opinion will lead to a lower valuation range and 
higher valuation accuracy. The reasons for that are that if only one valuation 
method is used, the advisor has faced severe difficulties to draw up any valuation 
and might have only delivered a valuation to fulfil the assignment due to moral 
hazard. In the own interest, fairness opinion providers should deliver as many 
valuations as possible to moderate the risks of wrong valuation methods over more 
precise valuation methods. More valuations show easier access to data or 
management information and will lead to a more precise valuation. 
 
Table 11: Pros and Cons of multiple valuation models 
Pro Con 
pricing function is stronger 
risk sharing ---  
signalling function 
less asymmetric information   
wrong valuation models are 
moderated 
  
Source: own production 
 
Hypothesis 8: More valuation models in one fairness opinion lead to a higher 
precision of the FO. 
 
3.2.2.3 Previous relation between principal and advisor 
The criticism towards fairness opinions names the advantages and 
disadvantages of a previous relation between the target or acquirer and the 
consulting investment bank. Whereas a previous relation helps to easier 
understand the company to be valued and the market it is acting within, 
disadvantages are seen in potentially friendly valuations as people know each 
other. 
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The discussion of the principal-agent theory names the lower risk of selecting 
a highly reputable, but lowly qualified advisor as the biggest advantage if a 
previous relation is accepted. 
Due to different levels of asymmetric information the monitoring costs for 
external advisors are seen to be higher in fairness opinions as an increased need for 
interaction with management is given. If an advisor with no previous relation is 
selected, the advisor is less familiar with the valuation object. Consequently, the 
familiarity of related advisors, who know the company well and have a reduced 
need for interaction with management, which might potentially influence the 
independency of the advisor or data integrity, outweigh the latent conflict of 
interest (Hartmann-Wendels et al., 2015). Furthermore, the typical job of advisors 
is the ongoing valuation process of businesses or at least parts of the business, 
implying that tied advisors will have access to more precise multiplies or discount 
rates and, consequently, better valuations (Kisgen et al., 2009). Related advisors 
have the advantage that the level of asymmetric information is smaller than for 
unrelated advisors. 
The superior deal hypothesis is supported by a second study on the influence 
of a previous relation on fairness opinions, where the accuracy of fairness opinions 
is analysed based on a data set of mergers between 1998 and 2005. This research 
concludes that relationship-based information appears to play a role in the 
precision of fairness opinions (Cain and Denis, 2012). Advisors on both sides, 
targets as well as advisors, produce significantly lower absolute valuation errors, if 
previous business relationships have been established. The results are limited for 
two reasons. First of all, the tests are performed on CARs after the deal is completed 
and not on the precision of fairness opinions. Secondly, statistic results are only 
based on univariate tests. However, these lower absolute valuation errors lead to a 
stronger pricing function of fairness opinions with a previous relation. 
Nonetheless, the study discovers only little evidence that fairness opinions 
might be driven by conflicts of interest. Instead, the researchers demonstrate that 
unaffiliated third-party investment banks do not provide more accurate valuations 
than affiliated investors Cain and Denis (2012). 
Even the two combatants of fairness opinions, Bebchuk and Kahan (1989), do 
generally come to comparable results to the presented view of Kisgen et al. (2009) 
and Cain and Denis (2012). They suppose independent advisors are chosen to add 
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persuasive support for management’s position, but not with the aim to add any 
value in the transaction process. However, they also assume that established 
advisors will craft a fairness opinion in the right light of management to retain the 
client and due to psychological loyalty to managers. However, both propositions 
are not proven by any empirical test. 
Summarising the results of the current state of research a previous relation 
between the company and the investment bank helps to understand the business 
faster and more thoroughly and allows to come up with better valuations. Hence, 
previous relation will increase the precision. 
 
Table 12: Pro and cons of previous relation 
Pro Con 
more knowledge of company more management interaction 
ongoing valuation experience conflicts of interest 
lower absolute valuation 
errors 
lower level of asymmetric 
information 
FO to pleasure management 
Source: own production 
 
Hypothesis 9: A previous relation between the principal and the agent 
increases the valuation precision of fairness opinions 
 
3.2.2.4 Year of fairness opinion 
The introduction of FINRA rule 2290 in 2007 is seen as a possible major 
milestone in increasing the implied value of fairness opinions and, hence, 
increasing the precision. 
Courts have largely ignored the need for FOs in mergers and acquisitions 
before mid-1985, when the Delaware Supreme Court found the managers of Trans 
Union Corporation guilty of not making a sufficiently informed decision (Davidoff, 
2006). Albeit the court laid out that they “do not imply that an outside valuation 
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study is essential to support an informed business judgment” and that they do not 
“state that fairness opinions by independent investment bankers are required as 
matter of law” (Smith vs. van Gorkom, 488 A.2d. at 873), an small, though 
statistically insignificant increase in FO acquisition frequency has been proven in 
the following years (Bowers, 2002). In the following, several lawsuits have been 
filed against fairness opinion advisors for issuing unreasonable recommendations 
(e.g. City Partnership Co. vs. Lehman Bros. Inc., and Rosser vs. New Valley Corp.). 
However, courts have failed to hold advisors liable at least partly because “it is 
problematic enough to decide between even two conflicting appraisals” (Pinson v. 
Campbell-Taggart, Inc. (C.A. No. 7499, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, 24–25, Del. 
[November 8, 1989]). 
The new regulations introduced with the adoption of FINRA rule 2290 
require further annotations in the fairness opinions. Since the rule became effective, 
fairness opinion providers are, for example, obligated to indicate any previous 
relation, possible contingency fees paid and the qualifications of the people 
involved. Especially the referencing of a previous relation, as discussed before, 
might significantly increase the quality of a fairness opinion. 
However, due to the publication years of the papers dealing with fairness 
opinions available in the current body of literature, many of them do not have the 
possibility to check for an increase in the usefulness or precision of fairness 
opinions after the new regulations became effective. Others, more recent research, 
did not address this topic. Hence, no paper can be quoted here. Nonetheless, it is 
expected that the changes are beneficial for the precision of fairness opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Fairness opinions issued after legislation change at the end of 
2007 are more precise than FOs issued before. 
 
3.2.2.5 Contingency fees in fairness opinions 
Contingency fees are one of the most common contractual forms of advisor 
compensation. Generally the advisor receives only a comparably small fee for the 
provision of a FO and the bulk of the compensation depending on deal completion 
(Giuffra, 1986) either as a percentage of the complete transaction value, as a 
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predefined dollar amount, or as a sliding scale (Calomiris and Hitscherich, 2007). 
The problems linked to contingency fees are already briefly mentioned in the 
discussion of the conflicts of interest raised by the agent and are a heavily debated 
topic with respect to fairness opinions. 
Kisgen at el. (2009) describe contingency fees as the appetiser to complete the 
deal as the premium for obtaining an FO is relatively small compared to the overall 
fees paid for deal completion. The incentives for investment banks are on average 
around 1% of the total deal value (Servaes and Zenner, 1996) or according to data 
from Mergers and Acquisitions reports, the contingency fees paid from 1985 to 1994 
totalled on average 0.85% of the total dollar value (Servaes and Zenner, 1996). 
However, first-tier banks earn on average 55% of their fees as contingent fees, 
whereas third-tier banks only earn 32% on average. In tender offers the percentage 
charge goes up to 73% for first-tier banks (Rau, 2000). Rau explains the higher fees 
by a better quality, supporting the superior deal hypothesis, of the advisor as well 
as with a higher percentage of completed deals. The number of completed deals is 
positively and significantly aligned with the market share in subsequent years. 
Therefore, his final argument states that the contingency fees have no impact on 
the quality of deals and, hence, fairness opinions. 
In fact, there is mixed evidence on the influence of contingency fees on 
precision. Some researchers found evidence of proper alignment of incentives 
(Hunter and Walker, 1990) and faster deal completion (Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003), 
which might free managerial time for core activities and reduce the time spent on 
monitoring the agent. An alignment of incentives increases the chances of a positive 
working environment and better access to data for the fairness opinion provider. 
Faster deal completion lowers the risks of M&A battles and, as previously 
discussed, increases the likelihood of a better precision. 
While directors of the acquirer or target might favour this kind of 
compensation because they believe that it might align their interests and those of 
the investment bankers, the same setup has been widely criticised, especially by 
researchers of law, as being contra productive since deal execution becomes the 
primary objective instead of giving a prudent and truly independent advice 
(Bebchuk and Kahan, 1989). Given that the financial advisor receives the bulk of 
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the compensation if the deal is closed, a strong incentive will be there to render the 
fairness opinion in a way that maximizes two crucial aspects. 
Firstly, the advisor is interested in increasing the likelihood of deal 
consummation, and ultimately the odds of receiving the larger chunk of fees. If the 
advisor thinks that there is a realistic chance that the proposed bid will be rejected, 
it will be logical to increase the range of financially fair values in order to create 
room for an upward price correction without losing a direct justification (Bebchuk 
and Kahan, 1989). 
Secondly, leaving only room for an upward revision might have a signalling 
effect to the market that the advisor might consider the current bid to be at the 
lower bound. Even though a fairness opinion does not represent an investment 
advice, target-side shareholders might be lured in thinking that a higher price is 
obtainable, which will lead to a rejection of the first bid (Bebchuk and Kahan, 1989). 
Both arguments have a negative impact on the precision of FOs. 
McLaughlin (1990) demonstrates a link between some features of investment 
banking’s contracts and its customers. In 95% of all deals in her sample, 
contingency fees increased if the acquisition was successful. Therefore, she 
concludes, that investment banks might have an incentive to suggest higher 
premiums and valuation ranges in order to close the deal. 
More recent research (Cain and Denis, 2012; Calomiris and Hitscherich, 2007; 
Rau, 2000) contradicts the results of McLaughlin. In the most recent research of 
fairness opinions and its accuracy, the authors are able to provide a data set that 
has not shown any evidence that fairness opinions are less accurate when 
contingency fees are paid. They mention their rejection of previous research results 
explicitly (Cain and Denis, 2012). They support the research results of Rau (2000) 
and Calomiris and Hitscherich (2007), who did also find no relation between the 
advisor’s fee structure and the precision of their fairness opinions (Cain and Denis, 
2012).  
Table 13 summarises all given arguments on pros and cons. Judging from the 
function of contingency fees to align the interests of management and the advisor, 
neither the level of asymmetric information nor the pricing function of fairness 
opinions should be affected. Due to that and the most recent research results, where 
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contingency fees do not significantly influence the precision of fairness opinions, 
no influence of contingency fees on fairness opinions is assumed. 
 
Table 13: Pros and Cons of contingency fees 
Pro Con 
alignments of goals deal execution in focus 
faster deal completion  
Source: own production 
 
Hypothesis 11: Contingency fees do not influence the precision of fairness 
opinions. 
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3.3 VALUATION MODELS IN FAIRNESS OPINIONS 
The advantages and disadvantages of the most used valuation models in 
fairness opinions should be discussed as an analysis on the precision of these 
models is expected to deliver further, significant results. 
 
3.3.1 Valuation models and their frequency of usage 
Previous discussion of approaches how to improve the quality of fairness 
opinions has shown that the valuation models are often criticised for their 
arbitrariness (Mihanovic, 2005). Furthermore, Ratner et al. (2010) criticise the 
advantages and disadvantages of the valuation models with regards to their unique 
strength and weaknesses. Valuation models can be classified into three different 
groups, according to Schönefelder (2007). These groups are fundamental valuation 
models (DCF, residual income, dividend discount model), comparison models 
(earnings multiples and transaction multiples) and individual valuation models.  
Not all valuation models are used with the same frequency. Schönefelder 
(2007) has seen the following usage rates for valuation models in his data set, which 
focuses on US mergers. The numbers are comparable to other research in Germany 
(Aders et al., 2011). The numbers show that DCF valuations are used in nearly 
every fairness opinion and are, hence, the leading valuation model. Earnings 
multiple valuations are used in 75.1% of all fairness opinions followed by 
transaction multiple valuations with 56.6%. Sum-of-the-parts analysis is the fourth 
most used valuation model with 22.4%, any other valuation model is used in 80.5% 





Table 14: Usage rate of valuation models in fairness opinions 
WEALTH TRANSFERS IN MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS AND ITS RELATION 
TO FAIRNESS OPINIONS      123 
Usage rate of valuation models 
Valuation model Buyer Target Total 
DCF 84.6% 94.4% 93.2% 
Earnings Multiple 69.2% 76.0% 75.1% 
Transaction Multiple 7.7% 63.7% 56.6% 
Sum-of-the-parts 42.3% 19.6% 22.4% 
Other 57.7% 83.8% 80.5% 
Observations 26 179 205 
Source: own production, based on numbers of Schönefelder (2007) 
Due to the leading role of the three most used valuation models, the focus 
will now be put deliberately on these models and the other valuation models will 
not be discussed. The discussion focuses on the essential methodological 
foundations and the advantages and disadvantages of the valuation models. 
 
3.3.2 Discounted Cash Flow valuation 
In the DCF valuation model, the company valuation is derived from the sum 
of all discounted future free cash flows (FCF) that are available for distribution. The 
FCF available for distribution can either be calculated from the FCF minus 
borrowing costs (net method) or before the deduction of borrowing costs (gross 
method). The FCF is forecasted over a detailed planning period, called forecasting 
horizon, often three years, and afterwards a residual value is calculated 
(Damodaran, 2012b). The residual value is either calculated with a percentage 
growth per year or without a growth rate or based on a terminal value calculation 
based on multiples (Brealey et al., 2009). This calculation leads to the firm value. If 
the gross method of FCF is chosen, net debts need to be deducted from the firm 
value to arrive at the equity value (Ernst et al., 2017). 
The discount factor for the FCF can be calculated from the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC), where the cost of equity is determined by market-based 
models like the capital asset pricing model (Timmreck, 2002). There are other 
methods to calculate the discount factor in DCF besides the described WACC, 
which usually use a combination of a factor to discount for the time value of money 
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(inflation) and a risk premium, which investors demand for their investment 
compared to a “risk-free” investment (Simkovic, 2017). However, as the exact 
model to calculate the DCF value in fairness opinions is neither always fully stated 
in the fairness opinions nor in the scope of this dissertation, further detailed 
descriptions are not beneficial. Instead the focus will now be shifted to the 
advantages and disadvantages of the valuation model. 
The advantages of the DCF valuation include its wide-spread use in other 
business calculations. Discounted cash flows are, hence, well-known by managers 
and shareholders and easy to understand. Cash flows are additionally less 
distorted by different accounting methods than profit-based methods. The risk of 
manipulation by a change in accounting standards is, hence, less likely (Ballwieser, 
2011). The FCF calculation delivers precise results for companies with a positive 
cash flow, stable growth and known risk proxies, which are needed for the discount 
factor (Kranebitter, 2017). 
The disadvantages of the DCF valuation include problems to determine the 
free cash flow for young and fast growing companies with a negative FCF, 
companies facing bankruptcy, companies with unsteady growth and generally fast 
growing companies (Kranebitter, 2017). Furthermore, the discount factor is crucial 
for the firm value due to its impact on the calculations. A small variation of 0.5% 
can change the entire valuation significantly. Hence, the determination of the 
capital costs is often difficult or, with regards to fairness opinions, can be adjusted 
to derive at the desired valuation (Rau, 2000). 
Due to the high usage rate of DCF calculations, which gives them the status 
as the standard valuation model in fairness opinions, there is no difference in the 
valuation precision expected for FOs that use the DCF valuation to those, who do 
not make use of it. The DCF model is often the only valuation model employed in 
fairness opinions. 
 
Hypothesis 12: The use of DCF calculations does not influence the precision 
of fairness opinions. 
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3.3.3 Earnings multiple valuation 
For the earnings multiple valuations the advisor first chooses a relevant peer 
group of stock-listed companies. The selection of the peer group is based on 
different criteria, but should be as similar as possible to the valuation object. These 
criteria are resting on a combination of the branch, growth, size, profitability and 
other factors (Kranebitter, 2017). 
In a next step, market-based multiples for the peer group are calculated, e.g. 
price-earnings ratio, firm value (FV)/EBITDA, FV/EBIT, FV/Sales (Berner/Rojahn, 
2003). The selected multiples are applied accordingly (for example 9.5xEBIT) to the 
corresponding reference value of the company to be evaluated (e.g. EBIT of 20 
million USD) (Kranebitter, 2017). 
The advantages of the earnings multiple valuation models include the 
fastness and easiness to be applied. The stock market prices of the peer group 
contain implicit and current assumptions on growth and actual and future capital 
costs, which are comparable to the valuation object. Furthermore, earnings 
multiples are often used as a reference model and to check for plausibility of more 
complex assessments like the DCF valuation as EM valuations allow to 
communicate the results of complex calculations in a more efficient way (Liu et al., 
2002).13 
The disadvantages of the earnings multiple valuations are mostly related to 
the peer group. First of all, companies must be found that are comparable to the 
valuation object. It is possible that no comparable company can be found or the 
differences are so huge that the method becomes meaningless for valuation 
purposes (Litigation process: Radiology Associates, Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 490). 
Secondly, under- and overvaluations of the market with regards to the peer group 
companies influence the valuation of the company to be valued in the fairness 
                                                   
13 Liu et al., 2002, p.136: „Multiples are used often as a substitute for 
comprehensive valuations, because they communicate efficiently the essence of 
those valuations.“ 
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opinion (Penman, 2013). Thirdly, due to the focus on the peer group, company 
specific valuation details might be left out of consideration (Kranebitter, 2017). 
Fourthly, different kinds of shares can either have voting rights or not. Shares 
without voting rights are traded with an average discount of 0-10% (Masulis et al., 
2009). However, these special share price discounts shall be corrected by the creator 
of the fairness opinion by either finding a corresponding peer group, where the 
same voting rights are given, or by discounting the fair value of a peer group 
without voting right discounts. By doing so, both methods allow a representative 
comparison and result in a contrastable valuation (Zimmermann, 2015). 
Nonetheless, the easiness of valuation and the inclusion of market valuations 
of comparable companies together with the assumption that more valuations 
increase the precision (Shaked and Kempainen, 2009), a positive association of the 
usage of the earnings multiple valuation on the precision of fairness opinions is 
assumed. 
 
Hypothesis 13: The use of the earnings multiple valuation increases the 
precision of fairness opinions. 
 
3.3.4 Transaction multiple valuation 
The transaction multiple valuation follows the same logical standards as the 
earnings multiple valuation. A peer group is selected; however in this model the 
focus is put on comparable companies that have been engaged in mergers and 
acquisitions in the previous years. The major advantage is that in the underlying 
valuations, control premiums are included as well as synergy gains (Kranebitter, 
2017). Especially the control premiums and efficiency gains from transactions are 
in the focus of the price negotiations (Campbell, 2003). The model allows, therefore, 
to make use of previously paid premiums and can indirectly deduct appropriate 
premiums for the transaction covered in the underlying fairness opinion. 
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The main disadvantage of the transaction multiple valuation is a lack of 
comparability between peer companies, takeover environment and buyer nature 
(potential for synergy), which can distort the valuation and its precision (Finnerty 
and Emery, 2004). If no comparable transactions can be found, no valuation can be 
crafted. 
 However, the advantages to make implicitly use of transaction premiums 
and synergies gained in previous, comparable transactions are assumed to have a 
positive association on the precision of fairness opinions (Kranebitter, 2017).  
Additionally, the hypothesis of increased precision, if more valuation models are 
used (hypothesis 8) supports these arguments. Hence, fairness opinions making 
use of the transaction multiple valuations are expected to be more precise than FOs 
without. 
 
Hypothesis 14: The use of the transaction multiple valuations increases the 
precision of fairness opinions. 
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3.4 MAIN FINDINGS OF CHAPTER 3 
Chapter 3.1 discusses the general wealth transfers arising from M&A 
activities. Additionally, it names the theoretical background of six variables that 
belong to the deal specific characteristics. These six variables are derived from the 
analysis of the different functions fairness opinions have to fulfil in chapter 2. 
Chapter 3.2 summarises current research on fairness opinions, which is 
primarily focusing on cumulative abnormal returns of deals with FOs and without 
FOs. Besides the deal specific characteristics, the discussion is also able to 
theoretically deduct the association of the fairness opinion specific characteristics 
in relation to the precision of fairness opinions. Six variables are considered as 
being deal specific variables and five as FO specific. 
Lastly, chapter 3.3 discusses the three most commonly used valuation 
methods and three additional hypotheses are deducted from the discussion. The 
DCF valuation is the standard valuation method used in nearly all fairness 
opinions and, hence, no difference is expected. But the earnings multiple and 
transaction multiple valuations are expected to increase the precision, if used. 
These in total 14 hypotheses can serve as an answer to the sub objective to 
deduct variables and associations from the current body of literature. Starting from 
the different functions fairness opinions have to fulfil over to the principal-agent 
theory, first variables are extracted. These variables are explained in the context of 
M&A and the expected influence on M&A. 
Table 15 on the next page summarises the expected associations for each 
hypothesis based on the four different aspects that are discussed in the previous 
chapters. Table 16 finally summarises all 14 hypotheses on one page. 
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Acquirer +  + + 
Cash + + + + 
Size + + + + 
Reputation + + + + 
Related mergers o  + + 
Friendly deals +  + + 
Number of fairness opinion + +  + 
Number of valuations + +  + 
Previous relation o   + 
FINRA (year) +   + 
Contingency fees o   o 
Source: own production 
 
Where + indicates a positive association on the variable, e.g. higher fraction of cash 
increases precision. o means mixed evidence and – indicates a negative association of 
variable on precision. 
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Table 16: Overview of hypothesis 
Hypothesis 1a: Acquirer 
Fairness opinions issued by the acquirer’s advisor overvalue the target 
whereas FOs of the target’s advisor undervalues the target. 
Hypothesis 1b: Acquirer 
The valuation range in FOs of target advisors is smaller than the 
valuation range in FOs of the acquirer. 
Hypothesis 1c: Acquirer 
The difference between target and acquirer valuations has no 
association to the valuation accuracy 
Hypothesis 2: Cash A higher fraction of cash increases the precision of fairness opinions. 
Hypothesis 3: Size 
Larger deals lead to a higher precision of fairness opinions than 
smaller deals. 
Hypothesis 4: Reputation 
A higher reputation of the investment bank leads to an improved 
precision of fairness opinions. 
Hypothesis 5: Related mergers 
Related mergers lead to a higher precision of fairness opinions, 
diversified transactions lower the precision. 
Hypothesis 6: Friendly deals Friendly deals increase the precision of fairness opinions. 
Hypothesis 7: No. of FO Multiple fairness opinions increase the precision of FOs. 
Hypothesis 8: No. of valuations 
More valuations models in one fairness opinion lead to a higher 
precision of the FO. 
Hypothesis 9: Previous relation 
A previous relation between the principal and the agent increases the 
valuation precision of fairness opinions 
Hypothesis 10: FINRA (year) 
Fairness opinions issued after legislation change at the end of 2007 are 
more precise than FOs issued before. 
Hypothesis 11: Contingency fees Contingency fees do not influence the precision of fairness opinions. 
Hypothesis 12: DCF 
The use of DCF calculations does not influence the precision of fairness 
opinions. 
Hypothesis 13: EM 
The use of the earnings multiple valuation increases the precision of 
fairness opinions. 
Hypothesis 14: TM 
The use of the transaction multiple valuations increases the precision 
of fairness opinions. 
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4 DATA, METHODOLOGY AND UNIVARIATE TESTS 
The previous chapter has introduced the expected associations of the 
variables on the precision. Based on that, hypotheses are formulated. 
The current chapter will now define in a first step the definition of the term 
precision of fairness opinions in more detail by explaining the mathematical 
foundation. Once the necessary distinction between range, under-/overvaluation 
and accuracy is clear, the basis for the final data set as well as the selection and 
filtering procedures can be explained. Chapter 4.1 explains how the precision is 
calculated by introducing all three measurements. Chapter 4.2 introduces the data 
set and the descriptive statistics as well as general tests on the data set for outliers 
and normal distribution. Chapter 4.3 carries out univariate tests on the data sets. 
 
4.1 PRECISION OF FAIRNESS OPINIONS 
4.1.1 Valuation range 
The valuation range measures the difference between the highest and the 
lowest provided value in every valuation model in the fairness opinions14.  
 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ − 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑜𝑤 =  𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝑆𝐷    (1) 
 
Let us assume that a fairness opinion offers the following fair value ranges: 
                                                   
14 Cain and Denis (2012) make use of exactly the same calculations, who also find 
some significant results based on univariate tests. 
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 Valuation model DCF: 20-30$ 
 Valuation model EM: 25-40$ 
 Valuation model TM: 20-35$ 
Entering the values into the described formula for highest valuation minus 
lowest valuation, the range in USD is calculated, which leads to the following 
ranges in USD: 
 
 Valuation model DCF: 30$ - 20$ = 10$ 
 Valuation model EM: 40$ - 25$ = 15$ 
 Valuation model TM: 35$ - 20$ = 15$ 
 
The range in USD is then divided by the lower valuation to get to the 




= 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒     (2) 
 
This leads to the following ranges in percent: 
 Valuation model DCF: 10$ / 20$ = 50% 
 Valuation model EM: 15$ / 25$ = 60% 
 Valuation model TM: 15$ / 20$ = 75% 
 
The average of those valuation ranges leads to the mean valuation range; in 
this example the following formula is used: 
 
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 1+ 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 2+𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 3)
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠
 =
 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝑆𝐷     (3) 
 
This leads to mean a percentage range of 61.66% in this example. 
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4.1.2 Under- and overvaluation 
A small valuation range might indicate that the investment bank is sure about 
the valuation models and the circumstances of the deal so that it does not need to 
build reserves for risks in the valuation models due to biased data or missing data. 
But this does not necessarily mean that the valuation is accurate in relation to the 
later paid price. Taking the previous fair values of the three valuation models again 
and assuming a transaction price of 30 USD, the under- or overvaluation can be 
calculated by the following formula. The following formulas are derived from 
Dolgopolik (2018). Dolgopolik uses average values of statistical estimations and 
compares those to the later observed values. 
The mean valuation in USD is built by averaging over the lowest and the 




= 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝑆𝐷    (4) 
For the three valuation models this means: 
 Valuation model DCF: (20$+30$) / 2 = 25.00$ 
 Valuation model EM: (25$+40$) / 2 = 32.50$ 
 Valuation model TM: (20$+35$) / 2 = 27.50$ 
 
The mean valuation in USD is then divided by the later paid price minus one 
(compare with Rockafellar and Wets, 1998). If the result is negative, undervaluation 
is given and if it is positive, the target has received an overvaluation. The examples 




𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝑆𝐷
𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
− 1 = 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 −/𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛    (5) 
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 Valuation model DCF: (25.00$ / 30.00$) - 1 = -16.67% 
 Valuation model EM: (32.50$ / 30.00$) - 1 = + 8.33% 
 Valuation model TM: (27.50$ / 30.00$) - 1 = -  8.33% 
 
The average of those valuation accuracies leads to the mean under-
/overvaluation. In this example the mean under-/overvaluation is calculated as 
following: 
 
(𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 1 + 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 2 + 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛3)
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 =  
 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 −/𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 %   (6) 
 
This leads to an undervaluation of -5.56%. 
 
Formula 6 indicates whether an under- or overvaluation is present and 
regression analysis on this formula will provide answers how to reduce the under- 
or overvaluation. This formula is especially important to answer hypothesis 1a. If 
an undervaluation is given, significant results will indicate how the significant 
variable will change the undervaluation. A negative coefficient leads to an increase 
in the undervaluation, a positive association to a reduction of undervaluation. For 
the acquirer data set with overvaluation the results are exactly opposing.  Hence, 
linearity is given for the individual data sets on target and acquirer, but the formula 
is not able to answer the question how to get to a valuation difference of zero 
percent in the fairness opinion. For that the formula on valuation accuracy is 
needed. 
These tests are only possible for the target and acquirer data set due to the 
expected under- and overvaluation. In the entire data set the effects of negative and 
positive valuations would lead to a levelling of effects and the needed linearity for 
regression analysis is not given any more (Wooldridge, 2013), which will later be 
discussed in more detail. Nonetheless, for deals with one-sided fairness opinions, 
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the reader might be interested in knowing which variables will lower the under- or 
overvaluation. Depending on the point of view, the reader of the fairness opinion 
can deduct the level of precision from this information. The reader of the acquirer’s 
fairness opinion would prefer to see a lower overvaluation as this increases the 
precision of the fairness opinion. The reader of the target’s fairness opinion would 
prefer a lower undervaluation as this would mean in turn a higher precision of the 
fairness opinion according to the definitions of the presented formulas. However, 
the regressions will only indicate the direction of impact of the independent 
variable and is important for the general under-/overvaluation discussion. For any 
other reference, the valuation accuracy is needed. Hence, robustness checks will 
not be carried out on under-/overvaluation. 
 
4.1.3 Valuation accuracy 
The question is whether an under- or overvaluation is preferable. In case of 
valuation accuracy, both valuation discrepancies are not favoured. The reader of a 
fairness opinion would prefer an exact value in relation to the later paid price. 
Furthermore, the effects of under-/overvaluation are expected to level each other, 
which means that studying both fairness opinions, the expected undervaluation in 
the target advisor’s fairness opinion should match the overvaluation in the 
acquirer’s fairness opinion on average. Hence, both valuation mismatches can be 
seen as equally bad and the focus of the analysis will, consequently, focus on how 
to reach a valuation difference of zero. 
 For the statistical tests, the absolute value of the mean accuracy should be 
considered and is of greater interest than the under- and overvaluation. By taking 
the absolute values of formula 6, a difference in absolute percentage is given. The 
previously calculated undervaluation of -5.56% is, consequently, transferred to a 
valuation discrepancy of +5.56%. The calculation is shown in formula 7. 
 
|𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 −/𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 %| = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦   (7) 
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Regression analysis on formula 7 is able to provide answers how the variables 
can increase the accuracy by reducing the difference between the average prices in 
the fairness opinion to the later paid price towards 0%. Hence, the valuation 
accuracy is maximised. The use of absolute values for accuracy is also allowed to 
be carried out on the entire data set as linearity concerns are not given any more 
(Wooldridge, 2013). In contrast to the formula for under-/overvaluation, the 
valuation accuracy allows a concrete answer in how far a change of one unit in any 
independent variable will influence the valuation precision. 
A significant variable in this test indicates how the variable affects the 
valuation accuracy. As the average valuation difference is not zero, but due to the 
absolute values always positive, a significant variable with a negative coefficient 
will help to increase the precision but lowering the difference. 
The calculations and formulas in this paragraph have clarified the term 
precision and also highlight why it is meaningful to analyse the data set from three 
different aspects, which are range, accuracy and under-/overvaluation. 
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4.2 DATA SET 
4.2.1 Data collection 
The data collection process for the final data set used in this research begins 
with an extract from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Platinum database, 
which is the industry standard software for information on mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Included in the final data set and counted as deals are all acquisitions of at 
least 50% of the target company’s equity, repurchases and exchange offers for 
equity or securities that can be converted into equity of the target. Hence, a change 
in the controlling majority of shares is required.  
Additionally, these transactions must have made use of a fairness opinion 
requested by at least one of the two parties involved, the target or the acquirer. SDC 
qualifies a company as a financial advisor if the company acts as the deal manager, 
is the lead underwriter, offers financial advice or provides a fairness opinion. As 
these roles are typically combined and offered by one company, the mentioned 
company is mostly the fairness opinion provider as well. Therefore, deals that have 
made use of a FO can be identified by the provided information. 
No specific requirements are imposed on the data sample, except the date of 
merger execution must be between 2003 and 2013 and the deal size (value of the 
target) must be at least 10 million dollars. A limit of 10 million dollars is set to 
exclude very small deals, where financial data is mostly not available or not 
available from trustworthy sources as legal filings are not mandatory15 (IRS, 2014).  
                                                   
15 Those corporations with $10 million or more in total assets and that file 250 or more 
returns per calendar year are required to electronically file their Form 1120, 1120-S, and 
1120-F. 
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Generally fairness opinions need to be included in the form S-416, which must 
be filed in all mergers or acquisitions made in the United States and sent to the 
Unites States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in order to continue with 
the deal (SEC, 2017). This legal requirement is also the main reason to focus on US 
mergers as the S-4 form forces companies to unveil their fairness opinions. In other 
countries, companies are not obliged to do this. 
 
The following list summarises the deal’s criteria to be considered in the final 
data set. 
 At least one party must have requested an fairness opinion 
 Completed acquisition 
 Tender/merger acquisition technique 
 Size of at least 10 million USD in total assets 
 M&A announcement date corresponds to the aforementioned 
time period 
 Both the acquirer as well as target are US companies 
 Percent of shares acquired: At least 50% 
 At least one fairness opinion must be publicly available (S-4 
form) 
 At least one valuation method must deliver a valuation 
 
The time period up to 2013 has been chosen to have a final list of deals, where 
no deals are withdrawn at a later stage, but yet unknown of getting withdrawn 
when the data is collected. Consequently, the data set only contains finalised and 
                                                   
16 S-4: Form S-4, also known as the Registration Statement under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1933. The Securities Exchange Act of 1933, often referred to as the "truth in 
securities" law, requires that these registration forms, providing essential facts, are filed to 
disclose important information upon registration of a company's securities. It helps the SEC 
achieve the objectives of this act - requiring investors to receive significant information 
regarding securities offered, and to prohibit fraud in the sale of the offered securities. 
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definite deals. The beginning in 2003 was chosen for two reasons. First of all, since 
the end of 2002 and the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), auditors are no 
longer permitted to issue fairness opinions. Since SOX fairness opinions must come 
from a credible, objective and independent source (PWC, 2013). Furthermore, 
disclosure requirements on potential conflicts of interests were improved. 
Therefore, the quality of the fairness opinions is believed to have improved after 
the change in legislation. This change in legislation has no relation to the discussed 
changes that occurred at the end of 2007, which are extensively considered in 
chapter 2. 
The chosen filter criterions observation period from 2003 to 2013, deals with 
a market capitalisation of at least 10 million USD, deals executed in the United 
States as well as the focus on mergers and acquisitions delivers 325 transactions. 
Out of these 325 transactions, 24 transactions are cancelled or were at the end of 
2013 still pending. These transactions are excluded from the data set as no 
transaction has taken place and, hence, recognition of the transaction value is not 
possible. Therefore, only 301 transactions remain in the data set. For 26 deals no 
fairness opinions on any side are requested according to SDC Platinum. The 
correctness of the information of SDC Platinum for those 26 deals that should not 
have requested FOs is manually double-checked and the information is correct. As 
a consequence, these 26 transactions have to be eliminated as well. 
275 transactions have requested fairness opinions, but for 45 of these fairness 
opinions are not published or do not deliver any valuation model. It is possible that 
the published part of the fairness opinion does not deliver a valuation range, but 
valuations can still be stated in the not published valuation memorandum. 
Nonetheless, as valuations are needed for the statistical tests, these transactions 
must be excluded as well, reducing the data set to 230 deals. 
For the remaining 230 deals the fairness opinions are not always published 
from both advisors, those of the target and the acquirer. On the target side 25 deals 
have not delivered any valuation in the fairness opinion. On the acquirer side, 37 
deals have not delivered any valuation.  
These deals must be excluded as well in the corresponding data sets, which 
means that 205 deals on the target data set are remaining and 193 on the acquirer 
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data set. This leads to two different sized data sets for targets and acquirers and a 
third, differently sized data set for the entire data set, which combines the target 
and acquirer data sets. 
 
 
Source: own production 
 
All valuations and the information on the valuation methods have been 
gathered manually from the SEC filings by downloading and working through 
every fairness opinion that is included in the S-4 form. In the following, the terms 
FO and S-4 will be used interchangeably. The S-4 form itself is downloaded and 
opened, but only the included fairness opinion is read and considered. Due to the 
different calculations of range and accuracy, different sub data sets will later be 
separated from the final data set for the empirical analysis. 
 
Figure 4: Process from raw data to the final data set 
• 325 transactions between 2003 and 2013 following the limitations on the 
data set
• - 24 transactions are marked as being cancelled or still pending
• - 26 deals that have not requested fairness opinions (no legal obligation to 
buy FOs
• - 45 deals, where no fairness opinion is published or where the fairness 
opinions does not contain valuations
• 230 deals remain in the sample
• 205 target valuations and 193 acquirer valuations are contained as 25 target 
side FOs have not delivered a valuation and 37 on the acquirer side
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4.2.2 Independent variables 
With the aim to use only information that is provided by the fairness opinion, 
the values for the independent variable size are extracted manually from the S-4 
statement, although the size (h3) of the transaction has initially been extracted from 
the target’s value provided by SDC. The manual amendment is done to overcome 
possible shortcomings in the SDC database as SDC does not specifically explain 
whether the value of the target is based on the initial offering price or the final price 
in case the deal’s details have been altered. Moreover, the S-4 form must be updated 
whenever the offer is amended. On average, the targets have a market 
capitalisation of 3,946.4 million USD (SD=8,578.4). Tests for skewness and kurtosis 
indicate a positive, right skew (skew=4.2483) and high kurtosis for the exogenous 
variable with 23.4027.  
A normal distribution has a skew of zero and a kurtosis of three. Kurtosis 
indicates how much data is in the tails. Distributions with kurtosis less than 3 are 
said to be platykurtic. A platykurtic distribution means that the distribution 
produces fewer and less extreme outliers than does a normal distribution. 
Distributions with kurtosis greater than 3 are said to be leptokurtic. The tails 
approach zero more slowly than in a Gaussian distribution. Therefore a leptokurtic 
distribution produces more outliers than the normal distribution (Wooldridge, 
2013).  
For a unimodal distribution, negative skew indicates that the tail on the left 
side of the probability density function is longer or fatter than the right side. 
Conversely, positive skew indicates that the tail on the right side is longer or fatter 
than the left side. Skewness is expected to have a value of zero in a Gaussian 
distribution (Wooldridge, 2013). 
Although no hard thresholds are defined, both kurtosis and skewness are 
considered too large and, hence, a transformation of the variable is carried out. 
Figure 5 illustrates the histogram of size before the transformation. 
Source: Own production 
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The standard procedure to transform a positive skewed variable is to use the 
natural logarithm (Wooldridge, 2013; Peck and Devore, 2012). After transforming 
the variable, the histogram in figure 6 follows more a normal distribution. This also 
supported by the skewness (-0.2760) and kurtosis (3.0030) of the transformed 
variable. The mean of the transformed variable size is 6.6363 (SD=2.0646). 
 
Source: Own production 
Figure 5 Size before transformation 
Figure 6: Size after transformation 
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The payment terms of the deal are included in the original SDC Platinum 
software and the corresponding notes to the deals. Nevertheless, the S-4 statement 
is used once again to test on the correctness of information provided by SDC 
Platinum as the payment details might be altered during the negotiation’s process. 
In two mergers the payment details have changed from pure stock payments to a 
mixture of stock and cash. The fairness opinions of these two deals indicate that the 
changes have occurred during the negotiation phase. The corrected information 
retrieved from the S-4 statements is manually entered into the data sample and the 
incorrected information has been replaced. The exogenous variable is named cash 
(h2) and can take any value between 0% and 100%, where 0% stands for a deal fully 
paid with stocks of the acquirer and 100% for a fully cash financed deal. The mean 
of cash is 27.35% (SD=37.01%) and the median is 0.5%. The distribution of cash is 
bimodal with peaks at both ends (0% cash and 100% cash). Consequently, cash is 
not following the Gaussian-Markov distribution and subsequent tests must be 
robust to this violation. Nonetheless, the variable is right-tailed as the median is 
smaller than the mean with skewness of 1.0803 and kurtosis of 2.6148. A bimodal 
distribution with peaks at both ends does not require a transformation of the data 
and hence, no transformation is carried out. 
The SEC filing is used to double check the correctness of SDC Platinum in 
relation to the financial advisor and the assumed connection to the fairness opinion 
provider. Four deals have been identified to have used different fairness opinion 
providers due to a change in the fairness opinion provider for several reasons. In 
these four cases the information from the fairness opinion and the corresponding 
S-4 statement are used. The deals have been updated and corrected and have not 
let to an exclusion from the final data set. 
The reputation (h4) of the fairness opinion provider is taken from the fairness 
opinion itself. The name is stated in the fairness opinions and then looked up in the 
corresponding league table for the year (compare with chapter 3.2.1.4). The position 
in the league table is transferred into a range of numbers from 0 to 100. In other 
words, reputation is directly taken from the fairness opinion, but for the statistical 
analysis modulated by the help of league tables. League tables are rankings of 
companies based on a set of criteria such as sales or any other relevant metrics. The 
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league tables used for the investment banks are derived from previous period 
advised M&A transactions and the market capitalisation of the target. Three 
different league tables are used to adjust for changes in the positions during the 
years. However, in line with Rau (2000), the rankings are relatively stable across 
the years, meaning that the top 5 investment banks just change the position in the 
top 5, but never dropped out in the years covered17. The position is calculated by 
the average M&A market share of investment banks based on the market 
capitalisation of deals assisted during the previous period. League tables of M&A 
activities do not only reflect past M&A market shares of banks, they also influence 
future market share of banks (Derrien and Dessaint, 2018). Furthermore, league 
tables contribute to the reputation of banks, according to Derrien and Dessaint. 
Position 1 in the league table for a certain year gives 100 points, the second place 
96 points and so on. Position 24 in the league table grants 4 points for the provider, 
every position below or investment banks not mentioned in the league tables 
receive a zero. The league tables contain the top 25 investment banks that have 
accompanied mergers in terms of market capitalisation over the given time 
horizon. The mean reputation value is 52.6633 (SD=38.7435). The distribution is left-
tailed (-0.2446) and kurtosis is 1.3953. 
Deals with more than one fairness opinion provider are aggregated and 
shown once in the data sample. This step is introduced to overcome problems with 
double or even triple data samples for one merger, which would influence all other 
variables. Furthermore, a separation is not feasible as the writers of the fairness 
opinions are supposed to work together and come together to agreed and matching 
valuations. These matching valuations have been observed in nearly all FOs. 
Hence, it cannot be separated which fairness opinion writer contributed which part 
to the opinion. Fairness opinions created by investment banks with a low and a 
high reputation do normally follow the opinion of the leading investment bank, 
which is always the most experienced bank. Therefore, summarising these opinions 
to one and taking the higher reputation is the best option. Otherwise, the influence 
of fairness opinions advised by a low-tier bank, but using the presumably superior 
knowledge of top-tier banks, would negatively influence the data sets. Whether 
                                                   
17 Lehmann Brothers is the only top 5 investment bank that dropped out of the list 
due to the insolvency and take-over by Barclays. 
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multiple fairness opinions are used is measured by the independent variable 
number of FO (h7). The minimum value is 1 and the maximum number of official 
fairness opinions (fairness opinions requested by investors do not need to be 
published) is 3. The mean is 1.2073 (SD=0.4464) and the distribution is right-tailed 
(skew=2.0309) and shows a kurtosis of 6.3670. Due to that, the variable is used as a 
dummy variable for the multiple regressions, where deals with exactly one FO 
receive a 0 and all other deals a 1 for multiple fairness opinions. In total, 75 targets 
and acquirers have used multiple fairness opinions. The majority of 323 targets and 
acquirers used only one fairness opinion. For the univariate tests, though, the exact 
number of fairness opinions is used.  
Information on the previous relation (h9) between the target or acquirer and 
the issuer of the fairness opinion is stated in the fairness opinion. If no information 
is provided, no relation is assumed. This is corresponding with FINRA rule 2290 of 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (Davis, 2008), which stipulates 
additional disclosure requirements whenever the fairness opinion provider has 
had a material relationship with any party of the deal in the past two years or did 
any actions that could mutually be understood as a relationship. Previous relation 
is mutually a dummy variable as there is either a previous relation or not. 231 
targets and acquirers have not had any previous business relation to the FO 
provider and 167 have a previous relation. The mean is 0.4196. 
The number of valuations (h8) variable is calculated by adding up all 
valuations models used in the fairness opinion, which have yielded a valuation. 
Valuation models without a valuation are not counted. The maximum number of 
valuations in a fairness opinion is 7. The median number of valuations is 2 with a 
mean of 2.5126, which leads to a right-tailed distribution (skew=0.4959) and a 
kurtosis of 2.3749. No transformation is carried out. 
The industry sector is provided by SDC platinum and was manually 
reallocated to eight different industries, which are 
 energy 
 financial services 
 IT 
 manufacturing 
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 media 
 pharma 
 retail  
 other. 
Out of the 230 deals with fairness opinions, 220 are deals within the same 
industry. Hence, a distinction between related and diversified mergers cannot be 
applied as intended by hypothesis 5. As an alternative, the distinction bank 
(financial services) and non-bank (non-financial services) is chosen. This approach 
offers another advantage as well. The theoretical discussion has highlighted that 
valuation models must be adjusted to bank deals and the flexibility of the valuation 
models is often criticised. Hence, it can be tested whether these allegations are 
correct and significant. Whereas the industry segments are infrequently stated in 
fairness opinions, the information on the segment is mostly based on SDC. 
However, the information whether any of the companies is active in the financial 
industry, is given in the FO. The information can be retrieved either directly from 
the sector information, if mentioned, or indirectly by the name or the valuation 
models, when they have to be fitted to the explicit needs of financial services 
industries from the fairness opinions. Consequently, changing the industry 
segment to a dummy variable bank and non-bank follows the objectives of this 
dissertation to use only information provided directly by the fairness opinion. In 
the data set, 167 targets or acquirers are identified as banks and 231 as non-banks. 
The mean is 0.4196. 
The date of merger execution is used as a dummy variable in the univariate 
and multiple tests to check for a significant change in valuation precision due to 
FINRA (h10) rule 2290. Deals carried out before the adoption of the law receive a 0 
and deals after that a 1. The mean of the dummy variable is 0.3929 (SD=0.4890), 
which implies that 242 fairness opinions are requested before the adoption of the 
rule and 156 after the adoption. The dummy variable is named FINRA 
The original information on deal execution is additionally used to order the 
data in the final data set. The first deal in the final data set is the first completed 
merger and the last deal, accordingly, the last executed deal at the end of 2013.  
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The assumed undervaluation of the targets’ advisors and the expected 
overvaluation of the bidders’ advisors lead to the last exogenous variable, the 
dummy variable target/acquirer (h1a-1c). All deals in the final data set have 
received either a 0 for fairness opinions issued by the target advisor or a 1 for FOs 
of the acquirers. The mean is 0.4849, which indicates that 205 target fairness 
opinions and 193 FOs of the acquirer are summarised in the original data set. The 
variable is only relevant for tests on the entire data sets. 
Out of the 11 hypotheses based on variables mentioned in chapter 3.2, two 
are not yet discussed for good reasons. 
A test on contingency fees (h11) in form of hypotheses is not feasible due to 
the fact that all deals in the data set have made use of contingency fees. Therefore, 
no comparison and statistical analysis is possible.  
The hypothesis on friendly deals (h6) cannot be tested for similar reasons. 
Only two out of all 230 deals are hostile and both deals did not publish their fairness 
opinions, which means that no valuations can be used. Again, no comparison and 
statistical analysis can be made. 
Hence, due to the restrictions of the data set, only nine of the previous eleven 
hypotheses can be analysed. The elimination of contingency fees and friendly deals 
is not made arbitrarily, but based on the distribution of observations, which do not 
allow statistical tests for these two variables. 
For the target’s valuations, 167 fairness opinions use the discounted cash flow 
valuation (DCF (h12)), 123 use earnings multiples (EM (h13)) and 93 transaction 
multiples (TM (h14)). For the acquirers, 152 fairness opinions make use of the 
discounted cash flow valuation, 104 employ the earnings multiples and 93 
comparable transaction multiples. 
Table 17 summarises the number of observations for all data sets before 
outliers are eliminated. 
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Deal size of at least 10 million  between 2002 and 
2013 and indicated as having used a fairness opinion 275  
   
Deals with S-4 statement and valuations in the 
fairness opinion 230  
   
Target:   
with any valuation 205 100.00 
Information on DCF 167 81.46 
Information on earnings multiples 123 60.00 
Information on transaction multiples 93 45.36 
   
Acquirer:   
with any valuation 193 100.00 
Information on DCF 152 78.76 
Information on earnings multiples 104 53.89 
Information on transaction multiples 93 48.19 
   
Source: Own production 
 
 
It is noteworthy that 97.16% of all deals used at least one of the three 
mentioned valuation models, 57.73% at least two of the three valuation models and 
32.22% used all three valuation models. For the tests on hypothesis 12 to 14, 
whether FOs with any one of the three most used valuation models are more 
precise, the information is collected as dummy variables. If DCF is used, the 
dummy variable has a value of 1, if not zero. The same conversion is chosen for EM 
and TM. For the univariate tests, the 1 is changed to yes and the 0 to no. 
The percentage values provided for the usage rate of the valuation models 
DCF, EM and TM are similar to those of Schönefelder (2007). The most used 
valuation model is the DCF valuation, which is used in 80% of the FOs considered 
and delivering valuations, the EM model is used in 57% of the FOs and the TM 
model in 47% of the FOs. 
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4.2.3 Identification of outliers 
In a next step outliers in the data sets are identified and eliminated. It is 
important to differentiate between outliers or influential points. Influential points 
and outliers are first tested visually by the help of a scatter plot. However, a better 
way to detect outliers is the t-score test or Z-score test (Meier et al., 2012). 
The t-score test is often recommended in literature to test for outliers in a data 
set. Another method that can be used to screen data for outliers is the Z-Score, using 
the mean and standard deviation. The Z-Score is recommended to be used, when 
the data sample’s size is above 30 and the standard deviation is known (Meier et 
al., 2012)). Formula 7 shows the calculation of the Z-score. 
 (7) 
 
Where 𝑋𝑖 ~𝑁, ?̅? is the sample mean and sd the standard deviation 
When X is normally distributed, Z is a standard normal distribution. 
According to Shiffler (1988) a possible maximum Z-score is dependent on sample 
size and no Z-score exceeds 3 in a sample size of more than or equal to 10. Any 
value above 3 highlights outliers. One disadvantage of the Z-score test is that it is 
not very precise for outlier labelling as the standard deviation can be inflated by a 
few or even a single observation having an extreme value. Thus, it can cause a 
masking problem, i.e., the less extreme outliers go undetected because of the most 
extreme outliers, and vice versa (Iglewicz and Hoaglin (1993). 
To overcome this shortcoming, the modified Z-Score is used. Instead of the 
mean and standard deviation of the sample, the median and the median of the 
absolute deviation of the median (MAD) of the sample are used in the modified Z-
score, according to Iglewicz and Hoaglin (1993). The formula is as following: 
 
𝑀𝐴𝐷 = 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 (|𝑥𝑖 − ?̃?|)      (8) 
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Where ?̃? is the median 
The modified Z-Score is computed as 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
0.6745(𝑥𝑖−𝑥) 
𝑀𝐴𝐷
    (9) 
 
The modified Z-score test identifies data points as outliers, if the modified Z-
score is higher than 3.50 (Barnett and Lewis, 1994; Hawkins, 1980). Barnett and 
Lewis recommend, though, to check values detected as an outlier individually, if it 
is a real outlier or an influential point. Hence, in two rare cases the Z-score is 
accepted to be above 3.50. Figure 7 summarises what it means to have a Z-score of 
above 3.50 and how many of the cumulative data points are expected to be in this 
range. 
 
Source: Meier et al. (2012, p.128) 
 
Figure 7: Z-Score and normal distribution 
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Cock’s distance test is a second test to detect outliers and is applied to double 
check the results of the modified Z-score. 
For Cook’s distance test, Cook suggests an upper limit of 1 for outliers (Cook, 
2000; Cook and Weisberg, 1982). Cook’s distance test is a standard test to exam the 
influence of one data point when carrying out least-square regression analysis 
(Mendenhall and Sincich, 1996). 
The tests on outliers on the independent variables have not delivered any 
results that would lead to changes on the number of observations. 
However, outliers are identified in the dependent variables. Due to the 
different calculations of range, accuracy and under-/overvaluation, the data sets are 
not comparable and must be considered separately. This leads also to a different 
number of outliers in the data sets. For the range data set, 10 data points are 
eliminated, 5 observations on the target side and 5 observations on the acquirer 
side as the valuation ranges are too large. For the accuracy and under-
/overvaluation data sets 8 outliers need to be excluded, where 3 deals on the target 
side and 5 deals on the acquirer side are eliminated for the reason that the valuation 
accuracies are too low, hence, the over- or undervaluation too large compared to 
the other observations. This leads to changes in the three data sets. Hence, the final 
data set for the entire data set on range has 388 entries, consisting of 200 entries in 
the target data set and 188 in the acquirer data set. The accuracy and under-
/overvaluation data sets have now 390 observations, based on 202 observations in 
the target data set and 188 observations in the acquirer data set. 
 
4.2.4 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables for range are generally following a Gaussian 
distribution and show only small difference in means between the data sets and 
valuation models. The average valuation range is 30.6% with a standard deviation 
of 15.0% for the entire and the target data set. The acquirer data set has a lower 
valuation range with 30.1% and SD of 13.1%. Skewness is positive, but always 
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between zero and one. Kurtosis is between 2.5 and 3.5. Hence, no transformation is 
carried out. 
The dependent variables for accuracy are all transformed by taking the 
square root from the absolute mean to lower the positive skewness and kurtosis. 
The original absolute means for the data sets are 14.92% for the entire data set with 
a SD of 14.4% based on 390 observations, 7.72% for the target data set with a SD of 
12.01% based on 202 observations and an average mean of 14.92% for the acquirer 
data set with a SD of 15.74% based on 188 observations. Skewness and kurtosis are 
above the thresholds in all three data sets (skewness = 1.6, kurtosis = 6.0) and, hence, 
new values are transformed by taking the root of the absolute mean values. The 
average mean accuracy is around 35% afterwards. Standard deviation is 18%. The 
skewness is positive and between 0.6-1.0, kurtosis is around 3. Hence, accuracy is 
following the Gauss distribution more closely after transformation. 
The last dependent variables under-/overvaluation with its different means 
for the target and acquirer data sets show in its descriptive values the expected 
undervaluation and overvaluation. The target data set provides an undervaluation 
of -8.1% and the acquirer data set an overvaluation of +6.0%. The kurtosis of the 
variable is between 4.9 and 6.0, which indicates that the variable is not normally 
distributed. Nonetheless, a transformation is not necessarily needed to run the 
univariate and multiple analyses and, hence, no transformation is performed. 
Tables 18-20 show the descriptive statistics for the entire data sets, the target 
data sets and the acquirer data sets. All statistics are based on the transformed 
variables. 
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4.2.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 18: Descriptive statistics for the entire data sets 
Entire data set 








Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Mean (range) 388 0.006 0.7293 0.3060 0.2842 0.1327 0.0176 0.6083 2.8630 
Mean (accuracy) 390 0.030 0.8975 0.3445 0.3298 0.1751 0.0307 0.5977 2.9268 
Mean (DCF range) 314 0.002 0.7795 0.3166 0.2857 0.1489 0.0222 0.7740 3.4158 
Mean (DCF accuracy) 312 0.040 0.9274 0.3739 0.3592 0.1882 0.0354 0.6479 2.9897 
Mean (EM range) 223 0.000 0.7873 0.3025 0.2697 0.1661 0.0276 0.9123 3.3746 
Mean (EM accuracy) 223 0.000 0.8341 0.3654 0.3674 0.1612 0.0260 0.1733 2.7206 
Mean (TM range) 184 0.017 0.7994 0.3127 0.2723 0.1687 0.0285 0.8099 3.0281 
Mean (TM accuracy) 182 0.050 0.8786 0.3662 0.3371 0.1805 0.0326 0.5669 2.7166 
          








Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Bank 390 0 1 0.4175 0.0000 0.4938 0.2438 0.3345 1.1119 
Size (ln) 390 0.095 10.979 6.6686 6.7211 2.0092 4.0368 -0.0619 2.1848 
Cash 390 0 1 0.2723 0.0050 0.3677 0.1352 1.0866 2.6433 
Reputation 390 0 100 53.5297 68.0000 38.5356 1484.9910 -0.2833 1.4231 
Number of FO (dummy) 390 0 1 0.1881 0.0000 0.3913 0.1531 1.5959 3.5468 
Previous relation 390 0 1 0.4330 0.0000 0.4961 0.2461 0.2705 1.0732 
Number of valuations 390 1 7 2.5567 3.0000 1.3826 1.9115 0.4871 2.3959 
Year (dummy) 390 0 1 0.3840 0.0000 0.4870 0.2372 0.4769 1.2275 
Target/acquirer 390 0 1 0.4820 0.0000 0.5003 0.2503 0.0722 1.0052 
Source: Own production 
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Table 19: Descriptive statistics for the target data sets 
Target data set 








Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Mean (range) 200 0.006 0.6763 0.3063 0.2769 0.1290 0.0166 0.4921 2.6131 
Mean (accuracy) 202 0.030 0.8233 0.3520 0.3493 0.1596 0.0255 0.5557 3.1339 
Mean (undervaluation) 202 -0.678 0.5755 -0.0808 -0.0797 0.1816 0.0330 0.2287 5.4183 
Mean (DCF range) 164 0.006 0.7468 0.3182 0.2879 0.1411 0.0199 0.6693 3.2301 
Mean (DCF accuracy) 164 0.090 0.8257 0.3735 0.3636 0.1668 0.0278 0.4907 2.7388 
Mean (undervaluation accuracy) 164 -0.663 0.6818 -0.0695 -0.0819 0.2086 0.0435 0.5218 4.7000 
Mean (EM range) 121 0.000 0.7798 0.3056 0.2800 0.1604 0.0257 0.7703 3.1784 
Mean (EM accuracy) 121 0.000 0.8341 0.3820 0.3901 0.1653 0.0273 0.0975 2.8866 
Mean (EM undervaluation) 121 -0.696 0.5678 -0.1134 -0.1162 0.1877 0.0352 0.1968 4.6946 
Mean (TM range) 92 0.017 0.7994 0.3127 0.2789 0.1669 0.0279 0.6521 2.7900 
Mean (TM accuracy) 92 0.083 0.8085 0.3436 0.3243 0.1777 0.0316 0.7121 2.7511 
Mean (TM undervaluation) 92 -0.640 0.6537 -0.0539 -0.0565 0.2042 0.0417 0.6100 5.2858 
          








Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Bank 202 0.000 1.0000 0.4158 0.0000 0.4941 0.2441 0.3415 1.1166 
Size (ln) 202 2.332 10.9790 6.6361 6.6777 2.0059 4.0234 -0.0446 2.1212 
Cash 202 0.000 1.0000 0.2829 0.0130 0.3741 0.1400 1.0223 2.4774 
Reputation 202 0.000 100.0000 52.9109 68.0000 39.3353 1547.2660 -0.2427 1.3806 
Number of FO (dummy) 202 0.000 1.0000 0.2030 0.0000 0.4032 0.1626 1.4770 3.1815 
Previous relation 202 0.000 1.0000 0.3960 0.0000 0.4903 0.2404 0.4251 1.1807 
Number of valuations 202 1.000 7.0000 2.4851 3.0000 1.3429 1.8033 0.4642 2.2350 
Year (dummy) 202 0.000 1.0000 0.3861 0.0000 0.4881 0.2382 0.4677 1.2188 
Source: Own production 
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Table 20 Descriptive statistics for the acquirer data sets 
Acquirer data set 








Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Mean (range) 188 0.055 0.7001 0.3012 0.2832 0.1307 0.0171 0.5882 2.7176 
Mean (accuracy) 188 0.035 0.8975 0.3365 0.3189 0.1905 0.0363 0.6536 2.7369 
Mean (overvaluation) 188 -0.66 0.8056 0.0596 0.0207 0.2089 0.0436 0.455 4.8506 
Mean (DCF range) 150 0.002 0.7795 0.3096 0.2850 0.1514 0.0229 0.8316 3.5823 
Mean (DCF accuracy) 148 0.04 0.9274 0.3742 0.3522 0.2099 0.0441 0.7142 2.8848 
Mean (overvaluation accuracy) 148 -0.554 0.86 0.0721 0.0271 0.2588 0.0670 0.9069 4.2554 
Mean (EM range) 102 0.037 0.7873 0.2952 0.2571 0.1697 0.0288 1.0746 3.7006 
Mean (EM accuracy) 102 0.042 0.766 0.3456 0.3449 0.1546 0.0239 0.2357 2.4752 
Mean (EM undervaluation) 102 -0.285 0.5867 -0.0372 -0.0576 0.1809 0.0327 0.8819 4.0824 
Mean (TM range) 92 0.049 0.7411 0.3082 0.2668 0.1668 0.0278 0.9611 3.3358 
Mean (TM accuracy) 90 0.05 0.8786 0.3893 0.3839 0.1815 0.0329 0.4387 2.7822 
Mean (TM overvaluation) 90 -0.396 0.7719 0.0877 0.0599 0.2290 0.0524 0.5709 3.5679 
          








Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Bank 188 0 1 0.4309 0 0.4965 0.2465 0.2793 1.078 
Size (ln) 188 1.609 10.9796 6.6670 6.6777 2.0172 4.0692 -0.0888 2.2664 
Cash 188 0 1 0.2752 0.0104 0.3701 0.137 1.0815 2.6316 
Reputation 188 0 100 52.234 68 37.9365 1439.175 -0.2384 1.4191 
Number of FO (dummy) 188 0 1 0.1809 0 0.3859 0.1489 1.6584 3.7502 
Previous relation 188 0 1 0.4947 0 0.5013 0.2513 0.0213 1.0005 
Number of valuations 188 1 7 2.5745 3 1.4027 1.9677 0.5055 2.5091 
Year (dummy) 188 0 1 0.3989 0 0.491 0.2411 0.4128 1.1704 
Source: Own production 
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4.3 TWO-SAMPLE KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TESTS 
4.3.1 Introduction to two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
Univariate statistical tests can be a helpful tool to get a thorough 
understanding of the data set. Additionally, these tests allow a first check of the 14 
postulated hypotheses. Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests are used as the tests do 
not ask for the equality of distributions and more importantly, for homoscedastic 
data. Whereas violations of the normal distribution can be ignored, if the central 
limit theorem limit theorem of 30 observations (Le Cam, 1986) is met, 
homoscedasticity is still needed for classical univariate tests like ANOVA 
(Wooldridge, 2013). The existence of heteroscedasticity is a concern in the 
application of analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) as it can invalidate statistical 
tests of significance that assume that the modelling errors are uncorrelated and 
uniform; that their variances do not vary with the effects being modelled 
(Wooldridge, 2013). Kolmogorov-Smirnov is a non-parametric test of the equality 
of probability distribution, which is not affected by heteroscedasticity. Pre-tests 
have indicated violations of the homoscedasticity assumption and later tests will 
indicate this more precisely. 
Furthermore, univariate tests in this research can be used to compare and 
check previous research results of Kisgen et al. (2009), who obtained most of their 
results purely from univariate statistics. Therefore, the univariate tests can 
demonstrate the appropriateness of the regression analysis by supporting and 
repeating the obtained results. In this dissertation the significance levels are chosen 
to be between 0.000-1.000%, 1.001%-5.000% and 5.001%-10%, where *** indicate a 
significance on the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
 
4.3.2 Set-Up of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
Some adjustments are made for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. For the 
independent variables size and cash some data points are excluded from the data 
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set while running the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to increase the distinction 
between the two groups. Lilliefors (1967) recommends this statistical procedure to 
minimise risks of type I and type II errors. It is recommended to exclude deals 
around the mean of the independent variable. Deals with a value between 3 billion 
US Dollar and 5.0 billion US Dollar are excluded from the data set as the mean of 
size is 4 billion USD. Table 21 summarises the eliminated data points.  
 
Table 21: Number of excluded size data points for K-S tests 
    target acquirer entire 
Size: 
range 18 13 31 
accuracy 8 15 23 
under-/overvaluation 8 15 23 
Source: Own production 
 
Deals with a cash/stock ratio between 0.22 and 0.32 are excluded as the mean 
is around 0.27. Table 22 summarises the eliminated data points for the variable 
cash: 
 
Table 22: Number of excluded cash data points for K-S tests 
    target acquirer entire 
Cash: 
range 14 12 26 
accuracy 12 12 24 
under-/overvaluation 12 12 24 
Source: Own production 
 
All other variables are used in the existing version of a dummy variable or 
for the number of valuations, transformed accordingly. Deals with one valuation 
model have single valuations, all other are multiple valuations. 
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It is important to understand that the p-values of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test can be too conservative for smaller samples (n<50). Nevertheless, a significant 
p-value will, even with this limitation, still be significant (Steinskog et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, even for the smallest of the data sets that is used in this thesis, the 
number of samples is still larger than 50. 
 
4.3.3 Range 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on valuation range fail to reject three of the 
nine remaining hypotheses on the independent variables in all three data sets. 
Table 21 on the next page summarises the results of all Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. 
The distribution between targets and acquirers is not significantly different for 
range, which leads to a rejection of hypothesis 1b and contradicts the results of Cain 
and Denis. The valuations of targets do not have a significantly lower range and 
are, hence, not superior to fairness opinions of the acquirer. 
Cash deals have on average a smaller valuation range than deals paid with 
stocks. The results of the K-S-test are highly significant for the entire data and 
acquirer data set and significant for the target and acquirer data sets. The 
significance of the three tests leads to a failure to reject hypothesis 2. 
 The variable size is highly significant in the entire data set and acquirer data 
set and significant on the 5% confidence level for the target data set. Smaller means 
can always be found in the group of larger deals. Therefore, larger deals lead to a 
lower valuation range in fairness opinions. The results fail to reject hypothesis 3. 
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Table 23: K-S results for range 
Entire data set 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
Acquirer Acquirer: Target 0.323  
Cash Cash Stock 0.003 *** 
Size Large Small 0.000 *** 
Reputation Top Tier Not Top Tier 0.000 *** 
Bank No Yes 0.092 * 
Number of FO Multiple Single 0.018 ** 
Number of valuations Multiple Single 0.011 ** 
Previous relation Yes No 0.203  
FINRA Before After 0.230  
     
Target data set 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
Cash Cash Stock 0.051 * 
Size Large Small 0.029 ** 
Reputation Top Tier Not Top Tier 0.015 ** 
Bank No Yes 0.145  
Number of FO Multiple Single 0.251  
Number of valuations Multiple Single 0.152  
Previous relation Yes No 0.615  
FINRA Before After 0.436  
     
Acquirer data set 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
Cash Cash Stock 0.044 ** 
Size Large Small 0.001 *** 
Reputation Top Tier Not Top Tier 0.003 *** 
Bank Yes No 0.328  
Number of FO Multiple Single 0.055 * 
Number of valuations Multiple Single 0.019 ** 
Previous relation Yes No 0.150  
FINRA After Before 0.279  
Source: Own production 
Hypothesis 4 also fails to be rejected as all three models have delivered 
significant results for the independent variable reputation. Fairness opinions of 
banks with a higher reputation are more precise as the valuation range is smaller 
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than for deals with a lower reputation. The results are highly significant for the 
entire and acquirer data sets and significant on the 5% level for the target data set.  
Furthermore, the independent variables number of fairness opinions and 
number of valuations are significant in the entire and acquirer data set. Hence, the 
hypotheses 6 and 7 fail to be rejected. The smaller means can be found in the groups 
of multiple fairness opinions and multiple valuations. Hypothesis 5 has delivered 
marginally significant results in the entire data set, accordingly non-bank 
transaction have a smaller valuation range than bank deals. 
The results of the K-S tests on range support the theoretical assumptions. 
None of the hypotheses has delivered significant results that are opposing the 
expected association on the valuation range. 
It is noteworthy that the differences for size and cash are also significant, if 
the data around the means would not have been excluded. 
 
4.3.4 Accuracy 
The K-S results for valuation accuracy agree mostly with the results for 
valuation range. Hypothesis 3 fails to be rejected in all three data sets and, hence, 
larger deals increase significantly the valuation accuracy of fairness opinions. The 
results are highly significant for the entire data set and significant for the target and 
acquirer data set.  
A top-tier reputation of the advisor leads to a higher precision of the 
valuations, which leads to a failure to reject hypothesis 4. Results are significant in 
all three data sets. The results for number of fairness opinions and number of 
valuations show significant results in all data sets and lower means for multiple 
fairness opinions and multiple valuations. The results are significant and 
marginally significant for number of fairness opinions and highly significant for 
the number of valuations. 
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Table 24: K-S results for accuracy 
Entire data set 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
Acquirer Acquirer Target 0.014 ** 
Cash Cash Stock 0.486  
Size Large Small 0.000 *** 
Reputation Top Tier Low Tier 0.015 ** 
Bank No Yes 0.185  
Number of FO Multiple Single 0.018 ** 
Number of valuations Multiple Single 0.000 *** 
Previous relation Yes No 0.342  
FINRA Before After 0.201  
     
Target data set 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
Cash Stock Cash 0.028 ** 
Size Large Small 0.019 ** 
Reputation Top Tier Low Tier 0.076 * 
Bank No Yes 0.043 ** 
Number of FO Multiple Single 0.052 * 
Number of valuations Multiple Single 0.003 *** 
Previous relation Yes No 0.389  
FINRA After Before 0.344  
     
Acquirer data set 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
Cash Cash Stock 0.167  
Size Large Small 0.015 ** 
Reputation Top Tier Not Top Tier 0.020 ** 
Bank Yes No 0.853  
Number of FO Multiple Single 0.088 * 
Number of valuations Multiple Single 0.000 *** 
Previous relation Yes No 0.447  
FINRA Before After 0.184  
Source: Own production 
 
Hence, hypotheses 6 and 7 fail to be rejected. The results so far are also found 
in the K-S tests on range. 
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However, the results for hypothesis 2, cash, are only significant in the target 
data set and they do not support hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 expects a positive 
association of cash on the valuation precision, but the K-S test shows smaller means 
and a higher precision for deals paid with stock. For the entire data set and the 
acquirer data set a higher precision can be found in the cash groups, however the 
results are not significant.  
Lastly, a significant difference between targets and acquirers is observed. The 
valuation accuracy of the advisors of the acquirer is higher than that of the targets. 
The results lead to a rejection of hypothesis 1c and are, hence, in contrast to the 
results of Cain and Denis (2013), who have found FOs of the target to be more 
precise, however with regards to the valuation range. 
 
4.3.5 Under-/overvaluation 
The under- and overvaluation in the accuracy data sets is not only shown in 
the descriptive statistics, but also the K-S test on the entire data set has delivered 
highly significant results for hypothesis 1a. Smaller means can be found in the 
target data set and, consequently, hypothesis 1a fails to be rejected. For the 
following results discussion it is important to remember that the entire data set 
shows an undervaluation of approximately -1.3%. This implies that larger means 
help to lower the undervaluation, which is in contrast to the previous two K-S tests, 
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Table 25: K-S results for under-/overvaluation 
Entire data set 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
Acquirer Target Acquirer 0.000 *** 
Cash Cash Stock 0.004 *** 
Size Small Large 0.012 ** 
Reputation Not Top Tier Top Tier 0.126  
Bank Yes No 0.005 *** 
Number of FO Single Multiple 0.133  
Number of valuations Single Multiple 0.002 *** 
Previous relation Yes No 0.013 ** 
FINRA After Before 0.004 *** 
     
Target data set 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
Cash Cash Stock 0.002 *** 
Size Small Large 0.015 ** 
Reputation Not Top Tier Top Tier 0.060 * 
Bank Yes No 0.001 *** 
Number of FO Single Multiple 0.157  
Number of valuations Single Multiple 0.009 *** 
Previous relation Yes No 0.189  
FINRA After Before 0.064 * 
     
Acquirer data set 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
Cash Cash Stock 0.044 ** 
Size Large Small 0.026 ** 
Reputation Top Tier Not Top Tier 0.229  
Bank Yes No 0.298  
Number of FO Multiple Single 0.359  
Number of valuations Multiple Single 0.102  
Previous relation Yes No 0.017 ** 
FINRA After Before 0.029 ** 
Source: Own production 
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The previously found mixed results on the association of cash on the precision are 
highlighted by the results for under-/overvaluation. In the entire data set and the 
target data set cash payments increase the undervaluation and, hence, lower the 
precision. The opposing association is given for the acquirer data set, where cash 
payments increase the precision significantly. The results for the acquirer data set 
fail to reject hypothesis 2. The descriptive statistics have shown that the target data 
set contains more valuations and a stronger overall undervaluation than is the 
overvaluation in the acquirer data set. Therefore, the results of the entire data set 
are influenced by the larger data set and the stronger misappraisal. Nonetheless, 
the association of cash on precision of fairness opinions can be doubted and further 
tests are needed. 
The results of the K-S test for the independent variable size are significant 
in all three data sets and the precision is increased by a larger size of the deal. 
Hypothesis 3 fails to be rejected. 
 In contrast to the other tests on range and accuracy, the reputation of the 
advisor has no significant influence on the under-/overvaluation. Only for the 
target data set a marginal significance is found, where the association on the 
precision is as expected. 
  For the two data sets with undervaluation, the variable bank is highly 
significant. The undervaluation is reduced, if non-bank deals are evaluated. 
Therefore, hypothesis 5 fails to be rejected. The discussion has briefly addressed 
the issue that valuations models must be adapted to the needs of financial services 
in order to be used successfully. Hence, the association of a lower precision of bank 
deals is expected (Damodaran, 2013). 
  The number of valuations in one fairness opinion lowers the 
undervaluation in the entire and target data set. Results are highly significant and 
agree with previous findings on range and accuracy. Hypothesis 7 fails to be 
rejected. 
 The results for the exogenous variable FINRA are significant in all three 
data sets. The precision is always higher for deals before the legislation has 
changed. This is in contrast to the expected association of FINRA on the precision 
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of fairness opinion. The results can be interpreted as a first indication that criticism 
on FINRA rule 2290 is correct and that the changes in legislation have only 
incorporated the de-facto industry standard into law. The previous K-S tests on 
range and accuracy support this argument as no significant, positive association is 
found and, consequently, no positive effects of FINRA are found. However, the 
results lead to a rejection of hypothesis 10. 
 
4.3.6 Valuation models 
The test of an influence of the valuation models on the precision of fairness 
opinions is also conducted with Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. A dummy variable is 
build, which takes the value yes, if the valuation model to be analysed, is used in 
the underlying fairness opinion. If the model is not used, a no is assigned. 
For the valuation range, DCF valuations do not influence the precision, 
which means that fairness opinions having a DCF valuation are not more precise 
than fairness opinions not making use of DCF valuations. Hence, hypothesis 12 
fails to be rejected. The transaction multiple valuation does also not influence the 
valuation range, which leads to a rejection of hypothesis 14. In contrast to that, 
fairness opinions with earnings multiple valuations are more precise than deals 
without earnings multiple valuations. Hence, hypothesis 13 fails to be rejected. 
Deals in the entire data set using EM valuations have on average a valuation range 
of 29.4%, whereas fairness opinions without have a valuation range of 32.2%. 
The tests on valuation accuracy fail to reject the three hypotheses 12 to 14 as 
the DCF valuation does not significantly change the valuation accuracy, whereas 
EM and TM both positively and highly significantly impact the valuation accuracy. 
Both help to increase the accuracy. For the entire data set, the difference between 
the suggested price and the paid price of fairness opinions with EM valuations is 
12.8%, whereas the difference of FOs without the EM valuation is 17.8%. The 
differences for TM are 12.1% compared to 17.4%. 
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Concerning the under-/overvaluation of the fairness opinions all three 
hypotheses 12 to 14 fail to be rejected, again. The undervaluation of the entire and 
the target data set is reduced, if EM and TM are delivering valuations. For the entire 
data set, FOs with TM valuations do on average undervalue the deals by -0.7%, 
whereas FOs without the TM valuation come to an undervaluation of -1.8%. For 
EM the under valuations are -1.2% and -1.5% for the entire data set and -6.6% and 
-10.4% for the target data set, respectively. 
The tests on the valuation models will be limited to univariate tests as an 
inclusion in the regression analysis will lead to problems of multicollinearity and 
endogeneity due to double accounting for the effects of multiple valuations. 
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Table 26: Results K-S tests for valuation models 
Data sets range 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
DCF entire Yes No 0.945  
EM entire Yes No 0.002 *** 
TM entire Yes No 0.740  
DCF target Yes No 0.148  
EM target Yes No 0.040 *** 
TM target Yes No 0.409  
DCF acquirer Yes No 0.421  
EM acquirer Yes No 0.008 *** 
TM acquirer Yes No 0.132  
     
Data sets accuracy 
DCF entire Yes No 0.188  
EM entire Yes No 0.001 *** 
TM entire Yes No 0.004 *** 
DCF target Yes No 0.451  
EM target Yes No 0.004 *** 
TM target Yes No 0.004 *** 
DCF acquirer Yes No 0.216  
EM acquirer Yes No 0.067 * 
TM acquirer Yes No 0.085 * 
     
Data sets under-/overvaluation 
Independent variable: smaller mean larger mean p-value Sig. 
DCF entire No Yes 0.478  
EM entire No Yes 0.054 * 
TM entire No Yes 0.021 ** 
DCF target No Yes 0.255  
EM target No Yes 0.010 *** 
TM target No Yes 0.022 ** 
DCF acquirer Yes No 0.339  
EM acquirer Yes No 0.290  
TM acquirer Yes No 0.106  
Source: Own production 
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4.3.7 Main findings of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
The nine K-S tests on range, accuracy and under-/overvaluation have 
delivered consistent results for most of the exogenous variables. The results for 
size, reputation, number of fairness opinions and number of valuations show a 
strong, positive association to the precision of fairness opinions. The exogenous 
variables previous relation and FINRA have only delivered significant results in 
the under-/overvaluation analysis, which is in line with the discussions of the 
theoretical deduction. Cash has provided mixed results. 
Cash shows a strong and negative association on the valuation range. Cash 
helps to lower the valuation range, but if the focus is moved to accuracy, the results 
are mixed. Cash helps to lower the overvaluation in the acquirer data set, but 
increases the undervaluation in the target data set and entire data set. The target 
data set for valuation accuracy sees also a decrease in the precision, if cash is used.  
The size of the transaction is eminently important. Larger deals increase the 
valuation precision of fairness opinions in all three ways to measure the precision. 
The range is significantly lower, accuracy higher and under-/overvaluation is 
reduced. Based on the univariate statistics, readers of fairness opinions should 
consider the size of a target, if they doubt in the precision and information 
provided. It can be assumed that the increased availability of public and unbiased 
data helps to come to a better valuation. 
The number of fairness opinions used in one deal has delivered significant 
results for the range and accuracy tests. The positive association, which is assumed 
in the theoretical discussion, is supported. More fairness opinions increase 
significantly the precision of fairness opinions. 
The same results are observed for the number of valuations within one 
fairness opinion. If more valuation models are employed, the precision increases in 
all three groups of K-S tests. 
The reputation of the advisor has delivered significant results for range and 
accuracy. The under-/overvaluation shows no association to the reputation. Top-
Tier investment banks are able to deliver a lower valuation range and more precise 
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valuations with regards to the later paid price. The theoretical discussion has 
delivered different assumptions why a positive association is expected. One of 
these assumptions is that advisors with a higher reputation cost more for the 
principal and are, hence, more likely engaged in larger transactions. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that top-tier advisors take more time in the creation process to come 
up with more valuation models. Additional K-S tests on the reputation18 have 
delivered highly significant results supporting these arguments. Advisors with a 
higher reputation are engaged in larger deals that consume more fairness opinions 
and more valuations models. Hence, the certification hypothesis claiming that top-
tier advisors are chosen to certify a bad deal must be rejected (Bebchuk and Kahan, 
1989). Instead, the superior deal hypothesis is supported, which states that top-tier 
investment banks deliver better valuations as they fear a loss of reputation by 
certifying bad deals (Kisgen et al., 2009). 
The results for the exogenous variables previous relation and FINRA are only 
significant in some of the tests on under-/overvaluation. Therefore, the results 
confirm the assumption that a previous relation does either positively or does not 
influence the precision. Criticism on a previous relation focuses on possible bias of 
the agent due to moral hazard and the will to satisfy a long-term partner. No 
indications are found for this. However, the positive association is neither found. 
There are no indications that the previous relation is beneficial to precision due to 
a better understanding of the company. 
Theory assumes a positive association of the adoption of FINRA rule 2290 on 
the precision. However, this positive association is not confirmed by the K-S tests. 
Obviously the more scrutinised view by some researchers claiming that only the 
de-facto standard was implemented in legislation should be supported. 
The significant test results of five variables in nearly all K-S tests demonstrate 
that the information provided by the fairness opinions can help to prudently check 
the quality of a fairness opinion. Hence, based on the univariate results, the 
hypothesis of law researchers that fairness opinions are just an expensive rubber 
                                                   
18 See appendix 1 
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stamp cannot be supported. Contrary, fairness opinions are able to add value to 
M&A transaction by lowering asymmetric information levels. 
Table 27 summarises the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests and 
indicates the general expected association of the independent variables for the OLS 
regressions. Only significant results are entered, hence an empty box does not 
imply that a test is not conducted, instead it means that the results are not 
significant.  
The results of the K-S test should be briefly put in contrast to the results of 
Kisgen et al. (2009)  and Cain and Denis (2013) on cumulative abnormal returns as 
their work was used to deduct the association of some of the independent variables 
with regards to fairness opinions. The statistical tests of Kisgen et al. are based 
solely on univariate tests. Hence, the results here allow a comparison. Kisgen et al. 
find significant results for cash, reputation and the number of fairness opinions 
used within one deal and a positive association to cumulative abnormal returns. 
The variables reputation and number of fairness opinions show the same positive 
association to the precision as the results of Kisgen et al. (2009) do for CARs. The 
association of cash on the precision is less explicit. Cain and Denis (2013) have 
found lower valuation ranges and CARs for fairness opinions of the target advisor. 
The results of the K-S tests support the opposing view and have significantly 
rejected their results. A higher precision is found for fairness opinions of the 
acquirer. 
The tests on the influence of valuation models on the precision of fairness 
opinions have delivered clear results. The usage of DCF models does not influence 
the precision, but EM and TM do significantly increase the precision of fairness 
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Acquirer       +     +     + 
Cash + + +   -   - - + o 
Size + + + + + + + + + + 
Reputation + + + + + +   +   + 
Non-bank +       +   + +   + 
Number of fairness opinions +   + + + + +     + 
Number of valuations +   + + + + + +   + 
Previous relation             -   + o 
FINRA             - - + o 
DCF           
EM + + + + + + + +  + 
TM    + + + + +  + 
Source: Own production 
 
Where + indicates a positive association on the variable, e.g. higher fraction of cash 
increases precision. o means mixed evidence and – indicates a negative association of 
variable on precision. Blanc fields have not delivered significant results 
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5 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The data set and its exogenous and endogenous variables are described and 
univariate tests have provided first results on the significances of the hypotheses. 
However, the power of the results is limited to the often unrealistic assumption 
that the effect of a variable x on the dependent variable is uncorrelated to variable 
y. Multiple regression analysis is able to capture these effects (Wooldridge, 2013). 
Therefore, chapter 5 will focus on multiple regression analyses. 
 
5.1 LINEAR REGRESSIONS 
5.1.1 Requirements for linear regressions 
Multiple regression analysis is more amenable to ceteris paribus analysis 
because it allows to explicitly control for many other factors that simultaneously 
affect the dependent variable y. Ceteris paribus analysis is concerned with the 
question how x affects y. The key assumption for univariate tests is that all other 
factors influencing the dependent variable y are uncorrelated with the independent 
variable x, which is mostly unrealistic (Wooldridge, 2013). 
 Multiple regression models can accommodate many explanatory variables 
that may be correlated. The more useful factors are added to the model, the more 
of the variation in y can be explained. Thus, multiple regression analysis can be 
used to build better models for predicting the dependent variable. Ordinary least 
square regression models (OLS models) are the most common multiple regression 
model (Wooldridge, 2013). A linear regression, to which OLS regressions are 
counted, has three major purposes (Quinn and Keough, 2014): 
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(1) Describe the linear relationship between the dependent and the 
independent variable 
(2) Explain how much of the variation in the dependent variable can be 
explained by changes in the independent variable 
(3) Facilitate the prediction of future values of the dependent variable 
by changes of the independent variable. 
 
The linear relationship between the dependent and the independent 
variables is shown by the following three formulas, where the regressions on range 
for the entire data set make use of the following formula. These formulas are 
derived from the standard multiple regression formula by Wooldridge (2013). 
 
𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆 =  𝛽0 + 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ ∗ 𝛽𝑖1 + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝛽𝑖2 + 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝛽𝑖3 + 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝛽𝑖4 +
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑂 ∗ 𝛽𝑖5 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗ 𝛽𝑖6 + 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝛽𝑖7 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝛽𝑖8 + 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 ∗
𝛽𝑖9 + 𝜀𝑖      (10) 
 
The regressions on accuracy are based on the following formula: 
𝒂𝒄𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒚 =  𝛽0 + 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ ∗ 𝛽𝑖1 + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝛽𝑖2 + 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝛽𝑖3 + 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗
𝛽𝑖4 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑂 ∗ 𝛽𝑖5 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗ 𝛽𝑖6 + 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝛽𝑖7 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝛽𝑖8 +
𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝛽𝑖9 + 𝜀𝑖    (11) 
 
The regressions on under-/overvaluation are based on the following formula: 
𝒖𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 −/𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 =  𝛽0 + 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ ∗ 𝛽𝑖1 + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝛽𝑖2 + 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝛽𝑖3 +
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝛽𝑖4 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑂 ∗ 𝛽𝑖5 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 ∗ 𝛽𝑖6 + 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 ∗ 𝛽𝑖7 +
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝛽𝑖8 + 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝛽𝑖9 + 𝜀𝑖   (12) 
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Where 𝛽0 the intercept of the model is, 𝛽1 is the parameter associated with first 
independent variable, 𝛽2 is the parameter associated with second independent variable etc., 
i stands for a randomly drawn observation from the population and 𝜀 the error term. 
The amount of variation in the dependent variable by a change of the 
independent variables is explained by the coefficient. By delivering these values for 
all independent variables, the future values of the dependent variable can be 
predicted, if the independent variables are known.  
The ordinary least square regression models for the precision tests of the 
main analysis, range, accuracy and under-/overvaluation, are carried out in the 
statistical software STATA. The regression models for the robustness checks follow 
the same calculations; only the endogenous variable is replaced with the according 
variable. 
To achieve robust results in a regression analysis, the underlying data need 
to exhibit different requirements (Kritzman, 1991a): 
 
(1) Linearity 
(2) No serial correlation/autocorrelation 
(3) Homoscedasticity 
(4) Normally distributed residuals 
(5) No perfect multicollinearity 
(6) Expected value of residuals equals zero 
(7) No endogeneity 
 
The first requirement is that the parameters are linear, which means that a 
one-unit increase in x changes the expected value of y by the amount of 𝛽𝑖 . The 
linearity for range and accuracy is given as a change in the independent variables 
will either increase or decrease valuation range or accuracy. 
For under-/overvaluation a deeper explanation is needed. The descriptive 
statistics and the results of the univariate tests have shown that the target data set 
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faces an undervaluation and the acquirer data set an overvaluation. Linearity could 
not be assumed, if the question is raised how to increase precision on the entire 
data set as the effects of under- and overvaluation mitigate the effects on each other. 
However, if the research question is focussing on the answer how to lower the 
undervaluation (target data set) or how to lower the overvaluation (acquirer data 
set), linearity is given. In case of undervaluation, the stronger the overvaluation, 
the better are the results and vice versa. 
No serial correlation, also known as autocorrelation, is tested by the help of 
Breusch-Godfrey tests. Violations of the homoscedasticity requirement are tested 
by the help of Breusch-Pagan and White tests. If the requirement of 
homoscedasticity is violated, heteroscedasticity is given, which requires changing 
the regression model from an OLS regression to an ordinary least squares 
regression, where heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are used (Wooldridge, 
2013). The requirement of normally distributed residuals does not need to be 
qualified as the limit theorem of Levy states (Le Cam, 1986) that the residuals 
should be regarded as sufficiently normally distributed, if the number of 
observations is large enough. A number of 30 observations is considered as a large 
number of observations and as the smallest multiple regression is carried out on a 
data set of 88 observations, the normal distribution assumption can be accepted. 
Multicollinearity is tested by the help of variance inflation factors. 
Multicollinearity does not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model 
as a whole, at least within the sample data set; it only affects calculations regarding 
individual predictors as long as no perfect multicollinearity is given. That is, a 
multiple regression model with collinear predictors can indicate how well the 
entire bundle of predictors predicts the outcome variable, but it may not give valid 
results about any individual predictor, or about which predictors are redundant 
with respect to others (Wooldridge, 2013). 
The expected value of the residuals being zero is generally considered as 
given as long as long as β0 as the constant term is considered. The assumption is 
tested by visual tests of the residuals. 
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Endogeneity is especially problematic in panel data sets, which are not used 
in the empirical discussion. Endogeneity can also be caused in other data sets by 
omitting variables or overfitting. Autocorrelation can also lead to endogeneity, but 
is sufficiently tested for. Other causes for endogeneity are measurement errors in 
one of the independent variables, which can be neglected due to the way the data 
is derived. The last cause for endogeneity can be simultaneous causality, which can 
originate from multiple formulas to predict the causality; a situation which is also 
not given (Wooldridge, 2013). Hence, endogeneity is not a relevant factor in this 
empirical research.    
In the following, the just described tests will be explained in more detail. 
 
5.1.2 Multicollinearity: Variance inflation factor 
Multicollinearity is often observed and a relevant case when R² of a 
regression analysis is “close” to one (Wooldridge, 2013). High (but not perfect) 
correlation between two or more of the independent variables is called 
multicollinearity and leads to a violation of the linearity requirement (1) 
(Wooldridge, 1989). 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) is used in statistics to quantify the severity 
of multicollinearity in an ordinary least squares regression analysis (Balakrishnan, 
2014). The tolerance and variance inflation factor for each variable is calculated to 
reveal potential multicollinearity problems. The threshold for tests on the VIF is set 
at 10 (Miles, 2014), although O’Brien claims for a less strict approach (2007). 
According to O’Brien “values of the VIF of 10, 20, 40, or even higher do not, by 
themselves, discount the results of regression analyses, call for the elimination of 
one or more independent variables from the analysis, suggest the use of ridge 
regression, or require combining of independent variable into a single index” 
(O’Brien, 2007, p. 676). This implies that the amount of variables used in the 
regression models must be reduced, if multicollinearity is detected. However, the 
variance inflation factor tests show clearly that multicollinearity does not exist in 
the data sets as the highest VIF value is below 3 and, hence, a discussion to use 
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higher thresholds is not necessary, if the valuation models are not included in the 
OLS. Therefore, no independent variables need to be excluded. All tests for all 
regression analyses can be found in appendix 2. 
 
5.1.3 Misspecification: Ramsey’s RESET test 
Ramsey’s regression specification error tests (RESET tests) are carried out 
after every single regression analyses to detect general forms of misspecifications 
of the model (Ramsey, 1969). The test has proven to be most powerful to detect 
general functional form misspecifications like violations of the linearity 
requirement (Wooldridge, 2013). In case a misspecification of the model is 
indicated by the RESET test, independent variables will be tested up to the power 
of 4. This is a standard procedure recommended. If the F-test of the RESET test 
becomes significant, a functional form of misspecification does exist. A drawback 
with the RESET test is that it provides no real direction on how to proceed if the 
model is rejected. Furthermore, the test is not able to detect heteroscedasticity 
(Wooldridge, 1995). 
 
5.1.4 Autocorrelation: Breusch-Godfrey test 
Autocorrelation has two different forms. The first form of autocorrelation is 
related to time series data sets. The second form of autocorrelation is called spatial 
autocorrelation and can affect any data set. The Durbin–Watson test is a standard 
test to detect the presence of autocorrelation. Autocorrelation describes a 
relationship between values separated from each other by a given time lag in the 
residuals from a regression analysis (Durbin and Watson, 1971). Durbin and 
Watson applied this statistic to the residuals from least squares regressions 
(Chatterjee and Simonoff, 2013). Autocorrelation leads to a violation of the BLUE 
efficiency since the Gauss-Markov assumption is violated. Autocorrelation can be 
a significant problem in analysing historical data, especially of stock prices. Stock 
prices do not tend to change radically from one day to another. This means that a 
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stock price might go down from 40 USD to 39.60 USD. The prices from one day to 
the next could be highly correlated. In order to avoid autocorrelation issues, the 
easiest solution is to convert the series of historical prices into a series of 
percentage-price changes from day to day, according to Wooldridge, 2013. 
According to this solution for autocorrelation, a time-series autocorrelation cannot 
exist as the precision for range, accuracy and under-/overvaluation is measured in 
percentage points. Additionally, the only time-series related variable is year, but 
no transaction has more than one data point and, hence, no series is given. 
Although the first form of autocorrelation can generally be found in time-
series analysis and panel data, where none of the two is applicable for the data sets 
used, tests on autocorrelation are conducted for all data sets. The test is needed as 
a second form of autocorrelation can, theoretically, exist, although geographical 
effects are not considered in this research as only the US market is analysed 
(Wooldridge, 2013). 
In order to be able to run the analyses some minor adjustments on the dates 
are needed. By definition, every time point must be unique. Where the merger 
execution is made on the same day twice, the next free day was chosen. This 
limitation is present for every deal in the entire data sets as the fairness opinions of 
the target and the acquirer are mutually for the same deal and, as a consequence, 
the date of one of the two deals needs to be adjusted. 
Although the described Durbin-Watson tests are a standard test for 
autocorrelation, Breusch-Godfrey tests are carried out. Breusch-Godfrey tests are 
similar to the Durban-Watson test, but are more general and have no restrictions 
on the regressors. Furthermore, the test is more powerful (Wooldridge (1991b)). 
Any probability of the Chi square test below 0.10 indicates autocorrelation 
(Godfrey, 1996). Despite the use of the more powerful Breusch-Godfrey tests, as 
expected, no autocorrelation is found in any of the data sets and regression 
analyses. The results of tests are stated in appendix 2. 
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5.1.5 Heteroscedasticity: Breusch-Pagan test and Information-matrix-test 
The Breusch-Pagan test on random coefficients and the White test on 
specification robustness are conducted to check the presence of spatial 
heteroscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test begins by allowing the 
heteroscedasticity process to be a function of one or more of the used independent 
variables. The test is usually applied by assuming that heteroscedasticity may be a 
linear function of all the independent variables in the model (Pedace, 2013).  A Chi-
squared test is the basis of the Breusch-Pagan test. If the test statistic of the Chi-
square test has a p-value below an appropriate threshold, in this case 10%, then the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected and heteroscedasticity is assumed. 
The White-test is a specialisation of the Breusch-Pagan test and is less 
sensitive against violations of the standard distribution (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2010). The White-test firstly uses the squared residuals from the original model. 
These serve as a proxy for the variance of the error term at each observation. The 
independent variables in the auxiliary regression account for the possibility that 
the error variance depends on the values of the original regressors in some way 
(Waldman, 1983). The non-constant coefficients in the auxiliary regression should 
be statistically indistinguishable from zero and R squared should be low. A high R² 
indicates violations of the hypothesis of homoscedasticity (Wooldridge, 2013). 
Furthermore, an information matrix test (IM-test) is run for all regressions. 
The IM-test tests for heteroscedasticity, skewness and kurtosis follows the set-up 
of Cameron and Trivedi (1992). The test has the advantage that it also includes in 
its first term the just described White test for homoscedasticity against unrestricted 
forms of heteroscedasticity. 
If heteroscedasticity is present, the ordinary least square regressions are 
made robust for heteroscedasticity. Robust regressions are indicated by the term 
“OLS HC3 YES”. Heteroscedasticity does not influence the coefficients, but the 
standard errors and t-value. As a consequence of that, the P>t is too optimistic for 
large values. Nonetheless, heteroscedasticity does not cause a bias or inconsistency 
of the OLS estimators and does not violate the BLUE efficiency, if the sample size 
is large enough. Furthermore, it is not recommended to change from OLS to 
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weighted least squares (WLS) or generalised least squares (GLS) regressions, if the 
functional form of heteroscedasticity is not known (Hayes and Cai, 2007). 
 Instead it is recommended to use heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
error (HCSE) estimators of OLS parameter estimates (Long and Erwin, 2000; 
Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). The main advantage is seen in the fact that, 
unlike WLS or GLS regressions, the fitted OLS regression requires neither 
knowledge about nor a model of the functional form of the heteroscedasticity and 
no transformation of Y is needed (Hayes and Cai, 2007). They describe the HCSE 
model as “an alternative and highly appealing method of reducing the effects of 
heteroscedasticity on inference […]. With this approach, the regression model is 
estimated using OLSs, but an alternative method of estimating the standard errors 
is employed that does not assume homoscedasticity.” (Hayes and Cai, 2007, p.711). 
Over the last 40 years different HCSE consistent estimators have been 
proposed. Starting with the work of Eicker (1963) and Huber (1967) over White 
(1980), HC0 to HC3 estimators are recommended. In current research HC3 
estimators are seen as the most advanced estimators and simulations. Long and 
Ervin (2000) have evaluated the empirical power functions of the t test of the 
regressions coefficients, using both the ordinary OLS estimator and the four HC 
methods. They recommended that HC3 should always be used because it can keep 
the test size at the nominal level regardless of the presence or absence of 
heteroscedasticity. Additionally, only a slight loss of power is associated with HC3 
when the errors are indeed homoscedastic. Cribari’s et al. (2005) simulations results 
also suggest the superiority of HC3 over its predecessors. Nonetheless, HC3 
consistent estimators are only used if heteroscedasticity is observed; otherwise the 
normal OLS regression will be carried out. This approach ensures that 
heteroscedasticity is carefully considered in the analysis. 
The tests for heteroscedasticity can be found in appendix 2. 
Summarising the results of the tests on the requirements for linear 
regressions it can be concluded that the regression models are only affected by 
heteroscedasticity and, where heteroscedasticity is detected, the regressions will be 
made robust to it. Any other concern like autocorrelation, misspecifications of the 
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model and multicollinearity between the variables do not exist as the tests have 
indicated. Linearity is given due to transformation of the dependent variable 
under-/overvaluation to absolute values (dependent variable: accuracy). 
Autocorrelation is tested by the Breusch-Godfrey test, homoscedasticity by testing 
for heteroscedasticity and adjusting the regression models to a heteroscedasticity 
robust model, if needed. The residuals are normally distributed by visual checks; 
multicollinearity is tested by the variance inflation factor test. Expected value of the 
residuals is zero and endogeneity can be ignored due to the definitions of the tests. 
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5.2 MAIN ANALYSIS 
5.2.1 Range 
5.2.1.1 Entire data set on range 
Model 1a examines the determinants of the valuation range for the entire data 
set. The F-test of the regression is highly significant (0.000) and R² shows a model 
fit of 0.137. The variables cash and size are highly significant and both variables 
lower the valuation range. Hence, hypothesis 2 and 3 fail to be rejected. The results 
do support the results of the univariate analysis. Reputation has a significant, 
positive influence on the range and a higher reputation leads to a lower valuation 
range. Hypothesis 4 fails to be rejected. 
 In contrast to the results of the univariate analysis, bank deals lower the 
valuation range. The K-S tests have provided that non-bank deals lower the 
valuation range. The results contradict the positive association of non-bank deals 
on valuation range that is expected. 
The variables number of fairness opinions and number of valuation have not 
delivered significant results. However, the coefficients still support the positive 
association on range. For the other two variables, previous relation and FINRA, no 
significant results are found. This corresponds to the results of the univariate tests. 
The missing significance of the variable acquirer leads to a rejection of 
hypothesis 1b. Previous studies by Cain and Denis (2013) have found lower 
valuation ranges for targets, but the OLS regression does not support this view. 
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Table 28: OLS regression valuation range on entire data set 
Entire data set (model 1a) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Acquirer -0.009 0.480   
Cash -0.056 0.000 *** 
Size (ln) -0.015 0.002 *** 
Reputation -0.001 0.037 ** 
Bank -0.027 0.073 * 
Number of FO -0.001 0.950   
Number of valuations -0.008 0.125   
Previous relation 0.023 0.121   
FINRA 0.016 0.229   
Constant 0.468 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.137     
Probability F-test 0.000     
Sample size 388     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
5.2.1.2 Target data set on range 
Model 1b focuses on fairness opinions issued by the advisors of the targets 
and offers a highly significant R² of 0.150 with a probability of the F test of 0.000.  
The results for the variables cash and size are significant and highly 
significant and lower the valuation range of target’s fairness opinions. These results 
are congruent to the results for the entire data set in model 1a and the results of the 
K-S tests. The results fail to reject the hypotheses 2 and 3. 
The number of fairness opinions is marginally significant and more fairness 
opinions lower the valuation range. Hypothesis 7 fails to be rejected. The K-S tests 
did not deliver significant results for the number of FO.  
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A previous relation increases the valuation range for targets and the results 
are significant. Based on previous results and based on the theoretical outline, a 
previous relation is positively associated to the precision and not negatively. 
 
Table 29: OLS regression valuation range on target data set 
Target data set (model 1b) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.045 0.049 ** 
Size (ln) -0.020 0.004 *** 
Reputation 0.000 0.328   
Bank -0.022 0.327   
Number of FO 0.011 0.579   
Number of valuations -0.013 0.055 * 
Previous relation 0.040 0.043 ** 
FINRA 0.016 0.358   
Constant 0.484 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.150     
Probability F-test 0.000     
Sample size 200     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
5.2.1.3 Acquirer data set on range 
Model 1c with its focus on the acquirer data set is based on 188 observations. 
The model itself is highly significant and R² is 0.138. The variables cash and size are 
significant as in the other two models on range, where cash is highly significant 
and size marginally significant. Both variables have a negative coefficient, which 
means that the valuation range gets smaller and the precision increases. The 
positive association is, hence, recognised. Hypotheses 2 and 3 fail to be rejected. 
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Comparable to the entire data set, reputation is significant and the range is 
lowered by advisors with a higher reputation. Hypothesis 4 fails to be rejected. All 
three results are confirmed by the previous univariate tests. In the univariate tests, 
number of fairness opinions and number of valuations have delivered significant 
results, reducing the valuation range. The positive association to the precision can 
be acknowledged by the negative coefficients, but the results are not significant. 
 
Table 30: OLS regression valuation range on acquirer data set 
Acquirer data set (model 1c) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.064 0.004 *** 
Size (ln) -0.011 0.097 * 
Reputation -0.001 0.049 ** 
Bank -0.028 0.182   
Number of FO -0.001 0.972   
Number of valuations -0.004 0.592   
Previous relation 0.003 0.898   
FINRA 0.001 0.966   
Constant 0.447 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.138     
Probability F-test 0.001     
Sample size 188     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
5.2.1.4 Main findings on range 
To summarise the results of models 1a to 1c, it can be said that the same two 
independent variables are significant in all three models. These are cash and size. 
Based on the theoretical deduction, a large target is easier to value as more 
information sources are available, for example due to higher media coverage, 
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which leads to lower levels of asymmetric information between the principal and 
the agent. Hence, the FO provider is not purely depending on the target’s 
cooperation and goodwill to get the necessary data for the valuation process. 
Instead, the fairness opinion provider can access more publicly available and 
unbiased data. Additionally, controlling and monitoring of the agent is easier for 
the principal. The results of the first three regression analyses support this view. 
The theory shows that cash deals are more precise as the final value of the 
offer is known whereas stocks can fluctuate and change the cash-equivalent 
exchange ratio in the acquisition process. Hence, a buffer is needed which will 
negatively influence the precision of fairness opinions.19 These statements can be 
supported by the results of all three models 1a to 1c. Additionally, cash deals do 
better serve the pricing function of fairness opinions. 
The reputation of the investment bank is built on the monetary size of deals 
supported in the past and, therefore, shows experience in valuing companies. The 
experience helps to come up with better valuations and comparisons, which reduce 
the valuation range. This perspective has been supported by two of three models 
(1a, 1c). The additional tests on reputation while carrying out the K-S tests have 
furthermore shown that the statements of Titman and Trueman (1986) are 
maintained that advisors with a higher reputation are more engaged in larger 
deals, where a higher fraction of cash is used and more fairness opinions are 
obtained. All three variables are assumed to have a positive association on the 
precision, which is supported by the OLS results. The results support the superior 
deal hypothesis. 
The results of the first multiple analysis are in line with the results of the 
univariate tests of the previous chapter for hypotheses 1-3. The hypotheses for cash, 
size and reputation deliver significant results in both univariate tests and increase 
the precision. Hence, hypotheses 1-3 fail to be rejected. In the univariate tests, the 
hypothesis 5 (number of valuations) and 6 (number of fairness opinions) are both 
                                                   
19 Due to the independence of the agreed purchase price and the prices in the fairness 
opinion, a correction for changes in an underlying index like the S&P 500 as it is needed for 
CAR analysis, is not mandatory (compare with chapter 3.2.1.2). 
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significant in two of three tests. The significances of the univariate tests are not 
supported by the multiple tests. This does, however, not mean that previous results 
of the univariate tests are wrong. Instead, the influence on the regression might be 
too low compared to size, cash and reputation. Hence, the results are not significant 
in the regression analyses.  
 
5.2.2 Accuracy 
5.2.2.1 Entire data set on accuracy 
Model 2a examines the determinants of the valuation accuracy for the entire 
data set. The F-test of the regression is highly significant (0.000) and R² shows a 
model fit of 0.126. The mean of the transformed endogenous variable is 0.3445. 
Size is again highly significant and a larger size of the target lowers the 
difference between the valuation and the paid price and is, therefore, beneficial for 
a higher precision. Hypothesis 3 fails to be rejected.  
Highly significant are the number of valuations in one fairness opinion. The 
more valuations are used, the higher the precision. Hence, hypothesis 8 fails to be 
rejected. 
Interestingly and against the assumed association, deals carried out before 
FINRA 2290 became effective, are more precise than deals afterwards. This leads to 
a rejection of hypothesis 10. 
The variables acquirer, reputation and number of fairness opinions have not 
delivered significant results. The results are significant in the univariate analysis, 
though. 
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Table 31: OLS regression valuation accuracy on entire data set 
Entire data set (model 2a) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Acquirer -0.015 0.389   
Cash -0.001 0.973   
Size (ln) -0.021 0.001 *** 
Reputation 0.000 0.723   
Bank -0.026 0.203   
Number of FO 0.007 0.739   
Number of valuations -0.028 0.000 *** 
Previous relation 0.025 0.177   
FINRA 0.042 0.022 ** 
Constant 0.552 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.126     
Probability F-test 0.000     
Sample size 390     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
5.2.2.2 Target data set on accuracy 
The OLS regression on the target data set is highly significant and R² is 0.145. 
The mean of the endogenous variable, after transformation, is 0.352. The target data 
set shows the highest difference of the three data sets on accuracy. 
The two variables size and number of valuations are significant, which is in 
line with the previous test on the entire data set. The negative coefficients indicate 
for both variables an increase in precision. Therefore, the hypotheses 3 and 8 fail to 
be rejected. Both variables have also delivered significant results in the univariate 
tests. 
However, other variables that have shown significant results in the 
univariate analysis like cash, reputation, bank and number of fairness opinions fail 
to deliver significant results in the regression analysis. 
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Table 32: OLS regression valuation accuracy on target data set 
Target data set (model 2b) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash 0.041 0.126   
Size (ln) -0.020 0.013 ** 
Reputation 0.000 0.884   
Bank -0.009 0.736   
Number of FO 0.032 0.241   
Number of valuations -0.030 0.003 *** 
Previous relation 0.016 0.476   
FINRA 0.030 0.194   
Constant 0.534 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.145     
Probability F-test 0.000     
Sample size 202     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
5.2.2.3 Acquirer data set on accuracy 
The mean of the dependent variable, after transformation, is 0.336, which 
means that the acquirer data set has the highest accuracy of the three data sets. The 
OLS regression on the acquirer data set is highly significant and R² is 0.141. 
The independent variables size and number of valuations are again 
significant and increase the precision of the fairness opinion, which leads to a 
failure to reject the hypotheses 3 and 8. These results are also observed in the other 
two data sets on accuracy and the univariate analysis. 
The variable bank is marginally significant and bank deals increase the 
precision. This is against the predicted association that non-bank deals are more 
precise. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test supports the view that the valuation 
accuracy is higher for bank deals, but did not find significant results. 
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Reputation and number of fairness opinions have delivered significant 
results in the univariate tests, but these results are not supported in the OLS 
regressions. 
Lastly, the independent variable FINRA is marginally significant and deals 
analysed after the change in legislation are less precise. This leads to a rejection of 
hypothesis 10, where an increased precision after the adoption of FINRA rule 2290 
is assumed. 
 
Table 33: OLS regression valuation accuracy on acquirer data set 
Acquirer data set (model 2c) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.041 0.257   
Size (ln) -0.022 0.018 ** 
Reputation 0.000 0.894   
Bank -0.054 0.097 * 
Number of FO -0.024 0.529   
Number of valuations -0.029 0.006 *** 
Previous relation 0.027 0.368   
FINRA 0.058 0.064  * 
Constant 0.567 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.1405     
Probability F-test 0.006     
Sample size 188     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
5.2.2.4 Main findings on accuracy 
The main findings for the three OLS regressions on accuracy are that the 
valuation accuracy is significantly increased, if the deal is larger and more 
valuation models are used within the fairness opinion. Hence, hypotheses 3 and 8 
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fail to be rejected in all three data sets. The results for the number of valuation 
models support the arguments that with more valuation models the pricing 
function of fairness opinions is better fulfilled and that information asymmetries 
are lowered by every valuation model used. 
The implications of size based on the theoretical discussion are already 
addressed in the main findings of range. However, further univariate tests, which 
can be found in the appendix 1, deliver further significant results. Larger deals are 
more likely to be advised by top-tier investment bank, which are believed to assist 
only better performing deals. Furthermore, larger deals are more likely to use 
multiple fairness opinions and fairness opinions with multiple valuation models. 
All results are highly significant (see appendix 1 for details). These significant 
results might also explain why the univariate tests have provided significant results 
for reputation and number of fairness opinions for all three data sets. These 
findings are not supported by the OLS regressions. 
Only for the acquirer data set, the accuracy is increased by bank deals. The 
results are marginally significant. The assumptions are that non-bank deals are 
more precise as valuation models need to be adapted to value banks accordingly. 
The univariate tests have not delivered significant results for bank in the acquirer 
data set, but in the target data set. For the target data set, non-bank deals increase 
the precision of fairness opinions. But the OLS regression failed to deliver 
significant results for this. 
 
5.2.3 Under- and overvaluation 
The tests on the under- and overvaluations in the data sets must be limited to 
the target and acquirer data sets as linearity concerns are raised for the entire data 
set in chapter 5.1.1. Hence, the analysis will begin with the target data set. 
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5.2.3.1 Target data set on under-/overvaluation 
The endogenous variable for the target data set shows an undervaluation of 
-8.08%. Hence, a positive coefficient helps to lower the undervaluation and increase 
the precision. The OLS regression delivers two significant variables. 
The first significant variable is cash. The negative coefficient of cash, 
however, does violate the positive association of cash, which is assumed based on 
the theoretical outline and indicates that hypothesis 2 must be rejected. Stock deals 
are more precise than cash deals as the undervaluation is lower. This result is 
supported by the univariate tests. 
The other significant variable is bank and bank deals increase the 
undervaluation and are, consequently, less precise. With regards to hypothesis 5, 
the results indicate a failure to reject hypothesis 5. Non-bank deals are expected to 
be more precise as valuation models do not need to be adjusted. The K-S test agrees 
to these findings. 
The univariate tests have again delivered further significant variables, which 
are not supported by the OLS regression. The results provided by the tests include 
a higher precision of large deals and fairness opinions issued by an advisor with a 
higher reputation. Additionally, the number of valuations is highly significant in 
the K-S tests and more valuations lower the undervaluation. Although the results 
are not significant in the regression analysis, the coefficients indicate that larger 
deals and FOs with more valuation models are more precise. 
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Table 34: Under-/overvaluation on target data set 
Target data set (model 3a) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.069 0.047 ** 
Size (ln) 0.006 0.519   
Reputation 0.000 0.734   
Bank -0.067 0.024 ** 
Number of FO 0.001 0.972   
Number of valuations 0.002 0.824   
Previous relation -0.025 0.384   
FINRA 0.011 0.683   
Constant -0.082 0.154   
        
R² 0.082     
Probability F-test 0.033     
Sample size 202     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
5.2.3.2 Acquirer data set on under-/overvaluation 
The endogenous variable for the acquirer data set shows an overvaluation of 
+5.96%, which is significantly smaller than the undervaluation of -8.08% in the 
target data set. This is in line with the previous results, where the acquirer data sets 
have also been superior to the target data sets with regards to the precision. Due to 
the overvaluation, a negative coefficient helps to lower the overvaluation and 
increases the precision. The OLS regression delivers four significant variables. 
Highly significant is the variable size, which helps to lower the overvaluation 
in the acquirer data set. Hence, hypothesis 3 fails to be rejected. Cash is significant 
on the conventional level of 5% and, in contrast to the target data set, helps to 
increase the precision. Cash reduces the overvaluation attached by the advisor of 
acquirer on the target, which is also in line with the theoretical deduction. Both 
variables are also significant in the univariate tests.  
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Table 35: Under-/overvaluation on acquirer data set 
Acquirer data set (model 3b) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.082 0.032 ** 
Size (ln) -0.028 0.008 *** 
Reputation 0.001 0.057 * 
Bank -0.062 0.077 * 
Number of FO 0.044 0.314   
Number of valuations -0.018 0.158   
Previous relation -0.004 0.905   
FINRA 0.029 0.440   
Constant 0.223 0.009 *** 
        
R² 0.0851     
Probability F-test 0.009     
Sample size 188     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
Marginally significant are reputation and bank, where a higher reputation 
increases the overvaluation and bank deals lower it. Hence, both results are 
contradicting the hypothesis 4 and 5. Based on the theoretical deduction non-bank 
deals and deals of advisors with a higher reputation are expected to be more 
precise. Both results are not supported by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, where 
even a higher precision was found for deals advised by top-tier banks. However, 
the results have not delivered significant results. Besides the marginal significance 
of reputation, the coefficient is also around zero with 0.001 and, hence, reputation 
has nearly no influence on the overvaluation as an 1 point increase in reputation 
does only lead to an improvement of 0.001% of the overvaluation. 
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5.2.3.3 Main findings on under-/overvaluation 
The main findings of the OLS regressions on under-/overvaluation are that 
due to linearity problems a discussion of the entire data set is not possible and a 
break-down into the target and acquirer data set does also not deliver consistent 
results. The univariate tests are better suited for tests on the under- and 
overvaluation of the data sets as they can also be performed on the entire data set, 
where significant results for nearly all variables are obtained. 
The results of the OLS regressions are limited as they do not match between 
the data sets as in previous tests on range and accuracy. The main reason is that the 
difference in the valuations is explainable by the variable acquirer, which has 
yielded highly significant results in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the entire 
data set. This variable is consistent with hypothesis 1a as the main determinant 
whether the target is overvalued or undervalued in FOs. Hence, the theoretical 
deduction is correct and advisors of the acquirer overvalue the target to indicate 
that the offered price offers a good investment to the shareholders. The 
shareholders of the acquirer can assume to buy an undervalued asset as the fair 
price is, according to the fairness opinion, higher than the market capitalisation 
suggests. 
The limitations of the under-/overvaluation due to the linearity concerns of 
the entire data set lead to an exclusion from tests on the robustness of the results in 
the chapters 5.3 to 5.5. 
 
5.2.4 Main findings on regressions 
The results of the multiple regression tests just carried out are for the most 
significant variables in line with expectation from theory and the results put 
forward by the univariate tests carried out before. 
In all eight OLS regressions, the variable size increases the precision of 
fairness opinions. The valuation range is significantly reduced and the accuracy 
increases. The undervaluation in the target data set is reduced and the 
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overvaluation in the acquirer data set is lowered as well. The results for size fail to 
reject hypothesis 3 in all data sets. Further univariate tests have shown that some 
of the assumptions of the theoretical deduction are correct. Larger deals make more 
often use of advisors with a higher reputation and larger deals consume more 
fairness opinions than smaller deals and make use of more valuation models per 
fairness opinion. All three variables have proven to improve the precision in the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. 
The independent variable cash has a significant influence on the valuation 
range. In all three models the valuation range is reduced, if cash is used as the 
payment method. Therefore, hypothesis 2 fails to be rejected. The theoretical 
deduction has highlighted that cash financed deals are easier to value for the 
advisor as no specific knowledge is needed in valuing additional share capital. 
Cash deals do also carry a fixed monetary value, whereas share prices can fluctuate, 
which required an additional buffer for these fluctuations. 
In the same vein, reputation does significantly lower the valuation range. 
Advisors with a higher reputation create fairness opinions with a smaller valuation 
range, leading to a failure to reject hypothesis 4. Further tests on reputation have 
shown that, in line with expectations, higher reputation is often linked to deals with 
a larger size and more fairness opinions with more valuation models. Again, all 
three variables have a positive association to the precision of fairness opinions. 
Whereas the number of valuations has delivered significant results on range 
and accuracy in the univariate tests, the significance of the variable is only found 
in the regressions on accuracy. In these regressions, the number of valuations is 
highly significant and helps to increase the valuation accuracy. Hence, hypothesis 
7 fails to be rejected. 
Although the number of fairness opinions has delivered significant results in 
the univariate tests, none of the regression analyses has supported this view. The 
number of fairness opinions is not significant in the regression models. One 
explanation for this discrepancy can be seen in the correlations to size and 
reputation, which is demonstrated before. Larger deals and deals assisted by top-
tier advisors are linked to an increased number of fairness opinions. Hence, in the 
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OLS regression analysis this positive correlation can explain the missing 
significance. 
Furthermore, the missing significant results for bank, previous relation and 
FINRA are worth to be discussed in more detail. All variables have only yielded 
significant results in one of the tests on range and accuracy. The missing 
significances of bank and previous relation indicate that the problems and doubts 
in the variables raised in the theoretical discussion by some researchers are not 
severe. Advisors have to adopt the valuation models for banking services, but do 
obviously not use these adjustments to their advantage by issuing heavily 
manipulated valuations only to foster deal completion. 
The deal completion hypothesis is also used to explain the concerns by some 
researchers towards a previous relation. Due to moral hazard, Morgensohn (2005) 
sees risks from a previous relation that might potentially lower the precision of 
fairness opinions. He assumes that previous connections and personal bonds 
between the advisor and the management might put pressure on the advisor to 
craft a fairness opinion in the interest of the management team. The results of this 
analysis show that these negative associations are not supported. However, Cain 
and Denis (2013) and Kisgen et al. (2009) assume that a previous relation will help 
to increase the precision of fairness opinions as the company is better known and 
due to ongoing valuations more reliable and updated financial forecasts exist for 
affiliated advisors. These assumptions have also let to the positive association 
expressed by hypothesis 8. However, these positive associations can also not be 
significantly supported by the regression analysis and the univariate tests. 
Criticism on FINRA rule 2290 has largely focused on the fact that de-facto 
industry standards given by previous court rulings are only put into legislation. 
Based on the results of the univariate and multiple tests, these assumptions are 
supported and the increase in disclosure requirements has not let to a significant 
increase in the precision of fairness opinions. 
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5.3 ROBUSTNESS CHECK: DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW VALUATION 
5.3.1 Introduction to robustness checks 
The previous chapter has shown that most of the hypotheses can be 
significantly supported, but some of the variables have come up with different 
coefficients than assumed. All models have in common that a valuation mean is 
used, which is calculated based on the results of all valuation methods. However, 
not all valuation models are used equally often within fairness opinions. When the 
data set was introduced, it is mentioned that DCF valuations are used in roughly 
80% of all fairness opinions considered in this research, earnings multiple 
valuations in nearly 60% and transaction multiples in approximately 45% of all 
these fairness opinions. Any other valuation models are only used in 53% of any 
fairness opinion. 
Due to the importance of the three valuation models DCF, earnings multiple 
and transaction multiple on the previously used valuation means, further analyses 
is beneficial to either support previous findings or come up with new findings. If 
the independent variables are also significant for the valuation models, the results 
can be seen as tested and reinforced. The following tests on the three valuation 
models fulfil, consequently, the role of robustness tests. 
 The test of the valuation models will follow in the same order as before. First 
the range will be analysed and afterwards, the accuracy. Under-/overvaluation is 
analysed as well, but the results are only shown in the appendices as again no tests 
on the entire data set are possible. 
Outliers are eliminated before running the regressions. This leads for the DCF 
regressions on range to an elimination of three deals on the target side and two on 
the acquirer side, resulting in 5 data points for the entire data set. For the accuracy 
data set three and four data points are eliminated on the target and acquirer side, 
respectively, totalling seven for the entire data set. 
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For the EM regressions two data points are removed in the target and 
acquirer data sets, respectively, totalling four in the entire data set. This applies to 
both the range and accuracy data sets. 
For the TM regressions one data points is removed from the target data set 
and one from the acquirer data set, totalling two data points in the entire data set 
for range. Again one data point is removed for the target data set on accuracy and 
three on the acquirer data set, totalling four data points in the entire data set. 
 
5.3.2 Regression Analysis: Range Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
The first robustness check on the entire data set is highly significant and R² is 
0.121. The dependent variable has a mean value of 0.316, which implies that the 
valuation range of DCF valuations for the entire data set is approximately 1% larger 
than the mean of all valuation models on range. 
The most significant variables of model 1a are supported by the robustness 
checks. Cash and size are highly significant again and both lower the valuation 
range. Hence, hypothesis 2 and 3 fail to be rejected. The significant results for 
reputation and bank are not supported by the DCF test. Instead, previous relation 
is highly significant and a previous relation increases the valuation range. This 
leads to a rejection of hypothesis 9, where smaller valuation ranges are expected, if 
a previous relation exists. The significance of hypothesis 9 suggests that the most 
used valuation method might be used to come to favourable valuations that are in 
line with management’s expectations. 
The robustness check for the target data set supports previous findings of 
model 1b. Cash and size are marginally significant and both lower the valuation 
range. This leads to a failure to reject hypothesis 2 and 3. Previous relation is again 
highly significant and a previous relation increases the valuation range. Model 1b 
has delivered the same result. The significance of number of valuation is not 
supported by the DCF robustness check.  Model 4b is highly significant with R² of 
0.113. 
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Table 36: OLS regression DCF range on entire data set 
Entire data set (model 4a) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Acquirer -0.013 0.408   
Cash -0.081 0.000 *** 
Size (ln) -0.018 0.002 *** 
Reputation 0.000 0.491   
Bank -0.024 0.222   
Number of FO -0.025 0.154   
Number of valuations -0.004 0.539   
Previous relation 0.056 0.002 *** 
FINRA 0.004 0.801   
Constant 0.475 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.121     
Probability F-test 0.000     
Sample size 314     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Table 37: OLS regression DCF range on target data set 
Target data set (model 4b) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.055 0.069 * 
Size (ln) -0.017 0.051 * 
Reputation 0.000 0.882   
Bank -0.015 0.610   
Number of FO -0.031 0.195   
Number of valuations -0.008 0.338   
Previous relation 0.070 0.006 *** 
FINRA -0.008 0.714   
Constant 0.460 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.113     
Probability F-test 0.010     
Sample size 164     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Both tables 36 and 37 are own production 
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Table 38: OLS regression DCF range on acquirer data set 
Acquirer data set (model 4c) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.105 0.001 *** 
Size (ln) -0.018 0.021 * 
Reputation 0.000 0.498  
Bank -0.027 0.326   
Number of FO -0.007 0.793   
Number of valuations -0.001 0.914   
Previous relation 0.034 0.200   
FINRA -0.001 0.973   
Constant 0.477 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.139     
Probability F-test 0.001     
Sample size 150     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
The DCF robustness check on accuracy supports the results for cash and size. 
Again, a larger fraction of cash and a larger size in a transaction lead to an increased 
precision, resulting in a failure to reject hypotheses 2 and 3. The variable reputation 
is not significant in the robustness check. The dependent variable has a mean of 
0.285, which is below the mean of model 1c with 0.3012. Hence, the DCF valuations 
of the acquirer are more precise than those of the target advisors. The model itself 
is highly significant and R² is 0.138. 
 
5.3.3 Regression Analysis: Accuracy Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
Based on a sample size of 312 deals, model 5a is highly significant with R² of 
0.083. The results fully support previous findings on the accuracy for the entire data 
set. The variables size and number of valuations are highly significant and increase 
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the valuation accuracy, which leads to a failure to reject hypotheses 3 and 8. The 
independent variable FINRA is marginally significant and deals after changes in 
legislation lower the accuracy, also supporting previous results. The result leads to 
a rejection of hypothesis 10. 
 
Table 39: OLS regression DCF accuracy on entire data set 
Entire data set (model 5a) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Acquirer 0.005 0.827   
Cash -0.028 0.320   
Size (ln) -0.022 0.003 *** 
Reputation 0.000 0.847   
Bank -0.017 0.513   
Number of FO 0.008 0.788   
Number of valuations -0.017 0.047 ** 
Previous relation 0.012 0.612   
FINRA 0.044 0.051 * 
Constant 0.548 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.083     
Probability F-test 0.001     
Sample size 312     
OLS HC3 Yes     
 
Source: Own production 
 
Model 5b does again fully support previous findings of model 2b. Size and 
number of valuations are significant and increase the valuation accuracy. Hence, 
hypotheses 3 and 7 fail to be rejected. Model 5b’s R² is 0.151 and is the model is 
highly significant. Model 5c fails to be significant and, therefore, no analysis is 
presented. 
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Table 40: OLS regression DCF accuracy on target data set 
Target data set (model 5b) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.040 0.231   
Size (ln) -0.022 0.005 *** 
Reputation 0.000 0.835   
Bank 0.000 0.992   
Number of FO 0.007 0.831   
Number of valuations -0.021 0.052 * 
Previous relation -0.003 0.926   
FINRA 0.039 0.131   
Constant 0.568 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.151     
Probability F-test 0.000     
Sample size 164     
OLS HC3 Yes     
 
Table 41: OLS regression DCF accuracy on acquirer data set 
Acquirer data set (model 5c) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.012 0.804   
Size (ln) -0.021 0.093 * 
Reputation 0.000 0.918   
Bank -0.036 0.408   
Number of FO 0.004 0.938   
Number of valuations -0.014 0.353   
Previous relation 0.029 0.466   
FINRA 0.051 0.272   
Constant 0.531 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.052     
Probability F-test 0.506     
Sample size 148     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Both tables 40 and 41 are own production 
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The valuation accuracy of all three DCF models on accuracy is lower than the 
accuracies of the main analysis. Whereas the data sets of model 2a-2c have an 
average accuracy of 14.9%, the difference for DCF valuations is 17.5%, hence the 
difference between the valuation in the FO and the paid price is 2.6% higher. The 
just stated values of the means are not transformed (in contrast to those used in the 
regressions and are, hence, not comparable to the values provided in chapter 4.2.5). 
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5.4 ROBUSTNESS CHECK: EARNINGS MULTIPLE VALUATION 
5.4.1 Regression Analysis: Range Earnings Multiple Valuation 
Model 6a is significant at the 5% confidence level and R² is 0.110. The 
independent variables cash and size are significant, which agrees to the results of 
model 1a. Both lower the lower the valuation range, which leads to a failure to reject 
the hypotheses 2 and 3. The variables acquirer and previous relation fail to deliver 
significant results. The results are, therefore, in line with model 1a. The 
significances for reputation and bank of model 1a are not supported by the 
robustness checks on earnings multiple for the entire data set. 
 
Table 42: OLS regression EM range on entire data set 
Entire data set (model 6a) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Acquirer -0.009 0.690   
Cash -0.056 0.053 ** 
Size (ln) -0.024 0.007 *** 
Reputation 0.000 0.635   
Bank -0.032 0.243   
Number of FO 0.010 0.695   
Number of valuations 0.009 0.371   
Previous relation -0.005 0.830   
FINRA 0.023 0.316   
Constant 0.472 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.110     
Probability F-test 0.022     
Sample size 223     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
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The OLS regressions on the targets’ data set and the acquirers’ data set in 
model 6b and 6c are not significant and, hence, no further results can be drawn 
from the analysis. The missing significances of the models 6b and 6c indicate that 
further, yet unknown, variables explain the valuation range for the earnings 
multiple model. Naturally the selection of corresponding companies (peer group) 
is expected to be the most important variable, although this assumption cannot be 
tested. 
 
Table 43: OLS regression EM range on target data set 
Target data set (model 6b) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.049 0.280   
Size (ln) -0.021 0.076 * 
Reputation 0.000 0.510   
Bank -0.030 0.452   
Number of FO 0.049 0.180   
Number of valuations 0.004 0.809   
Previous relation 0.009 0.768   
FINRA 0.031 0.342   
Constant 0.450 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.097     
Probability F-test 0.398     
Sample size 121     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
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Table 44: OLS regression EM range on acquirer data set 
Acquirer data set (model 6c) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.046 0.243   
Size (ln) -0.026 0.094 * 
Reputation 0.000 0.655   
Bank -0.029 0.459   
Number of FO -0.023 0.553   
Number of valuations 0.010 0.509   
Previous relation -0.017 0.689   
FINRA 0.004 0.908   
Constant 0.502 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.151     
Probability F-test 0.138     
Sample size 102     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
5.4.2 Regression Analysis: Accuracy Earnings Multiple Valuation 
Model 7a investigates the accuracy of fairness opinions using the multiple 
earnings valuation model on the entire set. The model is significant at the 5% 
confidence level and R² of the model is 0.077. Two independent variables are 
significant, reputation and acquirer. Both variables are not significant in the main 
analysis. However, as reputation helps to increase the precision, hypothesis 4 fails 
to be rejected. The significance of acquirer leads to a rejection of hypothesis 1c. The 
significance of acquirer indicates that the valuation accuracy of the bidder advisors 
is better than that of the targets. This does imply that the quality of the fairness 
opinions of acquirers is higher than that of the targets. Consequently, the results 
are contradicting previous results of Cain and Denis (2012), who found a higher 
quality for target advisors’ fairness opinions. 
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Table 45: OLS regression EM accuracy on entire data set 
Entire data set (model 7a) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Acquirer -0.040 0.064 * 
Cash 0.042 0.178   
Size (ln) 0.003 0.691   
Reputation -0.001 0.019 ** 
Bank -0.026 0.313   
Number of FO -0.007 0.758   
Number of valuations -0.006 0.625   
Previous relation 0.001 0.970   
FINRA 0.037 0.114   
Constant 0.425 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.077     
Probability F-test 0.050     
Sample size 223     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
In line with the results for EM on range, the regression models for the target 
and acquirer data sets are not significant. 
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Table 46: OLS regression EM accuracy on target data set 
Target data set (model 7b) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash 0.022 0.628   
Size (ln) 0.002 0.831   
Reputation -0.001 0.026 ** 
Bank -0.010 0.787   
Number of FO 0.008 0.792   
Number of valuations -0.008 0.620   
Previous relation 0.030 0.396   
FINRA 0.031 0.340   
Constant 0.423 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.067     
Probability F-test 0.435     
Sample size 121     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Table 47: OLS regression EM accuracy on acquirer data set 
Acquirer data set (model 7c) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash 0.065 0.131   
Size (ln) 0.003 0.772   
Reputation -0.001 0.267   
Bank -0.049 0.195   
Number of FO -0.027 0.421   
Number of valuations -0.005 0.750   
Previous relation -0.030 0.380   
FINRA 0.049 0.138   
Constant 0.398 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.101     
Probability F-test 0.250     
Sample size 102     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Both tables 46 and 47 are own production 
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5.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECK: TRANSACTION MULTIPLE VALUATION 
5.5.1 Regression Analysis: Range Transaction Multiple Valuation 
The dependent variable of model 8a has a mean of 0.312. The model is highly 
significant and R² is 0.1503. The independent variables cash and reputation are 
significant. Both lower the valuation range and increase the precision, which leads 
to a failure to reject the hypotheses 2 and 4. Both variables are also significant in the 
main analysis. The significance of size and reputation, which is found in the main 
analysis, is not supported by the results on the transaction multiple valuation 
model. 
 
Table 48: OLS regression TM range on entire data set 
Entire data set (model 8a) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Acquirer -0.012 0.616   
Cash -0.083 0.006 *** 
Size (ln) -0.016 0.137   
Reputation -0.001 0.092 * 
Bank -0.011 0.708   
Number of FO 0.012 0.659   
Number of valuations 0.001 0.928   
Previous relation -0.002 0.922   
FINRA 0.046 0.135   
Constant 0.475 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.1503     
Probability F-test 0.001     
Sample size 184     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
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R² of model 8b is 0.230 and the model itself is highly significant. The mean of 
the dependent variable is 0.313 and the valuation range is significantly reduced by 
the independent variables size, whereas FINRA increases the valuation range. As 
size lowers the valuation range and, hence, increases the precision of the FO, 
hypothesis 3 fails to be rejected. The negative association of FINRA on range leads 
to a rejection of hypothesis 10. The significance of the variables cash, number of 
valuations and previous relation in the main analysis are not supported by model 
8b.  
 
Table 49: OLS regression TM range on target data set 
Target data set (model 8b) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.070 0.148   
Size (ln) -0.033 0.021 *** 
Reputation -0.001 0.426   
Bank -0.018 0.694   
Number of FO 0.054 0.163   
Number of valuations -0.001 0.947   
Previous relation 0.015 0.661   
FINRA 0.090 0.030 ** 
Constant 0.550 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.230     
Probability F-test 0.003     
Sample size 92     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
The F-test of the OLS regression for model 8c is not significant and will not 
be further analysed. 
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Table 50: OLS regression TM range on acquirer data set 
Acquirer data set (model 8c) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.076 0.056 * 
Size (ln) 0.003 0.818   
Reputation -0.001 0.043 ** 
Bank -0.007 0.863   
Number of FO -0.005 0.915   
Number of valuations 0.002 0.923   
Previous relation -0.014 0.714   
FINRA -0.005 0.922   
Constant 0.382 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.125     
Probability F-test 0.117     
Sample size 92     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
5.5.2 Regression Analysis: Accuracy Transaction Multiple Valuation 
The F-test of model 9a is highly significant and R² explains 0.075 of variation 
in the model. The significance of size and number of valuations corresponds to the 
results of the main analysis and the negative coefficients indicate that the precision 
increases, if the target is larger and more valuation models are used. Hence, 
hypothesis 3 and 8 fail to be rejected. Cash and acquirer have not delivered 
significant results in the main analysis. However, in model 9a a higher fraction of 
cash helps to increase the precision, which leads to a failure to reject hypothesis 2. 
The valuation provided by the acquirer shows a lower accuracy than those of the 
targets. The marginal significance leads a rejection of hypothesis 1c. 
The OLS regression of model 9b is not significant. 
Table 51: OLS regression TM accuracy on entire data set 
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Entire data set (model 9a) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Acquirer 0.046 0.084 * 
Cash -0.061 0.091 * 
Size (ln) -0.017 0.067 * 
Reputation 0.000 0.429   
Bank -0.034 0.267   
Number of FO -0.065 0.020 ** 
Number of valuations -0.010 0.480   
Previous relation 0.001 0.968   
FINRA 0.048 0.117   
Constant 0.445 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.1207     
Probability F-test 0.007     
Sample size 182     
OLS HC3 No     
Table 52: OLS regression TM accuracy on target data set 
Target data set (model 9b) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash 0.004 0.944   
Size (ln) -0.019 0.143   
Reputation 0.000 0.616   
Bank -0.066 0.193   
Number of FO 0.080 0.059 * 
Number of valuations -0.012 0.600   
Previous relation -0.022 0.604   
FINRA 0.001 0.982   
Constant 0.449 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.102     
Probability F-test 0.301     
Sample size 92     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Both tables 51 and 52 are own production 
Table 53: OLS regression TM accuracy on acquirer data set 
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Acquirer data set (model 9c) 
Independent variable: coefficient p-value Sig. 
Cash -0.110 0.018 ** 
Size (ln) -0.012 0.608   
Reputation 0.000 0.688   
Bank 0.002 0.961   
Number of FO 0.036 0.524   
Number of valuations -0.021 0.325   
Previous relation 0.017 0.703   
FINRA 0.092 0.097 * 
Constant 0.505 0.000 *** 
        
R² 0.169     
Probability F-test 0.074     
Sample size 90     
OLS HC3 Yes     
Source: Own production 
 
Model 9c is marginally significant with an R² value of 0.169. Cash and FINRA 
are the two significant, independent variables. Cash increases the valuation 
accuracy, which leads to a failure to reject hypothesis 2. Deals analysed after the 
adoption of FINRA rule 2290 are less precise, supporting the results of the main 
analysis. This leads to a rejection of hypothesis 10. 
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5.6 RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
5.6.1 Range 
For range, consistent with the expectations, size, cash and reputation play an 
important role in determining the precision of fairness opinion, indicated by 
significant results. Nearly all univariate and multiple tests have yielded significant 
results for size and cash. Therefore, the results fail to reject the hypotheses 2 and 3. 
The valuation range is smaller if deals are larger and a higher fraction of cash is 
used as a method of payment. For reputation, in two out of three tests in the main 
analysis, hypothesis 4 fails to be rejected. In both tests deals with a higher 
reputation of the investment bank offer a smaller valuation range than deals 
advised by a lower tiered investment bank. 
The distinction between target and acquirers is, as expected, not significant 
for the valuation range. This leads to a failure to reject hypothesis 1b. The theory 
has shown that targets are expected to be undervalued by the advisors of the selling 
company and overvalued by the advisor of the buyer. Both advisors do this to 
imply that the offered conditions of the deal are beneficial for the corresponding 
party. The selling party will get a better price than a fair price would suggest and 
the acquirers will not find a better investment opportunity as the fair value of the 
target is higher than the offered price. As diverging valuation prices do not 
necessarily affect the valuation range, no association was assumed. 
Marginally significant are the results for bank deals in the entire data set. 
Bank deals offer a lower valuation range and in turn a higher precision than non-
bank deals. The theory has suggested opposite associations. Interestingly, the 
univariate test shows a higher precision for non-bank deals. The number of 
valuations has delivered significant results for the target data set on range. More 
valuations lower the range. Hence, hypothesis 8 fails to be rejected. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests found significant results in all three data sets. 
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Table 54: Summary independent variables, only significant variables and 
directions for main analysis 
Independent variable 
Data set 













Range, entire   + + + -         
Range, target   + +       + -   
Range, acquirer   + + +           
Accuracy, entire     +       +   - 
Accuracy, target     +       +     
Accuracy, acquirer     +   -   +   - 
under-/overvaluation, 
target 
+ -     +         
under-/overvaluation, 
acquirer 
+ +   - -         
K-S range, entire    + + + + + +     
K-S range, target    + + +           
K-S range, acquirer   + + +   + +     
K-S accuracy, entire +   + +   + +     
K-S accuracy, target    - + + + + +     
K-S accuracy, acquirer     + +   + +     
K-S under-/overvaluation, 
entire 
+ - +   + + + - - 
K-S under-/overvaluation, 
target 
  - + + +   +   - 
K-S under-/overvaluation, 
acquirer 
  + +         + + 
Result + + + + o + + o - 
Source: Own production 
Where + indicates a positive impact on the precision of fairness opinions, o a neutral influence on 
precision and – a negative impact. Empty fields indicate no significant results. 
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Previous relation is expected to have a positive association to the valuation 
range, but only for the target data set significant results are given. These results 
support the opposing view that a previous relation is bad for the valuation range. 
The results for cash, size and reputation are also supported by the robustness 
checks. For the DCF valuation on range, the independent variable previous relation 
is highly significant for the entire and the target data set. However, a previous 
relation does not increase the precision; it lowers the precision and increases the 
valuation range. Hence, the results do again contradict the expectations and 
investors should be careful, when a previous relation is given and DCF valuations 
are used. For any other valuation model this risk is not statistically supported. 
 
5.6.2 Accuracy 
The valuation accuracy is influenced by two independent variables, size and 
number of valuations. Both have delivered significant results in all three models of 
the main analysis on accuracy. Both variables help to increase the accuracy of the 
fairness opinions and, hence, hypothesis 3 and 8 fail to be rejected. These results 
are also supported by the univariate tests. The relevance of size and number of 
valuations on accuracy is supported by significant results in the robustness checks 
on the DCF valuation model and transaction multiples.  
Hypothesis 1c claims that the difference between acquirer and target 
valuations is not relevant for the valuation accuracy. The hypothesis fails to be 
rejected as no significant results are found. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fully 
support this view. However, the robustness checks have delivered significant 
results in two of the tests; one has a positive association, the other one a negative 
association.  
The distinction between deals carried out before the change in legislation, 
FINRA, has delivered significant results for the entire data set and marginally 
significant results for the acquirer data set. According to hypothesis 10, deals after 
the change are associated with a higher precision. The results suggest a different 
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association, which leads to a rejection of hypothesis 10. The valuation accuracy was 
higher before the changes in legislation have occurred. These results are supported 
by some of the robustness checks for accuracy. In two of them significant results 
are found and the association is negative, again. Consequently, the robustness 
checks support the results of the main analysis. The univariate tests do not support, 




The results for the tests on under-/overvaluation are not as clear as the results 
for valuation range and accuracy. Most significantly, the univariate tests on the 
entire data set are also able to demonstrate with highly significant results that 
acquirer advisors come to higher valuations than target advisors. Hence, 
hypothesis 1a fails to be rejected. It is important to highlight that this difference 
between undervaluation and overvaluation has a strong influence on the results of 
the independent variables in the further discussion of the results of under-
/overvaluation. 
The most important result, the difference between target and acquirer 
valuations, is highly significant in both regression models on the target and the 
acquirer set. Due to the violation of linearity, tests on the entire data set are not 
possible. However, for the two data sets analysed, acquirer based fairness opinions 
are more precise than those of the target. This is a clear contradiction to previous 
studies on fairness opinions, where better results are found in the target sought 
fairness opinions. 
 Cash, for example, is significant in all tests on under-/overvaluation. 
However, the questions whether cash deals are more precise than stock deals 
cannot be answered in a simple sentence due to diverging results. In the target data 
set, cash deals lower the valuation, which leads to a larger undervaluation and a 
lower precision. For the acquirer data set, however, cash deals are more precise 
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than stock deals as they help to lower the overvaluation. The univariate tests 
support these results. 
The same differentiation is needed for bank deals. Bank deals are less precise 
in the target data set, but more precise in the acquirer data set. However, in the 
univariate tests, bank deals are always less precise. 
Surprisingly, for the under-/overvaluation discussion, size has not delivered 
significant results in the regression analysis, but in all three Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests. Based on the univariate tests, larger deals are more precise than smaller deals 
as they help to lower the under- and overvaluation. 
Table 55 summarises the results of the robustness checks. 
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  o 
Cash + + +     +   +   + + + 
Size + + + + + +     + +   + 
Reputation             + +       + 
Bank                       o 
Number of fairness opinions                       o 
Number of valuations       + +         +   + 
Previous relation - -                   - 
FINRA       -         -   - - 
Source: Own production 
Where + indicates a positive impact on the precision of fairness opinions, o a neutral influence on 
precision and – a negative impact. Empty fields indicate no significant results. 
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5.7  MAIN FINDINGS OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
The results of the empirical research can help to end some of the ongoing 
discussions which variables are important for fairness opinions and which impact 
they are expected to have for some variables, for which neither clearly positive nor 
clearly negative results were found so far as the theoretical discussion has shown. 
The tests at hand have also delivered the so far missing multiple statistics for 
fairness opinion research. 
First of all, the results show that some variables are crucial for the precision 
of fairness opinions, demonstrated in form of the significances found. Fairness 
opinions can add value to mergers and acquisitions by lowering information 
asymmetries and providing insides to the valuation models applied within the 
valuation process and delivering precise and accurate results under certain 
circumstances as the failure to reject most of the hypotheses has shown. 
Therefore, fairness opinions can be more than a legal protection for managers. 
They are able to fulfil their pricing function under given situations very well. 
Shareholders can gain additional information from fairness opinions and use them 
for their advantages. The information content delivered solves, at least partly, the 
classical information gap arising from the principal-agent problem. The principal 
(shareholder) gains additional information to oversight the agent (management 
board) and make a more profound decision whether to sell the shares. The principal 
achieves the power to distinguish a good deal from a bad deal and might be able 
to intervene in deal execution. Alternatively, the principal is able to apply sanctions 
on the agent in form of a dismissal of management or litigation. Therefore, the 
results of this paper are showing that fairness opinions can be or are more than just 
a “rubber stamp” (Liu, 2015, p.8).  
Secondly, the results demonstrate that cash payments and a larger size are 
generally helpful to increase the quality of a fairness opinion, even when checking 
the results on the three mostly used valuation models. For cash, the results are 
limited to the valuation range as the valuation accuracy provides no significant 
results and the under-/overvaluation mixed results. The results for size are 
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significantly reducing the valuation range and the valuation accuracy is higher for 
larger deals. 
A higher reputation of the investment bank lowers the valuation range 
significantly and helps to increase the accuracy, at least in the univariate tests. 
Further research has shown that top-tier banks are more associated with larger 
deals that have used multiple valuations and valuation models and cash. Hence, a 
missing significance in the multiple tests can be explained by these correlations, 
although the correlations are statistically not relevant for the regression analysis. 
Nonetheless, the superior deal hypothesis is supported by a higher reputation. 
Thirdly, a higher number of fairness opinions created for one deal as well as 
a larger number of valuation models used in the opinion help to increase the 
precision based on the findings of the univariate tests. The results for the number 
of valuations are also supported by the OLS regressions for accuracy. With more 
valuation models and fairness opinions in one deal, information asymmetries are 
better lowered between all parties involved and pricing function is additionally 
better fulfilled. 
  Fourth of all, the theoretical outline has already shown that a previous 
relation is not expected to have a negative influence on the precision of fairness 
opinions. As only in one regression a significant result was found, the hypothesis 
that a previous relation does not influence the precision negatively fails to be 
rejected. This means that the concerns raised with regards to previous relations and 
a possible bias of FOs can statistically not be supported. 
The results do, furthermore, indicate that the changes in legislation by 
passing the FINRA rule 2290 in the end of 2007 have not led to significant changes 
in the quality of fairness opinions. The precision has not increased after that, neither 
for range nor for accuracy. Criticism on the improved disclosure requirements 
discussed in the literature review, hence, seems to be correct. The change in 
legislation appears to have adopted the de-facto requirements set by court 
decisions into written law. 
Furthermore, the tests and missing tests on the hypotheses 5 (bank/non-
bank), 6 (friendly deals) and 11 (contingency fees) help to answer and end some of 
Tobias Lippe    224 
the ongoing discussion in the current body of literature. Contingency fees are used 
in nearly every fairness opinion nowadays and must, therefore, not be seen as a 
warning signal to the readers of fairness opinions. Contingency fees are instead a 
common remuneration component and FOs are nonetheless able to fulfil their 
pricing function and information function. 
The data set also demonstrates that fairness opinions are only issued in 
friendly mergers. The risks of being engaged in a hostile merger, where the pricing 
function of fairness opinions is at risk due to a huge level of asymmetric 
information as the support of the target is not given, prevent the investment banks 
from accepting the contract. Hence, in hostile mergers fairness opinions are only 
very rarely written. 
The reformulated hypothesis on bank/non-bank deals has not provided clear 
results, which means that the needed changes in the valuation models for bank 
deals are not used by investment banks to manipulate the valuation models in a 
negative kind. This would results in a lower precision. If valuation models are 
changed, these changes occur obviously only to deliver a valuation and not to do 
harm to the shareholders or managers. 
An overview of all outcomes of the main analysis is presented in table 54 on 
page 218 and table 55 on page 222. A plus indicates a positive influence on the 
precision of fairness opinions. 
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6 CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Fairness opinions are subject of intensive discussions amongst researchers. 
On the one hand law researchers assume that fairness opinions are sought by 
management to protect themselves from liability in case of shareholder litigation. 
Any other objective than that is denied. On the other hand, economic research 
indicates that further benefits must exist.  “Even at high values for price variance, 
fairness opinions appear to contain incremental information”, according to Cain 
and Denis (2013, p.24). 
The aim of the dissertation is to find and define variables that influence the 
precision of fairness opinions. In order to achieve this objective, four sub objectives 
have been formulated in the introduction. The first three sub objectives consider 
the theoretical deduction of variables and its association to the precision of fairness 
opinions. 
The first sub objective is to extract variables from the discussion of the 
functions fairness opinions have to fulfil and the information they provide. The 
discussion of the functions has provided eleven variables that are assumed to 
influence the precision plus the three hypotheses on the valuation models. The 
second sub objective is to discuss the principal-agent theory in relation to fairness 
opinions in order to gain associations of the variables. This sub objective is 
successfully reached and in combination with the first and third sub objective, 
positive, negative and neutral associations of the variables are derived. The third 
sub objective is to deduct the association to precision of deal specific variables from 
M&A research and fairness opinion specific variables from existing FO research. 
The fourth sub objective is to analyse the data with appropriate statistical 
models. This is achieved in the empirical chapters and the provided results will 
now be summarised. 
 
Deals paid in cash rather than in stock lower the valuation range. However, 
evidence on accuracy is not significant and on under-/overvaluation mixed. For the 
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acquirer data set deals paid in cash increase the precision, for the target data set 
these deals lower the precision. 
Additionally, the argument stated in the discussion of the results of the 
regression analysis on under-/overvaluation that “last-minute” price changes 
might not be fully considered in a fairness opinion might explain the discrepancies 
to the expected outcome. The argument can be supported by the fact that the results 
on valuation range are clear, where a raised price does not influence the range due 
to the different calculations for range and under-/overvaluation. 
The hypothesis that target advisors significantly undervalue the target, 
whereas acquirer advisors overvalue the target is supported. The under-
/overvaluation discussion provides significant results for that. The results and the 
means suggest that the most accurate valuation with regards to the under-
/overvaluation can be achieved, if the two valuations of the target and the 
acquirer’s bank are averaged. This valuation is near the later paid price. However, 
in contrast to previous research results by Kisgen et al. (2009), fairness opinions by 
the advisor of the acquirer are more precise than those of the advisor of the target. 
All significant variables are an addition to current research due to the 
explorative nature of this research. Especially the results on number of valuations 
and number of fairness opinions are an addition to current research. Besides some 
general ideas on risk sharing or mitigation of extremely wrong valuations by either 
obtaining multiple fairness opinions or employing multiple valuations, no research 
in relation to fairness opinions is carried out on this so far, but the expected positive 
association due to pricing function and information asymmetries is supported. 
The research of this dissertation supports previous results of Kisgen et al. 
(2009) on deal size and reputation. Therefore, at least a minor connection to 
cumulative abnormal return studies is indicated by the results of this research. This 
means that for further research other exogenous variables that are significant for 
cumulative abnormal returns might be of significance for research on the precision 
of fairness opinions as well. 
The use of robustness checks by the means of the three most used valuation 
methods of the data set and running the same ordinary least square regressions on 
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these methods, is new in relation to fairness opinions. The results of the main 
analysis hold true even after the robustness checks. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on the valuation models have provided 
significant results for the hypotheses that the use of earnings multiple and 
transaction multiple valuation models increase the precision of fairness opinions 
compared to those that do not make use of these models. 
Although not in the focus of this research, the paper is able to support the 
numbers presented by Cain and Denis (2013) for their data set on multiple fairness 
opinions in mergers. Cain and Denis (2013) have seen that 8% of the deals in their 
data set use two fairness opinions and 1% obtain three opinions. In this newer data 
set 10% of all deals make use of two opinions and 2% make use of three opinions. 
The average valuation ranges have improved since the research of Cain and Denis 
(2013). They reported average valuation ranges of 76% for acquirers and 60% for 
targets and 57% for deals where both sides obtained fairness opinions. The average 
ranges in this data set are 31% for targets and 30% for acquires, 31% in the total 
data set.  
Due to the limitations of the data set, tests on the hypotheses for contingency 
fees and hostile mergers are not possible. Nearly all deals in the data set make use 
of contingency fees, which implies that contingency fees are an industry standard, 
at least in the US market. The limited number of hostile transactions does also 
support the statements of Servaes and Zenner (1996) that especially advisors with 
a high reputation try to avoid assisting in hostile acquisitions. 
Finally it can be said that the paper at hand provides a first and 
comprehensive insight to variables influencing the precision of fairness opinions. 
Precise fairness opinions can be assumed to serve more functions than the stated 
certification and processing function. These opinions are worth to be read by the 
shareholders or other involved parties. The results support the statement of Cain 
and Denis (2013), who argument that “it is possible that fairness opinions are 
informative when they are presented within a narrow range, but uninformative 
when there is greater variability in the valuation estimates” (Cain and Denis 2013, 
p.23), if the higher quality assumption of more precise FOs is accepted. Fairness 
opinions are able to lower information asymmetries and to fulfil the pricing 
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function. They do not only limit the liability of management by providing an 
insurance function. 
Changes and improvements in legislation are still not strict enough and need 
to be continued. The impact of FINRA rule 2290 on the precision of fairness 
opinions is rather negative than positive, although significant results are only 
found in some tests. Nonetheless, where significant results are achieved, the 
precision of fairness opinions have been higher before legislation was improved.  
 
Further research: 
Due to the fact that the results of this research are new and exclusive so far, 
they indicate a need for further research. In general, the results need to be repeated 
in another research with the same focus, but a different data set. Furthermore, the 
results of the regressions indicate that further variables influence the precision of 
fairness opinions as R² and adjusted R² are explaining only parts of the variations. 
These results are expected as only variables directly obtainable from the fairness 
opinions are considered. Future research should concentrate on any of the different 
fields offered in M&A research to find additional, significant variables. 
Further research should also expand the geographical region. The research at 
hand has sorely focused on US mergers and acquisitions, but especially the Swiss 
market offers great potential for further research. Swiss companies are obliged to 
publish fairness opinions as well as US American companies are compelled to do. 
Testing the results of this research on the Swiss market does not only add a new 
country to the discussion, but also a new continent with financial markets that are 
not fully comparable to the US markets. The data set in this dissertation does also 
not incorporate cross-border mergers. Including this element might provide 
additional and new insights as well. 
Secondly, a test on the significance of other variables related to M&A research 
seems to be promising. Weber et al. (2014) show that different focus points in M&A 
like financial data, negotiation and due diligence, just to mention a few, offer 
further variables to be researched. The theoretical discussion has highlighted one 
specific variable that might be of interest, relative size of the target. But also the 
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discussion on the different strategies to acquire a target by obtaining a toehold has 
illustrated the ongoing discussion in recent M&A research on the importance of 
blockholders and their level of activism. Therefore, blockholdership as a variable 
might deliver further, significant results (Gaughan, 2011, Ireland et al., 2009). In the 
last years stock market performance of companies engaged in M&A activities has 
also introduced the concept of debt levels of the engaged companies. Results 
suggest that the level of debt has an influence on the performance due to tax 
advantages and, consequently, debt levels might also affect the precision of fairness 
opinions (Trinchera, 2012). 
While discussing the fundamentals on fairness opinions, different areas of 
usage are identified, although fairness opinions are mostly used in M&A 
transactions. However, testing the significant variables on the other objectives, 
where FOs are used, can confirm the findings of this research. 
Furthermore, the unpublished Factoral Memorandum can be researched, if 
the focus is placed on litigation. This would allow testing whether the normally 
unpublished Factoral Memorandum contains additional information that have an 
influence on the precision and should, consequently, always be published. 
Lastly, the DCF valuation model has shown that it is negatively biased by a 
previous relation of the investment bank to the requester of the fairness opinion. 
As in many fairness opinions the DCF valuation is the only valuation model that 
comes to a valuation range, promising results can be expected from a data set only 
containing these deals. 
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APPENDIX 1: UNIVARIATE TEST RESULTS 
Results for range, entire data set: 
independent variable: Bank       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.1122 0.092   
Yes: -0.0858 0.248   
Combined K-S: 0.1122 0.184 0.153 
n=388 
   
    
independent variable: Size       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Large: 0.2517 0.000   
Small: -0.0176 0.958   
Combined K-S: 0.2517 0.000 0.000 
n=357 
   
    
independent variable: Cash       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Cash: 0.2154 0.003   
Stock: -0.0560 0.680   
Combined K-S: 0.2154 0.007 0.004 
n=362 
   
    
independent variable: Reputation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Top Tier: 0.2289 0.000   
not Top Tier: -0.0177 0.943   
Combined K-S: 0.2289 0.000 0.000 
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independent variable: No. of fairness opinion     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.1831 0.018   
Single: -0.0316 0.887   
Combined K-S: 0.1831 0.036 0.025 
n=388    
    
independent variable: Previous relation     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0167 0.948   
Yes: -0.0912 0.203   
Combined K-S: 0.0912 0.403 0.357 
n=388    
    
independent variable: Number of valuations     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.1627 0.011   
Single: -0.0613 0.530   
Combined K-S: 0.1627 0.023 0.016 
n=388    
    
independent variable: Who acquirer       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Acquirer: 0.0762 0.323   
Target: -0.0216 0.913   
Combined K-S: 0.0762 0.625 0.578 
n=388    
    
independent variable: year       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
after FINRA rule 2290 0.0700 0.386   
before FINRA rule 2290 -0.0870 0.230   
Combined K-S: 0.0870 0.455 0.407 
n=388 
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Results for range, target data set: 
independent variable: Bank       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.1409 0.145   
Yes: -0.1138 0.283   
Combined K-S: 0.1409 0.289 0.235 
n=200    
    
independent variable: Size       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Large: 0.2227 0.029   
Small: -0.0114 0.991   
Combined K-S: 0.2227 0.058 0.040 
n=182 
   
    
independent variable: Cash       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Cash: 0.2133 0.051   
Stock: -0.0268 0.954   
Combined K-S: 0.2133 0.101 0.03 
n=186 
   
    
independent variable: Reputation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Top Tier: 0.2069 0.015   
not Top Tier: -0.0245 0.942   
Combined K-S: 0.2069 0.029 0.020 
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independent variable: No. of fairness opinion     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.1512 0.251   
Single: -0.0909 0.607   
Combined K-S: 0.1512 0.494 0.413 
n=200    
    
independent variable: Previous relation     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0509 0.778   
Yes: -0.0708 0.615   
Combined K-S: 0.0708 0.968 0.954 
n=200    
    
independent variable: Number of valuations     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.1451 0.152   
Single: -0.0672 0.667   
Combined K-S: 0.1451 0.303 0.246 
n=200    
    
independent variable: year       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
after FINRA rule 2290 0.0663 0.642   
before FINRA rule 2290 -0.0908 0.436   
Combined K-S: 0.0908 0.801 0.753 
n=200 
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Results for range, acquirer data set: 
independent variable: Bank       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0931 0.451   
Yes: -0.1102 0.328   
Combined K-S: 0.1102 0.632 0.568 
n=188 
   
 
   
independent variable: Size       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Large: 0.3308 0.001   
Small: -0.0490 0.854   
Combined K-S: 0.3308 0.001 0.001 
n=175 
   
 
   
independent variable: Cash       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Cash: 0.2333 0.044   
Stock: -0.1302 0.379   
Combined K-S: 0.2333 0.088 0 
n=176 
   
 
   
independent variable: Reputation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Top Tier: 0.2542 0.003   
not Top Tier: -0.0141 0.982   
Combined K-S: 0.2542 0.006 0.004 
n=188 
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independent variable: No. of fairness opinion       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.2209 0.055   
Single: -0.0331 0.937   
Combined K-S: 0.2209 0.110 0.076 
n=188    
 
   
independent variable: Previous relation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0273 0.933   
Yes: -0.1423 0.150   
Combined K-S: 0.1423 0.300 0.245 
n=188 
   
 
   
independent variable: Number of valuations       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.2232 0.019   
Single: -0.0983 0.464   
Combined K-S: 0.2232 0.038 0.025 
n=188 
   
 
   
independent variable: year       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
after FINRA rule 2290 0.1168 0.279   
before FINRA rule 2290 -0.0550 0.753   
Combined K-S: 0.1168 0.545 0.480 
n=188    
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Results for accuracy, entire data set: 
independent variable: Bank       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0943 0.185   
Yes: -0.0066 0.992   
Combined K-S: 0.0943 0.367 0.339 
n=390    
 
   
independent variable: Size       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Large: 0.2565 0.000   
Small: 0.0000 1.000   
Combined K-S: 0.2565 0.000 0 
n=367    
 
   
independent variable: Cash       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Cash: 0.0656 0.486   
Stock: -0.0827 0.319   
Combined K-S: 0.0827 0.617 0.578 
n=366 
   
 
   
independent variable: Reputation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Top Tier: 0.0098 0.982   
not Top Tier: -0.1498 0.015   
Combined K-S: 0.1498 0.029 0.026 
n=390 
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independent variable: No. of fairness opinion       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.0076 0.993   
Single: -0.1822 0.018   
Combined K-S: 0.1822 0.036 0.031 
n=390 
   
 
   
independent variable: Previous relation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0197 0.928   
Yes: -0.0956 0.172   
Combined K-S: 0.0956 0.342 0.315 
n=390    
 
   
independent variable: Number of valuations       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.000 1.000   
Single: -0.274 0.000   
Combined K-S: 0.274 0.000 0.000 
n=390    
 
   
independent variable: FINRA       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
after FINRA rule 2290 0.0929 0.201   
before FINRA rule 2290 -0.0377 0.767   
Combined K-S: 0.0929 0.398 0.370 
n=390    
    
independent variable: Acquirer       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Target 0.0703 0.382   
Acquirer -0.1486 0.014   
Combined K-S: 0.1486 0.027 0.02 
n=390    
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Results for accuracy, target data set: 
independent variable: Bank       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.1790 0.043   
Yes: -0.0167 0.973   
Combined K-S: 0.1790 0.086 0.074 
n=202    
 
   
independent variable: Size       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Large: 0.3085 0.019   
Small: -0.0211 0.981   
Combined K-S: 0.3085 0.037 0.028 
n=194 
   
 
   
independent variable: Cash       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Cash: 0.0613 0.722   
Stock: -0.2027 0.028   
Combined K-S: 0.2027 0.057 0.048 
n=190 
   
 
   
independent variable: Reputation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
not Top Tier: 0.0085 0.993   
Top-Tier: -0.1617 0.076   
Combined K-S: 0.1617 0.152 0.134 
n=202    
 
   
independent variable: No. of fairness opinion       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Single: 0.0551 0.82   
Multiple: -0.2125 0.052   
Combined K-S: 0.2125 0.104 0.088 
n=202    
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independent variable: Previous relation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0242 0.945   
Yes: -0.1299 0.196   
Combined K-S: 0.1299 0.389 0.349 
n=202    
 
   
independent variable: Number of valuations       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Single: 0.007 0.995   
Multiple: -0.254 0.003   
Combined K-S: 0.254 0.006 0.004 
n=202    
 
   
independent variable: FINRA       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
after FINRA rule 2290 0.1365 0.168   
before FINRA rule 2290 -0.0926 0.440   
Combined K-S: 0.1365 0.334 0.300 
n=202    
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Results for accuracy, acquirer data set: 
independent variable: Bank       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0567 0.744   
Yes: -0.0897 0.477   
Combined K-S: 0.0897 0.853 0.809 
n=188 
   
 
   
independent variable: Size       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Large: 0.2614 0.015   
Small: -0.022 0.971   
Combined K-S: 0.2614 0.030 0.024 
n=173 
   
 
   
independent variable: Cash       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Cash: 0.1496 0.167   
Stock: -0.011 0.99   
Combined K-S: 0.1496 0.332 0.293 
n=176 
   
 
   
independent variable: Reputation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
not Top Tier: 0.0237 0.951   
Top-Tier: -0.2093 0.020   
Combined K-S: 0.2093 0.039 0.033 
n=188    
 
   
independent variable: No. of fairness opinion       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Single: 0.013 0.991   
Multiple: -0.2089 0.088   
Combined K-S: 0.2089 0.176 0.149 
n=188    
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independent variable: Previous relation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0724 0.611   
Yes: -0.1257 0.226   
Combined K-S: 0.1257 0.447 0.395 
n=188    
 
   
independent variable: Number of valuations       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Single: 0.000 1.000   
Multiple: -0.318 0.000   
Combined K-S: 0.318 0.001 0.000 
n=188    
 
   
independent variable: FINRA       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
after FINRA rule 2290 0.1626 0.092   
before FINRA rule 2290 -0.0401 0.865   
Combined K-S: 0.1626 0.184 0.158 
n=188    
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Results for under-/overvaluation, entire data set: 
independent variable: Bank       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0044 0.996   
Yes: -0.1677 0.005   
Combined K-S: 0.1677 0.009 0.007 
n=390    
    
independent variable: Size       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Large: 0.1268 0.108   
Small: -0.1791 0.012   
Combined K-S: 0.1791 0.024 0.017 
n=367 
   
    
independent variable: Cash       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Cash: 0.2120 0.004   
Stock: -0.0304 0.891   
Combined K-S: 0.2120 0.007 0.005 
n=366 
   
    
independent variable: Reputation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Not Top Tier: 0.1045 0.126   
Top Tier: -0.0672 0.425   
Combined K-S: 0.1045 0.252 0.214 
n=390 
   
    
independent variable: No. of fairness opinion     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.8620 0.406   
Single: -0.1289 0.133   
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Combined K-S: 0.1289 0.266 0.218 
n=390    
    
independent variable: Previous relation     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0544 0.574   
Yes: -0.0152 0.013   
Combined K-S: 0.1516 0.027 0.020 
n=390 
   
    
independent variable: Number of valuations     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.0913 0.236   
Single: -0.1918 0.002   
Combined K-S: 0.1918 0.003 0.002 
n=390    
    
independent variable: Acquirer       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Target: 0.4288 0.000   
Acquirer 0.0000 1,000   
Combined K-S: 0.4288 0.000 0.000 
n=390 
   
    
independent variable: FINRA       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
after FINRA rule 2290 0.0431 0.697   
before FINRA rule 2290 -0.1693 0.004   
Combined K-S: 0.1693 0.008 0.005 
n=390 
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Results for under-/overvaluation, target data set: 
independent variable: Bank       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0085 0.993   
Yes: -0.2651 0.001   
Combined K-S: 0.2651 0.002 0.001 
n=202    
    
independent variable: Size       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Large: 0.0685 0.714   
Small: -0.2425 0.015   
Combined K-S: 0.2425 0.030 0.019 
n=194 
   
    
independent variable: Cash       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Cash: 0.3017 0.002   
Stock: -0.0439 0.880   
Combined K-S: 0.3017 0.005 0.003 
n=190 
   
    
independent variable: Reputation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Not Top Tier: 0.1688 0.060   
Top Tier: -0.0476 0.800   
Combined K-S: 0.1688 0.120 0.090 
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independent variable: No. of fairness opinion     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.0802 0.464   
Single: -0.1682 0.157   
Combined K-S: 0.1682 0.313 0.247 
n=202    
    
independent variable: Previous relation     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0704 0.634   
Yes: -0.1347 0.189   
Combined K-S: 0.1347 0.375 0.313 
n=202    
    
independent variable: Number of valuations     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.0496 0.799   
Single: -0.2271 0.009   
Combined K-S: 0.2271 0.018 0.012 
n=202    
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Results for under-/overvaluation, acquirer data set: 
independent variable: Bank       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Yes: 0.1146 0.298   
No: -0.0048 0.998   
Combined K-S: 0.1146 0.580 0.514 
n=188    
 
   
independent variable: Size       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Large: 0.2343 0.026   
Small: -0.1098 0.449   
Combined K-S: 0.2343 0.052 0.035 
n=173 
   
 
   
independent variable: Cash       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Cash: 0.2307 0.044   
Stock: -0.0230 0.970   
Combined K-S: 0.2307 0.089 0.060 
n=176 
   
 
   
independent variable: Reputation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Not Top Tier: 0.0789 0.569   
Top Tier: -0.1277 0.229   
Combined K-S: 0.1277 0.452 0.386 
n=188 
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independent variable: No. of fairness opinion     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.1209 0.443   
Single: -0.1355 0.359   
Combined K-S: 0.1355 0.685 0.607 
n=188    
 
   
independent variable: Previous relation     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.0689 0.639   
Yes: -0.2073 0.017   
Combined K-S: 0.2073 0.034 0.024 
n=188    
 
   
independent variable: Number of valuations     
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Multiple: 0.1671 0.102   
Single: -0.1589 0.126   
Combined K-S: 0.1671 0.203 0.157 
n=188    
    
independent variable: FINRA       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
after FINRA rule 2290 0.0256 0.941   
before FINRA rule 2290 -0.1946 0.029   
Combined K-S: 0.1946 0.059 0.042 
n=188    
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Results for valuation models on range: 
independent variable: EM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.042 0.718   
Yes: -0.183 0.002   
Combined K-S: 0.183 0.004 0.003 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.053 0.581   
Yes: -0.067 0.420   
Combined K-S: 0.067 0.778 0.740 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: DCF entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.066 0.606   
Yes: -0.066 0.599   
Combined K-S: 0.066 0.960 0.945 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.049 0.798   
Yes: -0.184 0.040   
Combined K-S: 0.184 0.080 0.058 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.095 0.409   
Yes: -0.035 0.886   
Combined K-S: 0.095 0.762 0.710 
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independent variable: DCF target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.182 0.148   
Yes: -0.089 0.631   
Combined K-S: 0.182 0.295 0.227 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.065 0.675   
Yes: -0.227 0.008   
Combined K-S: 0.227 0.017 0.011 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.109 0.329   
Yes: -0.147 0.132   
Combined K-S: 0.147 0.263 0.212 
 
   
    
independent variable: DCF acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.100 0.562   
Yes: -0.122 0.421   
Combined K-S: 0.122 0.780 0.714 
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Results for valuation models on accuracy: 
independent variable: EM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.000 1.000   
Yes: -0.186 0.001   
Combined K-S: 0.186 0.003 0.002 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.023 0.900   
Yes: -0.167 0.004   
Combined K-S: 0.167 0.009 0.006 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: DCF entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.131 0.116   
Yes: -0.019 0.955   
Combined K-S: 0.131 0.231 0.188 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.008 0.994   
Yes: -0.241 0.004   
Combined K-S: 0.241 0.007 0.005 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.000 1.000   
Yes: -0.236 0.004   
Combined K-S: 0.236 0.008 0.005 
 
   
 
   
Tobias Lippe    282 
independent variable: DCF target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.145 0.271   
Yes: -0.048 0.867   
Combined K-S: 0.145 0.532 0.451 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.015 0.979   
Yes: -0.171 0.067   
Combined K-S: 0.171 0.133 0.101 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.081 0.543   
Yes: -0.162 0.085   
Combined K-S: 0.162 0.169 0.131 
 
   
    
independent variable: DCF acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.156 0.216   
Yes: -0.027 0.955   
Combined K-S: 0.156 0.427 0.350 
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Results for valuation models on under-/overvaluation: 
independent variable: EM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.124 0.054   
Yes: -0.080 0.299   
Combined K-S: 0.124 0.109 0.088 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.141 0.021   
Yes: -0.062 0.477   
Combined K-S: 0.141 0.041 0.032 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: DCF entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.077 0.478   
Yes: -0.074 0.508   
Combined K-S: 0.077 0.854 0.817 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.219 0.010   
Yes: -0.042 0.842   
Combined K-S: 0.219 0.019 0.013 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.195 0.022   
Yes: -0.053 0.753   
Combined K-S: 0.195 0.045 0.031 
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independent variable: DCF target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.065 0.774   
Yes: -0.149 0.255   
Combined K-S: 0.149 0.501 0.420 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.065 0.675   
Yes: -0.115 0.290   
Combined K-S: 0.115 0.566 0.501 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.072 0.614   
Yes: -0.154 0.106   
Combined K-S: 0.154 0.212 0.168 
 
   
    
independent variable: DCF acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.131 0.339   
Yes: -0.051 0.851   
Combined K-S: 0.131 0.651 0.575 
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Results for valuation models range: 
independent variable: EM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.042 0.718   
Yes: -0.183 0.002   
Combined K-S: 0.183 0.004 0.003 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.053 0.581   
Yes: -0.067 0.420   
Combined K-S: 0.067 0.778 0.740 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: DCF entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.066 0.606   
Yes: -0.066 0.599   
Combined K-S: 0.066 0.960 0.945 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.049 0.798   
Yes: -0.184 0.040   
Combined K-S: 0.184 0.080 0.058 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.095 0.409   
Yes: -0.035 0.886   
Combined K-S: 0.095 0.762 0.710 
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independent variable: DCF target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.182 0.148   
Yes: -0.089 0.631   
Combined K-S: 0.182 0.295 0.227 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.065 0.675   
Yes: -0.227 0.008   
Combined K-S: 0.227 0.017 0.011 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.109 0.329   
Yes: -0.147 0.132   
Combined K-S: 0.147 0.263 0.212 
 
   
    
independent variable: DCF acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.100 0.562   
Yes: -0.122 0.421   
Combined K-S: 0.122 0.780 0.714 
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Results for valuation models accuracy: 
independent variable: EM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.000 1.000   
Yes: -0.186 0.001   
Combined K-S: 0.186 0.003 0.002 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.023 0.900   
Yes: -0.167 0.004   
Combined K-S: 0.167 0.009 0.006 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: DCF entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.131 0.116   
Yes: -0.019 0.955   
Combined K-S: 0.131 0.231 0.188 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.008 0.994   
Yes: -0.241 0.004   
Combined K-S: 0.241 0.007 0.005 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.000 1.000   
Yes: -0.236 0.004   
Combined K-S: 0.236 0.008 0.005 
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independent variable: DCF target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.145 0.271   
Yes: -0.048 0.867   
Combined K-S: 0.145 0.532 0.451 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.015 0.979   
Yes: -0.171 0.067   
Combined K-S: 0.171 0.133 0.101 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.081 0.543   
Yes: -0.162 0.085   
Combined K-S: 0.162 0.169 0.131 
 
   
    
independent variable: DCF acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.156 0.216   
Yes: -0.027 0.955   
Combined K-S: 0.156 0.427 0.350 
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Results for valuation models under-/overvaluation: 
independent variable: EM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.124 0.054   
Yes: -0.080 0.299   
Combined K-S: 0.124 0.109 0.088 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.141 0.021   
Yes: -0.062 0.477   
Combined K-S: 0.141 0.041 0.032 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: DCF entire data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.077 0.478   
Yes: -0.074 0.508   
Combined K-S: 0.077 0.854 0.817 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.219 0.010   
Yes: -0.042 0.842   
Combined K-S: 0.219 0.019 0.013 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.195 0.022   
Yes: -0.053 0.753   
Combined K-S: 0.195 0.045 0.031 
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independent variable: DCF target data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.065 0.774   
Yes: -0.149 0.255   
Combined K-S: 0.149 0.501 0.420 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: EM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.065 0.675   
Yes: -0.115 0.290   
Combined K-S: 0.115 0.566 0.501 
 
   
 
   
independent variable: TM acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.072 0.614   
Yes: -0.154 0.106   
Combined K-S: 0.154 0.212 0.168 
 
   
    
independent variable: DCF acquirer data set       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
No: 0.131 0.339   
Yes: -0.051 0.851   
Combined K-S: 0.131 0.651 0.575 
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Results for reputation: 
independent variable: size       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
Large: 0.000 1.000   
Small: -0.546 0.000   
Combined K-S: 0.546 0.000 0.000 
 
   
independent variable: No. of provider       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
0: 0.375 0.000   
1: 0.000 1.000   
Combined K-S: 0.375 0.000 0.000 
 
   
independent variable: No. of valuations       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
0: 0.305 0.000   
1: -0.047 0.690   
Combined K-S: 0.305 0.000 0.000 
 
Results for size: 
independent variable: reputation       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
High tier: 0.000 1.000   
Low tier: -0.519 0.000   
Combined K-S: 0.519 0.000 0.000 
 
   
independent variable: No. of provider       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
0: 0.538 0.000   
1: -0.006 0.995   
Combined K-S: 0.538 0.000 0.000 
 
   
independent variable: No. of valuations       
Smaller group D P-value Corrected 
0: 0.325 0.000   
1: -0.027 0.884   
Combined K-S: 0.325 0.000 0.000 
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APPENDIX 2: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR RANGE 
Entire data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 388      
F(  9,   377) 6.18      
Prob > F 0.000      
R-squared 0.1371      
Root MSE 0.12482      
       
Mean Coef. 
HC3 
Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquirer -0.00904 0.01280 -0.71 0.480 -0.03421 0.01612 
Bank -0.02722 0.01512 -1.80 0.073 -0.05696 0.00251 
FINRA 0.01598 0.01326 1.21 0.229 -0.01008 0.04204 
Size (ln) -0.01459 0.00469 -3.11 0.002 -0.02381 -0.00537 
Cash -0.05624 0.01563 -3.60 0.000 -0.08697 -0.02552 
Reputation -0.00053 0.00025 -2.10 0.037 -0.00103 -0.00003 
Number of FO -0.00092 0.01478 -0.06 0.950 -0.02998 0.02813 
Previous relation 0.02258 0.01452 1.56 0.121 -0.00597 0.05113 
Number of valuations -0.00798 0.00519 -1.54 0.125 -0.01818 0.00222 
Constant 0.46757 0.03166 14.77 0.000 0.40531 0.52982 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =   40.48 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
  




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 70.03 49 0.0259 
Skewness 10.77 9 0.2920 
Kurtosis 0.00 1 0.9628 
Total 80.80 59 0.0313 
 
VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.17 0.461243 
Reputation 1.89 0.527906 
Number of valuations 1.38 0.725023 
Bank 1.27 0.784538 
Number of FO 1.27 0.787888 
Previous relation 1.22 0.81724 
FINRA 1.04 0.960219 
Cash 1.03 0.968091 
Acquirer 1.01 0.990664 
Mean VIF | 1.37   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 374)  =      1.95 
Prob > F  =      0.1216 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 1.326 1 0.2495 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Target data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 200      
F(  9,   377) 4.12      
Prob > F 0.0001      
R-squared 0.1500      
Root MSE 0.12142      
       
Mean Coef. 
HC3 Std. 
Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.02188 0.02227 -0.98 0.327 -0.06582 0.02205 
FINRA 0.01631 0.01771 0.92 0.358 -0.01862 0.05124 
Size (ln) -0.01963 0.00678 -2.90 0.004 -0.03301 -0.00626 
Cash -0.04523 0.02332 -1.94 0.049 -0.09124 0.00077 
Reputation -0.00033 0.00034 -0.98 0.328 -0.00100 0.00034 
Number of FO 0.01130 0.02036 0.56 0.579 -0.02886 0.05147 
Previous relation 0.03984 0.01952 2.04 0.043 0.00133 0.07835 
Number of valuations -0.01288 0.00666 -1.93 0.055 -0.02602 0.00027 
Constant 0.48438 0.04699 10.31 0.000 0.39169 0.57707 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =    19.92 





   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 54.58 40 0.0620 
Skewness 6.15 8 0.6310 
Kurtosis 1.92 1 0.1663 
Total 62.64 49 0.0912 
 
  




Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.35 0.424841 
Reputation 2.17 0.460653 
Number of valuations 1.38 0.727227 
Bank 1.33 0.751498 
Number of FO 1.29 0.776892 
Previous relation 1.28 0.782414 
FINRA 1.02 0.983194 
Cash 1.07 0.938151 
      
Mean VIF 1.48   
 
Ramsey RESET-Test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 187)  =      0.14 
Prob > F  =      0.9354 
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Acquirer data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 188      
F(  9,   377) 3.65      
Prob > F 0.0006      
R-squared 0.1380      
Root MSE 0.12424      
       
Mean Coef. 
HC3 Std. 
Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.02804 0.02092 -1.34 0.182 -0.06932 0.01325 
FINRA 0.00086 0.02023 0.04 0.966 -0.03907 0.04079 
Size (ln) -0.01051 0.00631 -1.67 0.097 -0.02296 0.01936 
Cash -0.06366 0.02179 -2.92 0.004 -0.10666 -0.02067 
Reputation -0.00067 0.00034 -1.98 0.049 -0.00134 -1.00000 
Number of FO -0.00078 0.02217 -0.04 0.972 -0.04452 0.04297 
Previous relation 0.00269 0.02091 0.13 0.898 -0.03857 0.04395 
Number of valuations -0.00446 0.00831 -0.54 0.592 -0.02086 0.01193 
Constant 0.44700 0.04156 10.76 0.000 0.36499 0.52901 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
 chi2(1)          =    17.05 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 47.91 40 0.1826 
Skewness 13 8 0.1119 
Kurtosis 0.32 1 0.5695 
Total 61.23 49 0.1128 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.05 0.48811 
Reputation 1.74 0.57620 
Number of valuations 1.47 0.68258 
Bank 1.25 0.80136 
Number of FO 1.28 0.77832 
Previous relation 1.20 0.83506 
FINRA 1.13 0.88201 
Cash 1.02 0.97970 
      
Mean VIF 1.39   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 174)   =      1.98 
Prob > F   =      0.1195 
 
Breusch-Godfrey 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
H0: no serial correlation 
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APPENDIX 3: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR ACCURACY 
Entire data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 390      
F(  9,   377) 6.03      
Prob > F 0.0000      
R-squared 0.1261      
Root MSE 0.16563      
       
Mean Coef. 
HC3 Std. 
Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquirer -0.01473 0.01708 -0.86 0.389 -0.04831 0.01884 
Bank -0.02565 0.02011 -1.28 0.203 -0.06520 0.01389 
FINRA 0.04155 0.01800 2.31 0.022 0.00615 0.07695 
Size (ln) -0.02125 0.00619 -3.43 0.001 -0.03344 -0.00907 
Cash -0.00074 0.02186 -0.03 0.973 -0.04373 0.04225 
Reputation -0.00011 0.00032 -0.35 0.723 -0.00073 0.00051 
Number of FO 0.00732 0.02192 0.33 0.739 -0.03578 0.05041 
Previous relation 0.02515 0.01861 1.35 0.177 -0.01145 0.06174 
Number of valuations -0.02823 0.00704 -4.01 0.000 -0.04208 -0.01438 
Constant 0.55236 0.04318 12.79 0.000 0.46746 0.63726 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)            =    14.00 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 78.41 49 0.0048 
Skewness 20.46 9 0.0153 
Kurtosis 1.05 1 0.3050 
Total 99.92 59 0.0007 
 




Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.18 0.45791 
Reputation 1.81 0.55328 
Number of valuations 1.34 0.74871 
Bank 1.29 0.77293 
Number of FO 1.28 0.74871 
Previous relation 1.19 0.84244 
FINRA 1.03 0.96646 
Cash 1.03 0.97333 
Acquirer 1.02 0.98442 
Mean VIF 1.35   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(12, 368)   =      1.61 




Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.684 1 0.4084 
H0: no serial correlation  
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Target data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 202      
F(  9,   377) 4.23      
Prob > F 0.0001      
R-squared 0.1452      
Root MSE 0.15055      
       
Mean Coef. 
HC3 Std. 
Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.00911 0.02703 -0.34 0.736 -0.06243 0.04420 
FINRA 0.03006 0.02306 1.30 0.194 -0.01542 0.07553 
Size (ln) 0.02047 0.00821 -2.49 0.013 -0.03666 -0.00429 
Cash 0.04052 0.02635 1.54 0.126 -0.01146 0.09250 
Reputation 0.00006 0.00041 -0.15 0.884 -0.00088 0.00075 
Number of FO 0.03186 0.02707 1.18 0.241 -0.02154 0.08526 
Previous relation 0.01613 0.02257 0.71 0.476 -0.02838 0.06064 
Number of valuations 0.03007 0.01009 -2.98 0.003 -0.04998 -0.01016 
Constant 0.53360 0.05575 9.57 0.000 0.42364 0.64355 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =     4.69 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 50.47 40 0.1241 
Skewness 17.17 8 0.0284 
Kurtosis 0.10 1 0.7465 
Total 67.74 49 0.0392 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.36 0.42303 
Reputation 1.96 0.51098 
Number of valuations 1.36 0.73747 
Bank 1.35 0.74027 
Number of FO 1.30 0.76911 
Previous relation 1.25 0.79837 
FINRA 1.02 0.98261 
Cash 1.05 0.95493 
      
Mean VIF 1.46   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 190)    =      0.30 
Prob > F    =      0.8283 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.135 1 0.7134 
H0: no serial correlation   
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Acquirer data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 188      
F(  9,   377) 2.82      
Prob > F 0.0058      
R-squared 0.1405      
Root MSE 0.18054      
       
Mean Coef. 
HC3 Std. 
Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.05380 0.03226 -1.67 0.097 -0.11746 0.00986 
FINRA 0.05829 0.03124 1.87 0.064 -0.00337 0.11994 
Size (ln) -0.02247 0.00937 -2.40 0.018 -0.04096 -0.00397 
Cash -0.04141 0.03643 -1.14 0.257 -0.11329 0.03048 
Reputation -0.00007 0.00050 -0.13 0.894 -0.00106 0.00092 
Number of FO -0.02407 0.03817 -0.63 0.529 -0.09939 0.05124 
Previous relation 0.02690 0.02982 0.90 0.368 -0.03195 0.08575 
Number of valuations -0.02918 0.01058 -2.76 0.006 -0.05006 -0.00830 
Constant 0.56724 0.06919 8.20 0.000 0.43070 0.70378 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =     6.64 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 61.53 40 0.0159 
Skewness 15.81 8 0.0451 
Kurtosis 0.24 1 0.6244 
Total 77.58 49 0.0057 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.04 0.49122 
Reputation 1.70 0.58990 
Number of valuations 1.37 0.73057 
Bank 1.26 0.79545 
Number of FO 1.30 0.76945 
Previous relation 1.13 0.88404 
FINRA 1.13 0.88594 
Cash 1.02 0.97774 
      
Mean VIF 1.37   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(12, 167)  =      0.98 
Prob > F    =      0.4723 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
H0: no serial correlation  
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Target data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 202      
F(  9,   377) 2.15      
Prob > F 0.0327      
R-squared 0.0820      
Root MSE 0.17754      
       
Mean Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.06689 0.02939 -2.28 0.024 -0.12486 -0.00892 
FINRA 0.01061 0.02591 0.41 0.683 -0.04050 0.06172 
Size (ln) 0.00586 0.00908 0.65 0.519 -0.01204 0.02377 
Cash -0.06857 0.03423 -2.00 0.047 -0.13608 -0.00107 
Reputation 0.00015 0.00044 0.34 0.734 -0.00071 0.00101 
Number of FO 0.00107 0.03049 0.04 0.972 -0.05906 0.06120 
Previous relation -0.02495 0.02861 -0.87 0.384 -0.08137 0.03147 
Number of valuations 0.00241 0.01081 0.22 0.824 -0.01890 0.02372 
Constant -0.08177 0.05711 -1.43 0.154 -0.19442 0.03087 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =     1.56 





   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 43.43 41 0.3684 
Skewness 4.58 8 0.8014 
Kurtosis 12.17 1 0.0005 
Total 60.18 50 0.1535 
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VIF   
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.21 0.45178 
Reputation 1.88 0.53318 
Number of valuations 1.34 0.74486 
Bank 1.34 0.74356 
Number of FO 1.34 0.78915 
Previous relation 1.25 0.79722 
FINRA 1.02 0.98031 
Cash 1.05 0.95642 
      
Mean VIF 1.42   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 190)  =      0.15  
Prob > F  =      0.9325 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.063 1 0.8011 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Acquirer data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 188      
F(  9,   377) 2.64      
Prob > F 0.0093      
R-squared 0.0851      
Root MSE 0.2042      
       
Mean Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.06227 0.03505 -1.78 0.077 -0.13144 0.00690 
FINRA 0.02941 0.03801 0.77 0.440 -0.04559 0.10441 
Size (ln) -0.02768 0.01024 -2.70 0.008 -0.04789 -0.00748 
Cash -0.08176 0.03775 -2.17 0.032 -0.15626 -0.00726 
Reputation 0.00104 0.00055 1.91 0.057 -0.00003 0.00212 
Number of FO 0.04361 0.04323 1.01 0.314 -0.04169 0.12890 
Previous relation -0.00426 0.03565 -0.12 0.905 -0.07462 0.06609 
Number of valuations -0.01767 0.01247 -1.42 0.158 -0.04227 0.00693 
Constant 0.22265 0.08484 2.62 0.009 0.05523 0.39007 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =    11.52 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 69.09 41 0.0039 
Skewness 13.05 8 0.1102 
Kurtosis 6.02 1 0.0142 
Total 88.16 50 0.0007 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.04 0.48931 
Reputation 1.69 0.59125 
Number of valuations 1.37 0.72764 
Bank 1.26 0.79511 
Number of FO 1.28 0.78041 
Previous relation 1.13 0.88263 
FINRA 1.12 0.89240 
Cash 1.02 0.97781 
      




Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 176)   =      1.87 
Prob > F   =      0.1356
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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APPENDIX 4: ROBUSTNESS TEST DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW 
Range entire data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 314      
F(  9,   377) 5.03      
Prob > F 0.0000      
R-squared 0.1206      
Root MSE 0.14182      
       
Mean Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquirer -0.01345 0.01622 -0.83 0.408 -0.04537 0.01847 
Bank -0.02380 0.01945 -1.22 0.222 -0.06208 0.01448 
FINRA 0.00417 0.01648 0.25 0.801 -0.02825 0.03659 
Size (ln) -0.01757 0.00575 -3.05 0.002 -0.02889 -0.00625 
Cash -0.08073 0.02100 -3.84 0.000 -0.12205 -0.03942 
Reputation -0.00022 0.00032 -0.69 0.491 -0.00085 0.00041 
Number of FO -0.02518 0.01762 -1.43 0.154 -0.05986 0.00950 
Previous relation 0.05584 0.01802 3.10 0.002 0.02037 0.09130 
Number of valuations -0.00408 0.00663 -0.62 0.539 -0.01711 0.00896 
Constant 0.47453 0.04050 11.72 0.000 0.39485 0.55421 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =    29.18 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 61.07 49 0.1155 
Skewness 26.73 9 0.0015 
Kurtosis 1.26 1 0.2614 
Total 89.06 59 0.0069 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.11 0.47449 
Reputation 1.86 0.53820 
Number of valuations 1.42 0.70657 
Bank 1.38 0.72379 
Number of FO 1.30 0.76701 
Previous relation 1.19 0.83785 
FINRA 1.07 0.93226 
Cash 1.04 0.96367 
Acquirer 1.01 0.98836 
Mean VIF 1.38   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 303) =      0.05 
Prob > F =      0.9834 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 1.206 1 0.2721 
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Target data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 164      
F(  9,   377) 2.64      
Prob > F 0.0097      
R-squared 0.1134      
Root MSE 0.13624      
       
DCF Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err. t P>|t| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
              
Bank -0.01510 0.02955 -0.51 0.610 -0.07348 0.04328 
FINRA -0.00771 0.02096 -0.37 0.714 -0.04912 0.03371 
Size (ln) -0.01725 0.00876 -1.97 0.051 -0.03456 0.00005 
Cash -0.05548 0.03029 -1.83 0.069 -0.11532 0.00435 
Reputation -0.00006 0.00043 -0.15 0.882 -0.00092 0.00079 
Number of FO -0.03101 0.02384 -1.30 0.195 -0.07810 0.01608 
Previous relation 0.07020 0.02527 2.78 0.006 0.02029 0.12011 
Number of valuations -0.00842 0.00877 -0.96 0.338 -0.02575 0.00890 
Constant 0.45983 0.06505 7.07 0.000 0.33133 0.58834 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =    11.53 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 48.2 40 0.1750 
Skewness 13.95 8 0.0832 
Kurtosis 0.00 1 0.9880 
Total 62.15 49 0.0983 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.23 0.44855 
Reputation 2.15 0.46433 
Number of valuations 1.42 0.70603 
Bank 1.54 0.64816 
Number of FO 1.30 0.76696 
Previous relation 1.27 0.78901 
FINRA 1.03 0.96775 
Cash 1.08 0.92703 
      
Mean VIF 1.5   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 152)   =      1.56 
Prob > F   =      0.195 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
  
Tobias Lippe    312 
Acquirer data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 150      
F(  9,   377) 3.59      
Prob > F 0.0008      
R-squared 0.1393      
Root MSE 0.1447      
       
DCF Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.02707 0.02749 -0.98 0.326 -0.08143 0.02728 
FINRA -0.00094 0.02810 -0.03 0.973 -0.05649 0.05461 
Size (ln) -0.01806 0.00773 -2.34 0.021 -0.03334 -0.00278 
Cash -0.10487 0.03044 -3.44 0.001 -0.16505 -0.04469 
Reputation -0.00031 0.00046 -0.68 0.498 -0.00121 0.00059 
Number of FO -0.00710 0.02701 -0.26 0.793 -0.06050 0.04630 
Previous relation 0.03436 0.02671 1.29 0.200 -0.01844 0.08716 
Number of valuations -0.00119 0.01101 -0.11 0.914 -0.02296 0.02058 
Constant 0.47727 0.05019 9.51 0.000 0.37806 0.57648 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =    14.65 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 35.47 40 0.6741 
Skewness 21.6 8 0.0057 
Kurtosis 1.14 1 0.2858 
Total 58.22 49 0.1724 
 
 




Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.05 0.48727 
Reputation 1.70 0.58721 
Number of valuations 1.35 0.64703 
Bank 1.29 0.77391 
Number of FO 1.35 0.74008 
Previous relation 1.17 0.85823 
FINRA 1.21 0.82339 
Cash 1.03 0.97091 
      
Mean VIF 1.42   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 136)  =      1.560 
Prob > F   =      0.195 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Accuracy entire data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 312      
F(  9,   377) 3.28      
Prob > F 0.0008      
R-squared 0.0832      
Root MSE 0.18284      
       
DCF Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquirer 0.00472 0.02155 0.22 0.827 -0.03769 0.04712 
Bank 0.01710 0.02612 -0.65 0.513 -0.06851 0.03430 
FINRA 0.04439 0.02262 1.96 0.051 -0.00011 0.08889 
Size (ln) 0.02162 0.00710 -3.04 0.003 -0.03560 -0.00764 
Cash 0.02845 0.02859 -1.00 0.320 -0.08471 0.02780 
Reputation 0.00007 0.00038 -0.19 0.847 -0.00081 0.00067 
Number of FO 0.00757 0.02819 0.27 0.788 -0.04790 0.06305 
Previous relation 0.01200 0.02364 0.51 0.612 -0.03451 0.05851 
Number of valuations 0.01711 0.00856 -2.00 0.047 -0.03394 -0.00027 
Constant 0.54750 0.05336 10.26 0.000 0.44250 0.65250 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =    3.74 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 72.83 50 0.0192 
Skewness 32.38 9 0.0002 
Kurtosis 0.47 1 0.4933 
Total 105.69 60 0.0002 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.08 0.48023 
Reputation 1.75 0.57123 
Number of valuations 1.38 0.72576 
Bank 1.41 0.70756 
Number of FO 1.29 0.77683 
Previous relation 1.16 0.85840 
FINRA 1.06 0.94005 
Cash 1.03 0.97434 
Acquirer 1.02 0.98425 
Mean VIF 1.35   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(13, 289)  =      1.03 
Prob > F     =      0.4180 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 1.523 1 0.2172 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Accuracy target data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 164      
F(  9,   377) 4.32      
Prob > F 0.0001      
R-squared 0.1505      
Root MSE 0.15767      
       
DCF Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.00034 0.03359 -0.01 0.992 -0.06668 0.06601 
FINRA 0.03950 0.02604 1.52 0.131 -0.01194 0.09093 
Size (ln) -0.02210 0.00781 -2.83 0.005 -0.03752 -0.00667 
Cash -0.04026 0.03345 -1.20 0.231 -0.10633 0.02581 
Reputation -0.00010 0.00049 -0.21 0.835 -0.00107 0.00087 
Number of FO 0.00703 0.03298 0.21 0.831 -0.05811 0.07218 
Previous relation -0.00256 0.02770 -0.09 0.926 -0.05727 0.05215 
Number of valuations -0.02114 0.01079 -1.96 0.052 -0.04246 0.00018 
Constant 0.56816 0.05981 9.50 0.000 0.45001 0.68630 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)           =     1.51 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 35.87 41 0.6978 
Skewness 12.53 8 0.1289 
Kurtosis 1.71 1 0.1914 
Total 50.11 50 0.4692 
 
VIF 
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Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.09 0.47952 
Reputation 1.82 0.54973 
Number of valuations 1.38 0.72357 
Bank 1.55 0.64341 
Number of FO 1.27 0.78746 
Previous relation 1.23 0.81223 
FINRA 1.05 0.95663 
Cash 1.06 0.94612 
      
Mean VIF 1.43   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 152)    =      0.21 
Prob > F     =      0.8883 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Accuracy acquirer data set: 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 148      
F(  9,   377) 0.92      
Prob > F 0.5058      
R-squared 0.0522      
Root MSE 0.21015      
       
DCF Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
              
Bank -0.03570 0.04301 -0.83 0.408 -0.12074 0.04933 
FINRA 0.05055 0.04587 1.10 0.272 -0.04015 0.14125 
Size (ln) -0.02147 0.01269 -1.69 0.093 -0.04657 0.00362 
Cash -0.01188 0.04789 -0.25 0.804 -0.10657 0.08282 
Reputation 0.00007 0.00063 0.10 0.918 -0.00118 0.00131 
Number of FO 0.00438 0.05581 0.08 0.938 -0.10597 0.11472 
Previous relation 0.02871 0.03931 0.73 0.466 -0.04902 0.10644 
Number of valuations -0.01393 0.01495 -0.93 0.353 -0.04349 0.01562 
Constant 0.53123 0.09538 5.57 0.000 0.34265 0.71982 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =     3.33 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 55.65 41 0.0631 
Skewness 26.51 8 0.0009 
Kurtosis 0.13 1 0.7225 
Total 82.29 50 0.0027 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.11 0.47307 
Reputation 1.72 0.58001 
Number of valuations 1.46 0.68448 
Bank 1.32 0.75885 
Number of FO 1.37 0.72945 
Previous relation 1.12 0.89538 
FINRA 1.21 0.82723 
Cash 1.03 0.97542 
      
Mean VIF 1.42   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 136)   =      0.69 
Prob > F    =      0.5567 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Range entire data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 223      
F(  9,   377) 2.22      
Prob > F 0.0220      
R-squared 0.1100      
Root MSE 0.15983      
       
Earnings Multiple Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquirer -0.00887 0.02223 -0.40 0.690 -0.05268 0.03493 
Bank -0.03168 0.02706 -1.17 0.243 -0.08501 0.02165 
FINRA 0.02323 0.02309 1.01 0.316 -0.02229 0.06874 
Size (ln) -0.02418 0.00880 -2.75 0.007 -0.04153 -0.00683 
Cash -0.05565 0.02854 -1.95 0.053 -0.11190 0.00061 
Reputation -0.00019 0.00040 -0.48 0.635 -0.00099 0.00060 
Number of FO 0.00976 0.02488 0.39 0.695 -0.03929 0.05881 
Previous relation -0.00510 0.02373 -0.21 0.830 -0.05188 0.04168 
Number of valuations 0.00872 0.00972 0.90 0.371 -0.01045 0.02788 
Constant 0.47240 0.05929 7.97 0.000 0.35554 0.58926 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =    29.45 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 76 49 0.0080 
Skewness 20.14 9 0.0170 
Kurtosis 0.02 1 0.8774 
Total 96.16 59 0.0016 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.06 0.48539 
Reputation 1.74 0.57361 
Number of valuations 1.22 0.82103 
Bank 1.04 0.96571 
Number of FO 1.22 0.81928 
Previous relation 1.36 0.73690 
FINRA 1.1 0.91083 
Cash 1.07 0.93363 
Acquirer 1.05 0.95557 
Mean VIF 1.32   
 
Ramsey RESET test  
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 211) =      0.50 
Prob > F =      0.6828  
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.001 1 0.9692 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Range target data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 121      
F(  9,   377) 1.06      
Prob > F 0.3977      
R-squared 0.0971      
Root MSE 0.15772      
       
Earnings Multiple Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
              
Bank |  -.0296473 0.03932 -0.75 0.452 -0.10756 0.04826 
FINRA |   .0314761 0.03297 0.95 0.342 -0.03385 0.09680 
Size (ln) |  -.0207744 0.01162 -1.79 0.076 -0.04380 0.00225 
Cash |  -.0491002 0.04525 -1.09 0.280 -0.13875 0.04055 
Reputation |  -.0003258 0.00049 -0.66 0.510 -0.00130 0.00065 
Number of FO |   .0485653 0.03600 1.35 0.180 -0.02276 0.11989 
Previous relation |   .0088155 0.02984 0.30 0.768 -0.05030 0.06793 
Number of valuations |   .0035016 0.01445 0.24 0.809 -0.02513 0.03213 
Constant |   .4499199 0.08220 5.47 0.000 0.28704 0.61279 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =    12.81 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 48.95 40 0.1567 
Skewness 11.56 8 0.1719 
Kurtosis 0.58 1 0.4473 
Total 61.09 49 0.1152 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.15 0.46608 
Reputation 1.91 0.52353 
Number of valuations 1.31 0.76284 
Bank 1.05 0.95380 
Number of FO 1.23 0.81349 
Previous relation 1.37 0.72956 
FINRA 1.08 0.92317 
Cash 1.12 0.88945 
      
Mean VIF 1.40   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 109)   =      0.67 
Prob > F    =      0.5746 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Range acquirer data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 102      
F(  9,   377) 1.59      
Prob > F 0.1382      
R-squared 0.1505      
Root MSE 0.16283      
       
Earnings Multiple Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
              
Bank -0.02933 0.03941 -0.74 0.459 -0.10760 0.04894 
FINRA 0.00396 0.03424 0.12 0.908 -0.06403 0.07195 
Size (ln) -0.02603 0.01538 -1.69 0.094 -0.05657 0.00452 
Cash -0.04626 0.03937 -1.17 0.243 -0.12445 0.03193 
Reputation -0.00031 0.00068 -0.45 0.655 -0.00166 0.00105 
Number of FO -0.02263 0.03798 -0.60 0.553 -0.09804 0.05279 
Previous relation -0.01694 0.04214 -0.40 0.689 -0.10062 0.06674 
Number of valuations 0.00976 0.01473 0.66 0.509 -0.01948 0.03900 
Constant 0.50220 0.09187 5.47 0.000 0.31976 0.68463 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =    23.19 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 58.79 40 0.0279 
Skewness 17.32 8 0.0269 
Kurtosis 1.33 1 0.2484 
Total 77.45 49 0.0059 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2 0.49936 
Reputation 1.63 0.61520 
Number of valuations 1.21 0.82854 
Bank 1.04 0.96295 
Number of FO 1.24 0.80450 
Previous relation 1.38 0.72723 
FINRA 1.17 0.85112 
Cash 1.05 0.95266 
      
Mean VIF 1.34   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 91)      =      1.26 
Prob > F     =      0.2920 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Accuracy entire data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 223      
F(  9,   377) 1.91      
Prob > F 0.0524      
R-squared 0.0773      
Root MSE 0.15807      
       
Earnings Multiple Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquirer -0.04006 0.02149 -1.86 0.064 -0.08241 0.00229 
Bank -0.02558 0.02527 -1.01 0.313 -0.07539 0.02423 
FINRA 0.03679 0.02318 1.59 0.114 -0.00891 0.08249 
Size (ln) 0.00284 0.00714 0.40 0.691 -0.01124 0.01693 
Cash 0.04188 0.03102 1.35 0.178 -0.01927 0.10302 
Reputation -0.00089 0.00038 -2.37 0.019 -0.00163 -0.00015 
Number of FO -0.00684 0.02220 -0.31 0.758 -0.05061 0.03692 
Previous relation 0.00094 0.02526 0.04 0.970 -0.04884 0.05073 
Number of valuations -0.00595 0.01214 -0.49 0.625 -0.02988 0.01798 
Constant 0.42478 0.05442 7.81 0.000 0.31751 0.53205 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =     6.10 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 43.47 50 0.7310 
Skewness 18.53 9 0.0295 
Kurtosis 3.47 1 0.0624 
Total 65.47 60 0.2927 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 1.94 0.51459 
Reputation 1.64 0.60883 
Number of valuations 1.17 0.85704 
Bank 1.04 0.96104 
Number of FO 1.19 0.83704 
Previous relation 1.27 0.78441 
FINRA 1.10 0.91224 
Cash 1.05 0.94852 
Acquirer 1.05 0.94971 
Mean VIF 1.27   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 210)    =      1.81 
Prob > F     =       0.1457 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Accuracy target data set 
 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 121      
F(  9,   377) 1.01      
Prob > F 0.4352      
R-squared 0.0671      
Root MSE 0.1653      
       
Earnings Multiple Coef. Std. Err.    t     P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.01000 0.03691 -0.27 0.787 -0.08313 0.06313 
FINRA 0.03055 0.03188 0.96 0.340 -0.03262 0.09373 
Size (ln) 0.00219 0.01022 0.21 0.831 -0.01806 0.02244 
Cash 0.02197 0.04521 0.49 0.628 -0.06760 0.11154 
Reputation -0.00114 0.00051 -2.25 0.026 -0.00214 -0.00014 
Number of FO 0.00842 0.03177 0.26 0.792 -0.05453 0.07136 
Previous relation 0.02953 0.03467 0.85 0.396 -0.03916 0.09822 
Number of valuations -0.00784 0.01576 -0.50 0.620 -0.03907 0.02340 
Constant 0.42270 0.06878 6.15 0.000 0.28642 0.55899 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)           =     0.91 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 32.64 41 0.8213 
Skewness 9.23 8 0.3230 
Kurtosis 2.14 1 0.1431 
Total 44.01 50 0.7112 
 
VIF 
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Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 1.89 0.52797 
Reputation 1.60 0.62375 
Number of valuations 1.25 0.80099 
Bank 1.05 0.95620 
Number of FO 1.17 0.85437 
Previous relation 1.30 0.76677 
FINRA 1.08 0.92182 
Cash 1.1 0.91110 
      
Mean VIF 1.31   
 
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 109)   =      1.71 
Prob > F    =      0.1688 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Accuracy acquirer data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 102      
F(  9,   377) 1.31      
Prob > F 0.2499      
R-squared 0.1010      
Root MSE 0.15274      
       
Earnings Multiple Coef. Std. Err.    t     P>|t| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
              
Bank -0.04948 0.03793 -1.30 0.195 -0.12480 0.02585 
FINRA 0.04878 0.03259 1.50 0.138 -0.01593 0.11349 
Size (ln) 0.00333 0.01144 0.29 0.772 -0.01939 0.02605 
Cash 0.06497 0.04264 1.52 0.131 -0.01970 0.14964 
Reputation -0.00061 0.00054 -1.12 0.267 -0.00169 0.00047 
Number of FO -0.02691 0.03326 -0.81 0.421 -0.09295 0.03913 
Previous relation -0.02990 0.03391 -0.88 0.380 -0.09725 0.03744 
Number of valuations -0.00499 0.01560 -0.32 0.750 -0.03596 0.02598 
Constant 0.39763 0.07384 5.39 0.000 0.25100 0.54426 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)           =     2.20 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 53.38 41 0.0932 
Skewness 12.27 8 0.1394 
Kurtosis 3.47 1 0.0625 
Total 69.12 50 0.0378 
 
VIF 
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Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.03 0.49338 
Reputation 1.72 0.58223 
Number of valuations 1.14 0.87601 
Bank 1.06 0.93973 
Number of FO 1.27 0.78843 
Previous relation 1.22 0.82103 
FINRA 1.16 0.86463 
Cash 1.04 0.95950 
      
Mean VIF 1.33   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 90)    =      0.54 
Prob > F   =      0.6533 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
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Range entire data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 184      
F(  9,   377) 3.44      
Prob > F 0.0006      
R-squared 0.1503      
Root MSE 0.15995      
       
Transaction Multiple Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Acquirer -0.01213 0.02415 -0.50 0.616 -0.05980 0.03553 
Bank -0.01089 0.02899 -0.38 0.708 -0.06810 0.04633 
FINRA 0.04613 0.03069 1.50 0.135 -0.01443 0.10669 
Size (ln) -0.01576 0.01056 -1.49 0.137 -0.03660 0.00508 
Cash -0.08328 0.02980 -2.79 0.006 -0.14209 -0.02446 
Reputation -0.00073 0.00048 -1.51 0.092 -0.00169 0.00022 
Number of FO 0.01242 0.02807 0.44 0.659 -0.04298 0.06782 
Previous relation -0.00248 0.02524 -0.10 0.922 -0.05230 0.04733 
Number of valuations 0.00116 0.01283 0.09 0.928 -0.02416 0.02648 
Constant 0.47452 0.06543 7.25 0.000 0.34538 0.60366 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)      =    17.13 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 54.62 49 0.2696 
Skewness 10.63 9 0.3017 
Kurtosis 0.12 1 0.7277 
Total 65.37 59 0.2651 
VIF 
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Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.46 0.40709 
Reputation 2.06 0.48551 
Number of valuations 1.45 0.68778 
Bank 1.16 0.86393 
Number of FO 1.31 0.76350 
Previous relation 1.43 0.70025 
FINRA 1.25 0.79896 
Cash 1.08 0.92213 
Acquirer 1.03 0.96933 
Mean VIF 1.47   
 
Ramsey RESET test  
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 171)   =      0.68 
Prob > F   =      0.5643 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.612 1 0.4339 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Range target data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 92      
F(  9,   377) 3.29      
Prob > F 0.0026      
R-squared 0.2300      
Root MSE 0.15335      
       
Transaction Multiple Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.01800 0.04563 -0.39 0.694 -0.10876 0.07275 
FINRA 0.09046 0.04091 2.21 0.030 0.00908 0.17183 
Size (ln) -0.03263 0.01384 -2.36 0.021 -0.06016 -0.00509 
Cash -0.07039 0.04825 -1.46 0.148 -0.16636 0.02558 
Reputation -0.00060 0.00076 -0.80 0.426 -0.00211 0.00090 
Number of FO 0.05359 0.03810 1.41 0.163 -0.02218 0.12937 
Previous relation 0.01474 0.03350 0.44 0.661 -0.05190 0.08138 
Number of valuations -0.00121 0.01822 -0.07 0.947 -0.03744 0.03503 
Constant 0.54998 0.08389 6.56 0.000 0.38312 0.71683 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)           =     4.99 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 36.29 40 0.6382 
Skewness 4.23 8 0.8359 
Kurtosis 0.03 1 0.8741 
Total 40.54 49 0.7998 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.52 0.39741 
Reputation 2.22 0.44956 
Number of valuations 1.5 0.66600 
Bank 1.3 0.76794 
Number of FO 1.40 0.71508 
Previous relation 1.43 0.70149 
FINRA 1.24 0.80933 
Cash 1.21 0.82531 
      
Mean VIF 1.60   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 80)    =      0.84 
Prob > F   =      0.4766 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Range acquirer data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 92      
F(  9,   377) 1.67      
Prob > F 0.1174      
R-squared 0.1253      
Root MSE 0.16437      
       
Transaction Multiple Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank -0.00688 0.03966 -0.17 0.863 -0.08577 0.07202 
FINRA -0.00471 0.04802 -0.10 0.922 -0.10024 0.09082 
Size (ln) 0.00340 0.01475 0.23 0.818 -0.02594 0.03274 
Cash -0.07622 0.03934 -1.94 0.056 -0.15448 0.00203 
Reputation -0.00127 0.00062 -2.06 0.043 -0.00250 -0.00004 
Number of FO -0.00488 0.04557 -0.11 0.915 -0.09553 0.08577 
Previous relation -0.01419 0.03854 -0.37 0.714 -0.09086 0.06248 
Number of valuations 0.00192 0.01980 0.10 0.923 -0.03747 0.04131 
Constant 0.38178 0.09326 4.09 0.000 0.19626 0.56731 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)      =     8.76 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 32.02 40 0.8116 
Skewness 14.08 8 0.0798 
Kurtosis 0.17 1 0.6821 
Total 46.26 49 0.5847 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.45 0.40883 
Reputation 2.03 0.49285 
Number of valuations 1.51 0.66381 
Bank 1.08 0.92627 
Number of FO 1.35 0.66381 
Previous relation 1.46 0.68671 
FINRA 1.36 0.73483 
Cash 1.05 0.95571 
      
Mean VIF 1.53   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 79)    =      1.11 
Prob > F   =      0.3497 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
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Accuracy entire data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 182      
F(  9,   377) 2.54      
Prob > F 0.0092      
R-squared 0.1207      
Root MSE 0.17365      
       
Transaction Multiple Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Acquirer 0.04565 0.02570 1.78 0.077 -0.00507 0.09638 
Bank -0.03372 0.03307 -1.02 0.309 -0.09899 0.03155 
FINRA 0.04825 0.03442 1.40 0.163 -0.01968 0.11618 
Size (ln) -0.01736 0.01091 -1.59 0.113 -0.03889 0.00417 
Cash -0.06096 0.03276 -1.86 0.065 -0.12562 0.00371 
Reputation -0.00037 0.00050 -0.73 0.464 -0.00136 0.00062 
Number of FO 0.06484 0.02956 2.19 0.030 0.00649 0.12319 
Previous relation 0.00118 0.02922 0.04 0.968 -0.05650 0.05887 
Number of valuations -0.00987 0.01446 -0.68 0.496 -0.03841 0.01867 
Constant 0.44453 0.06789 6.55 0.000 0.31052 0.57854 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)      =     1.91 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 59.34 50 0.1717 
Skewness 19.24 9 0.0232 
Kurtosis 3.89 1 0.0486 
Total 82.47 60 0.0288 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.23 0.44854 
Reputation 1.84 0.54281 
Number of valuations 1.37 0.73118 
Bank 1.17 0.85664 
Number of FO 1.24 0.73118 
Previous relation 1.32 0.75647 
FINRA 1.24 0.80405 
Cash 1.08 0.92573 
Acquirer 1.04 0.96101 
Mean VIF 1.39   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 169)    =      0.46 
Prob > F     =      0.7140 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.516 1 0.4725 
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Accuracy target data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 92      
F(  9,   377) 1.21      
Prob > F 0.3007      
R-squared 0.1020      
Root MSE 0.17628      
       
Transaction Multiple Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
              
Bank -0.06573 0.05004 -1.31 0.193 -0.16525 0.03380 
FINRA 0.00118 0.05207 0.02 0.982 -0.10238 0.10475 
Size (ln) -0.01906 0.01290 -1.48 0.143 -0.04472 0.00659 
Cash 0.00388 0.05522 0.07 0.944 -0.10595 0.11371 
Reputation -0.00031 0.00061 -0.50 0.616 -0.00151 0.00090 
Number of FO 0.08014 0.04178 1.92 0.059 -0.00296 0.16325 
Previous relation -0.02151 0.04137 -0.52 0.604 -0.10379 0.06077 
Number of valuations -0.01160 0.02206 -0.53 0.600 -0.05549 0.03228 
Constant 0.44909 0.08713 5.15 0.000 0.27579 0.62239 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =     3.90 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 48.19 41 0.2047 
Skewness 13.68 8 0.0905 
Kurtosis 1.79 1 0.1810 
Total 63.66 50 0.0928 
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VIF 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.21 0.45228 
Reputation 1.76 0.56844 
Number of valuations 1.50 0.66580 
Bank 1.30 0.76930 
Number of FO 1.29 0.77682 
Previous relation 1.46 0.68647 
FINRA 1.25 0.79698 
Cash 1.17 0.85314 
      
Mean VIF 1.49   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 80)    =      0.75 
Prob > F   =      0.5259 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.000 1 1.0000 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
  
Tobias Lippe    342 
Accuracy acquirer data set 
Linear regression 
Number of observations: 90      
F(  9,   377) 1.88      
Prob > F 0.0744      
R-squared 0.1692      
Root MSE 0.17338      
       
Transaction Multiple Coef. 
HCE3 Std. 
Err.    t     P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
              
Bank 0.00236 0.04848 0.05 0.961 -0.09410 0.09883 
FINRA 0.09234 0.05504 1.68 0.097 -0.01716 0.20185 
Size (ln) -0.01168 0.02268 -0.52 0.608 -0.05680 0.03344 
Cash -0.10977 0.04544 -2.42 0.018 -0.20017 -0.01936 
Reputation -0.00040 0.00098 -0.40 0.688 -0.00235 0.00156 
Number of FO 0.03650 0.05704 0.64 0.524 -0.07698 0.14998 
Previous relation 0.01657 0.04329 0.38 0.703 -0.06958 0.10271 
Number of valuations -0.02069 0.02088 -0.99 0.325 -0.06224 0.02086 
Constant 0.50468 0.10979 4.60 0.000 0.28623 0.72314 
 
Breusch-Pagan 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
chi2(1)          =     1.74 




   
Source chi² df p 
Heteroscedasticity 53.4 41 0.0928 
Skewness 9.24 8 0.3222 
Kurtosis 1.00 1 0.3174 
Total 63.65 50 0.0930 
 
VIF 
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Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Size (ln) 2.41 0.41415 
Reputation 2.03 0.49170 
Number of valuations 1.37 0.73250 
Bank 1.14 0.88015 
Number of FO 1.35 0.74032 
Previous relation 1.24 0.80519 
FINRA 1.34 0.74790 
Cash 1.06 0.94367 
      
Mean VIF 1.49   
 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 78)    =      1.64 
Prob > F  =      0.1867 
 
Breusch-Godfrey test 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation 
lags(p) chi² df Prob > chi² 
1 0.753 1 0.3855 
 
H0: no serial correlation 
 
